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Abstract	  
The	   ‘Africa	   Rising’	   narrative,	   which	   has	   gained	   popularity	   since	   the	   late	   2000s,	   refers	   to	   the	  
considerable	  economic	  and	  social	  gains	  that	  have	  been	  made	  across	  the	  continent	  since	  the	  start	  of	  
the	  new	  millennium.	  	  Heralded	  as	  more	  than	  just	  GDP	  growth	  and	  poverty	  reduction,	  supporters	  of	  
the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative	  also	  make	  reference	  to	  structural	  change,	  macroeconomic	  improvements	  
and	  a	   growing	  middle	   class	   among	   sub-­‐Saharan	  African	   countries.	   	  However,	   there	  are	  many	  who	  
dispute	   these	   claims,	   arguing	   instead	   that	   recent	   economic	   growth	   has	   not	   been	   inclusive	   and	  
sustainable,	  and	  many	  challenges	  still	  exist.	  	  This	  dissertation	  takes	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Ghana	  as	  a	  lens	  
through	   which	   to	   explore	   the	   arguments	   in	   more	   detail	   and	   determine	   whether	   robust,	   reliable	  
evidence	  exists	  to	  support	  the	  claims	  that	  Ghana	  is	  ‘rising’,	  both	  economically	  and	  socially.	  	  Using	  the	  
headings	  of	  poverty,	  economic	  growth,	  and	  employment	  and	  equality,	  socioeconomic	  data	  collected	  
from	  Ghana	  from	  the	  year	  2000	  onwards	  was	  analysed	  to	  assess	  the	  evidence	  behind	  the	  claims	  and	  
counter-­‐claims	  made.	  
Despite	  significant	  data	  limitations,	  the	  findings	  present	  a	  mixed	  picture	  of	  Ghana’s	  recent	  economic	  
growth	   and	   development,	  with	   substantial	   progress	  made	   in	   poverty	   reduction,	   economic	   growth	  
and	   income	   per	   capita,	   but	   considerable	   challenges	   remaining	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   current	  
macroeconomic	   crisis,	   high	   youth	   unemployment	   and	   rising	   income	   inequality.	   	   Ghana’s	   current	  
development	   pathway,	   based	   primarily	   on	   commodities	   and	   oil	   revenues,	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  
unsustainable	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  and	  the	  slow	  rate	  of	  structural	  change,	  especially	  in	  manufacturing,	  
means	  that	  growth	  so	  far	  has	  not	  been	  sufficiently	   inclusive	  or	  equitable	  to	  benefit	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	  population.	  	  Within	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative,	  the	  study	  also	  brought	  to	  
light	   two	   important	   considerations:	   firstly,	   that	   significant	   data	   limitations	   exist	   within	   national	  
statistics,	   making	   it	   necessary	   for	   claims	   to	   be	   investigated	   thoroughly;	   and	   secondly,	   that	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   examine	   the	   case	   of	   individual	   countries	   such	   as	   Ghana	   before	   painting	   a	   whole	  
continent	  with	  the	  same	  brush.	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1	  
Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
1.1	  Research	  Context	  
Since	   the	   start	   of	   the	   new	   millennium,	   the	   global	   economic,	   political	   and	   social	   landscape	   has	  
changed	  dramatically,	  most	  especially	  on	  the	  continent	  of	  Africa,	  which	  has	  experienced	  significant	  
economic	  growth,	  as	  well	  as	  fundamental	  shifts	   in	   living	  standards	  and	  in	  the	  health	  and	  wealth	  of	  
populations.	   	  Consequently,	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  about	  the	  continent	  has	  transformed	  from	  one	  
of	   ‘afro-­‐pessimism’	   to	   ‘afro-­‐optimism’,	   expressed	   by	   economists,	   politicians,	   journalists,	   investors	  
and	  civil	  society	  alike.	  	  Many	  believe	  that	  Africa	  is	  entering	  a	  new	  era	  of	  prosperity	  and	  development,	  
defined	   by	   rapid	   growth	   in	   Gross	   Domestic	   Product	   (GDP),	   urbanisation	   and	   technological	  
advancement,	   otherwise	   known	   as	   the	   ‘African	   growth	   miracle’,	   ‘Africa’s	   take-­‐off’	   or,	   most	  
commonly,	  ‘Africa	  Rising’.	  
This	  study	  will	   focus	  on	  Ghana,	  often	  regarded	  as	  the	   ‘poster	  child’	   for	   the	   ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative
(Rexer,	  2015),	  due	  to	  its	  historical	  legacy	  as	  the	  first	  African	  country	  to	  achieve	  independence	  in	  1957	  
and	   its	  subsequent	  success	   in	  enacting	  political	  and	  economic	  reform	  (BBC,	  2015).	   	   In	  2006,	  Ghana	  
became	  the	   first	  African	  country	   to	  meet	   the	   first	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal	   (MDG)	  of	  halving	  
extreme	  poverty	  and	  hunger	  (Republic	  of	  Ghana,	  2010)	  and	  in	  2011,	  the	  country’s	  economic	  status	  
was	   reclassified	  by	   the	  World	  Bank	   from	   low-­‐	   to	   low-­‐middle	   income	   following	   a	   reclassification	  of	  
GDP.	  	  Yet	  despite	  this	  positive	  outlook,	  challenges	  remain.	  	  After	  experiencing	  the	  fastest	  economic	  
growth	   in	   Africa	   in	   2011,	   recent	   GDP	   growth	   has	   slowed,	   causing	  many	   to	   call	   into	   question	   the	  
sustainability	  of	  this	  recent	  economic	  growth	  and	  look	  in	  more	  depth	  at	  the	  drivers	  behind	  it	  (ISSER,	  
2015).	  	  	  
This	  dissertation	  will	  use	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Ghana	  as	  a	  lens	  to	  explore	  the	  evidence	  behind	  the	  ‘Africa	  
Rising’	  narrative.	  	  Drawing	  on	  national	  statistics	  and	  institutional	  data	  since	  the	  year	  2000,	  a	  number	  
of	  economic	  and	  social	  indicators	  will	  be	  analysed	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  data	  from	  Ghana	  supports	  
the	  claims	  that	  the	  country,	  and	  continent	  more	  broadly,	  is	  ‘rising’.	  
1.2	  Research	  Aim	  and	  Objectives	  
The	  overall	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  claims	  that	  Ghana	  is	  ‘rising’	  through	  an	  analysis	  
of	  national	  socioeconomic	  data	  from	  the	  year	  2000	  to	  the	  present.	  	  The	  objectives	  are	  as	  follows:	  
1. Identify	  what	  claims	  are	  being	  made	   regarding	  Ghana’s	  economic	  and	  social	  development,
who	  is	  making	  them	  and	  what	  evidence	  they	  are	  based	  on.
2. Depending	  on	  whether	  adequate	  data	  can	  be	  collected,	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Ghana’s




1.3	  Justification	  for	  the	  Study	  
	  
This	   research	   will	   form	   part	   of	   the	   evidence	   base	   for	   the	   Mitigation	   Action	   Plans	   and	   Scenarios	  
(MAPS)	   programme	   under	   the	   Energy	   Research	   Centre	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Cape	   Town,	   which	  
supports	  developing	  countries	  with	  transitioning	  to	  carbon	  efficient	  and	  climate	  resilient	  economies.	  	  
After	  a	  successful	   roll-­‐out	  across	  Latin	  America,	  MAPS	   intends	  to	  expand	  –	   funding	  permitting	  –	  to	  
work	  with	  African	  governments,	  Ghana	  being	  one	  potential	  partner	  country.	  	  This	  research	  will	  thus	  
provide	   a	   critical	   inquiry	   into	   the	   assumptions	   that	   Africa	   is	   ‘rising’	   and	   that	   Ghana	   is	   one	   of	   the	  
countries	   spearheading	   this	   trend,	   to	  better	   inform	  the	  MAPS	  Africa	   research	  and	  decision-­‐making	  
processes.	  
When	   starting	   to	   research	   the	   ‘Africa	   Rising’	   phenomenon,	   it	   was	   apparent	   that	   relatively	   few	  
academic	  studies	  have	  been	  published	  directly	  on	   this	   theme,	  despite	   it	  being	   referred	   to	   in	  many	  
media	  reports,	  blogs	  and	  online	  articles,	  and	  the	  subject	  of	  some	  debate.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  signs	  
of	  a	  developing	  interest	  in	  research	  in	  this	  area,	  which	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  bring	  academic	  rigour	  to	  
the	  arguments	  made.	  	  In	  addition,	  many	  authors	  refer	  in	  a	  general	  way	  to	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  rarely	  
narrowing	  the	  analysis	  to	  individual	  countries.	  	  Therefore	  this	  dissertation	  aims	  to	  address	  this	  gap	  in	  
the	   literature	   by	   providing	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   Ghana’s	   socioeconomic	   development	   since	   the	  
year	  2000,	  situating	  it	  within	  the	  broader	  narrative	  of	  ‘Africa	  Rising’.	  	  
1.4	  Research	  Questions	  
	  
The	  following	  research	  questions	  have	  been	  identified	  to	  address	  the	  research	  aim	  and	  objectives:	  
1. What	  are	  the	  claims	  being	  made	  about	  ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  and	  who	  is	  making	  them?	  
	  
2. How	  accessible/reliable/accurate/complete	  is	  the	  evidence	  behind	  these	  claims,	  based	  on	  
the	  following	  definitions:	  
a. Accessibility	  –	  Is	  the	  data	  available	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  (i.e.	  online	  or	  printed)?	  
b. Reliability	  –	  Is	  the	  data	  consistent	  and	  verified	  by	  more	  than	  one	  source?	  	  
c. Accuracy	  –	  Is	  the	  data	  from	  an	  “official”	  source?	  i.e.	  from	  an	  agency	  that	  
publishes	  the	  methodologies	  used	  to	  collect	  and	  process	  the	  data?	  And	  has	  the	  
data	  been	  reviewed	  and	  used	  by	  reputable	  analysts?	  
d. Completeness	  –	  Is	  the	  dataset	  complete	  by	  years	  and	  indicators?	  
	  
3.	  	   Using	   a	   number	  of	   socioeconomic	   indicators	   including	  GDP,	   structural	   change	   (i.e.	   level	   of	  
industrialisation),	  poverty,	  employment	  and	  inequality,	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  data	  support	  
the	  claims	  that	  Ghana	  is	  ‘rising’,	  economically	  and	  socially,	  and	  reflect	  the	  broader	  narrative	  
of	  a	  ‘rising’	  Africa?	  




1.5	  Dissertation	  Outline	  
	  
This	   dissertation	   takes	   the	   form	  of	   eight	   chapters.	   	   Following	   the	   introduction,	   a	   literature	   review	  
provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative,	   its	  origins	  and	  key	  arguments	  and	  authors	  (on	  
both	   sides	   of	   the	   debate),	   before	   narrowing	   down	   to	   Ghana	   and	   the	   claims	   made	   regarding	   the	  
country’s	   recent	   economic	   growth	   and	   development.	   	   The	   third	   chapter	   introduces	   the	  
methodology,	   situating	   it	  within	   the	  broader	   theories	  of	  development	  economics,	  defining	   the	  key	  
terms	   and	   indicators	   used	   in	   the	   analysis,	   and	   providing	   an	   insight	   into	   the	   data	   limitations	  
experienced	  during	  this	  research	  process.	  	  The	  fourth	  chapter	  presents	  a	  profile	  of	  Ghana,	  describing	  
the	  broad	  demographic,	  economic	  and	  environmental	  trends	  across	  the	  country,	  as	  a	  background	  to	  
the	   socioeconomic	   analysis	   which	   will	   follow.	   	   The	   following	   three	   chapters	   analyse	   the	   data	  
collected,	   under	   the	   three	   headings	   economic	   growth,	   poverty	   and	   employment,	   and	   assess	   the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  source	  data	  supports	  the	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  Ghana’s	  ‘rise’.	  	  The	  
final	  chapter	  draws	  together	  the	  research	  findings	  and	  links	  back	  to	  the	  research	  aim	  and	  objectives,	  
before	   offering	   concluding	   remarks	   on	   the	   connections	   between	   this	   dissertation’s	   findings	   from	  
Ghana	  and	  the	  broader	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative.	  




Chapter	  2:	  ‘Africa	  Rising’?	  Differing	  Viewpoints	  
2.1	  Introduction:	  ‘Afro-­‐pessimism’	  to	  ‘Afro-­‐optimism’	  
Africa	  as	  a	  continent	  has	   long	  been	  characterised	  by	  a	   ‘doom	  and	  gloom’	  narrative,	  especially	  with	  
regards	   to	   economic	   growth	   and	   development.	   	   The	   failure	   of	   neoliberal	   policies	   to	   create	   and	  
sustain	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   1980s	   led	   to	   a	   surge	  of	   interest	   from	  development	   economists	   in	  
trying	   to	   explain	   the	   continent’s	   “growth	   failure”	   (Chitonge,	   2015:	   111).	   	   Yet	   the	   theories	   and	  
paradigms	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  West	  during	  this	  time	  were	  largely	  incompatible	  with	  the	  African	  
situation.	   	   For	  example,	   convergence	   theory,	  which	  assumes	   that	  developing	   countries	  are	  able	   to	  
grow	  faster	  than	  developed	  countries	  until	  their	  per	  capita	  incomes	  eventually	  converge,	  cannot	  be	  
applied	  to	  Africa’s	  development	  experience,	  which	  has	  actually	  diverged	  from	  the	  developed	  world	  
over	  the	  last	  50	  years	  (Chitonge,	  2015).	  	  In	  fact,	  Africa’s	  “growth	  puzzle”	  (Moss,	  2011:	  91)	  has	  been	  
so	  inexplicable	  that	  some	  began	  to	  view	  Africa’s	  underdevelopment	  as	  a	  “curse”,	  coined	  the	  ‘African	  
dummy	  variable’,	  which	  assumes	   that	   simply	  being	  an	  African	  country	   is	  explanation	  enough	   for	  a	  
poor	  growth	  performance	  (Severino	  &	  Ray,	  2011:	  56).	   	  However,	   in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  a	  new	  narrative	  
began	  to	  emerge,	  one	  which	  was	  completely	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  thinking	  that	  had	  come	  before.	  
The	  origins	  of	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  ‘African	  Renaissance’	  (Diop,	  1996),	  the	  
‘African	  Growth	  Miracle’	   (Young,	  2012)	  or	   ‘Africa’s	  Take-­‐off’	   (Perry,	  2012),	  can	  be	   traced	  back	   to	  a	  
TIME	  Magazine	   cover	   story	   of	   1998	   entitled	   ‘Africa	   Rising’,	   in	   which	   the	   authors	   argued	   that	   the	  
stereotypical	  image	  of	  Africa	  as	  a	  continent	  besieged	  by	  poverty,	  conflict	  and	  despair	  was	  gradually	  
changing	  to	  one	  of	  optimism	  and	  hopefulness,	  through	  democratic	  political	  and	  economic	  progress,	  
better	  management	  of	  resources	  and	  ‘home-­‐grown’	  prosperity	  and	  security	  advancements	  (McGeary	  
and	  Michaels,	  1998).	  	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  late	  2000s	  that	  the	  phrase	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  gained	  
popularity,	  prompted	  by	  the	  realisation	  that	  African	  economies	  had	  fared	  far	  better	  than	  expected	  
during	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008-­‐09	  (Chitonge,	  2015),	  with	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa’s	  GDP	  growth	  
averaging	  5.7%	  during	  the	  decade	  2000-­‐2010,	  far	  exceeding	  the	  global	  economy’s	  3.6%	  (Robertson,	  
2012).	  	  In	  2010,	  the	  McKinsey	  Global	  Institute	  (MGI)	  released	  a	  report	  entitled	  ‘Lions	  on	  the	  Move’,	  
which	   declared	   that	   the	   conditions	   were	   right	   for	   Africa’s	   economic	   ‘lions’	   to	   rise	   along	   with	   the	  
Asian	  ‘tigers’,	  both	  economically	  and	  socially	  (MGI,	  2010).	   	  This	  ground-­‐breaking	  report	  was	  closely	  
followed	  by	  media	   articles	   heralding	  Africa’s	   ‘Rise’	   from	   the	   Economist	   (2011;	   2013),	   CNN	   (Pence,	  
2011),	  TIME	  Magazine	  (Perry,	  2012),	  Forbes	  (Van	  Rensburg,	  2012),	  the	  Financial	  Times	  (Wallis,	  2013)	  
and	  Thomson	  Reuters	  (Fletcher,	  2013).	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  media	  publications	  on	  theme,	  relatively	  few	  academic	  articles	  have	  been	  
published	  interrogating	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative	  itself,	  with	  the	  few	  that	  have	  opting	  for	  a	  more	  
cautious	   or	   sceptical	   approach	   (e.g.	   Ayittey,	   2005;	   Clarke,	   2012;	   Obeng-­‐Odoom,	   2014;	   Moghalu,	  
2014;	   Rodrik,	   2014b).	   	   Horman	   Chitonge	   (2015)	   identifies	   three	   broad	   opinions	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
‘Africa	   Rising’	   discourse:	   ‘Afro-­‐optimism’,	   ‘Afro-­‐pessimism’	   and	   a	   middle-­‐ground,	   which	   neither	  
rejects	  the	  phenomenon	  nor	  embraces	  it	  whole-­‐heartedly.	  	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  hesitancy	  may	  
be	  the	  language	  used;	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  terms	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  or	  ‘Africa’s	  take-­‐off’	  refer	  purely	  
to	  economic	  growth	  or	  wider	  social	  development,	  and	  many	  authors	  do	  not	  specify	  to	  which	  they	  are	  
alluding.	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  much	  criticism	  of	  the	  evidence	  behind	  these	  claims,	  particularly	  the	  
credibility	   of	   data	   sources	   and	   their	  methodologies.	   	   Finally,	   there	   are	   some	  who	  believe	   that	   the	  




observed	   in	   a	   few	   select	   countries	   over	   a	   certain	   time	   period,	   and	   trying	   to	   make	   the	   whole	  
continent	  fit	  into	  this	  new	  story	  of	  optimism	  and	  opportunity	  (Rodrik,	  2014a;	  Obeng-­‐Odoom,	  2014).	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  introduce	  and	  explore	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative,	  looking	  at	  both	  
sides	   of	   the	   debate,	   before	  moving	   on	   to	   the	   Ghanaian	   context	   and	   how	   the	   country’s	   past	   and	  
present	  socioeconomic	  development	  path	  fits	  into	  the	  wider	  picture	  of	  the	  continent	  as	  a	  whole.	  
2.2	  Africa’s	  ‘Rising’	  Economic	  Growth	  
	  
Africa,	  especially	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (SSA),	  has	  a	  global	  reputation	  for	  being	  poverty-­‐stricken,	  prone	  
to	   natural	   disasters	   and	   conflicts,	   and	   unable	   to	   help	   itself.	   	   However,	   since	   the	   start	   of	   the	   21st	  
century,	   the	   continent	   has	   seen	   a	   radical	   transformation	   both	   economically,	   in	   terms	   of	   trade,	  
private	   investment	   and	   the	   overall	   wealth	   of	   nations	   and	   their	   citizens,	   and	   socially,	   through	  
improvements	   in	   governance,	   political	   stability	   and	   access	   to	   basic	   services	   (Robertson,	   2012;	  
Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011;	  Radelet,	  2010	  etc).	  	  These	  changes	  have	  been	  reflected	  by	  the	  rapid	  growth	  
in	  Gross	  Domestic	   Product	   (GDP),	  which	   has	   elevated	  Africa	   to	   the	   position	   of	   the	  world’s	   fastest	  
growing	   continent	   in	   recent	   years	   (Economist,	   2013).	   	   From	   2000-­‐2011,	   ten	   African	   countries	  
experienced	  GDP	  growth	  of	  7%	  or	  more,	   and	   total	  growth	   for	  SSA	  over	   the	   same	  period	  averaged	  
5.7%,	  compared	  with	  the	  global	  economy’s	  3.6%	  (see	  Figure	  2.1)	  (Robertson,	  2012).	  	  This	  growth	  also	  
translated	   into	  an	  estimated	  30%	   increase	   in	  per	   capita	   income	  over	   the	   same	  period	   (Economist,	  
2013).	  
Figure	  2.1	  Africa’s	  Economic	  Growth,	  2002-­‐2016*	  
	  
Source:	  African	  Development	  Bank	  et	  al	  (2015a:	  i)	  
*Graph	  shows	  exclusion	  of	  Libya	  in	  2012	  as	  its	  GDP	  grew	  by	  96%	  following	  the	  revolution	  in	  2011,	  	  
adding	  more	  than	  2	  percentage	  points	  to	  Africa’s	  growth	  in	  2012.	  
Some	   authors	   claim	   that	   this	   recent	   ‘take-­‐off’	   is	   not	   only	   widespread	   but	   also	   long-­‐lasting	   (e.g.	  
Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011).	  	  A	  recent	  World	  Bank	  report	  (2014b)	  states	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  current	  growth	  
is	  more	  rapid	  and	   less	  volatile	  than	  past	  episodes,	  and	  higher	  than	  corresponding	  growth	  surges	   in	  
other	   developing	   countries.	   	   McKinsey	   describes	   this	   acceleration	   as	   a	   result	   of	   “hard-­‐earned	  




and	   improved	   integration	  with	   international	   trade	   (World	   Bank,	   2014a).	   	   Severino	   and	   Ray	   agree,	  
declaring	  that	  Africa	  has	  embarked	  on	  a	  “new	  era”	  of	  economic	  growth	  based	  on	  strong	  political	  and	  
economic	  foundations,	  which	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  double	  living	  standards	  within	  15	  years	  (Severino	  
and	   Ray,	   2011:	   77).	   	   Finally,	   the	   continent	   has	   gained	   recognition	   as	   a	   “new	   frontier”	   in	   the	  
international	   economy	   (Moghalu,	   2014:	   vii),	   with	   the	   potential	   to	   become	   a	   new	   “global	   growth	  
pole”	  (UNECA,	  2012:	  1)	  and	  “a	  strategic	  piece	  on	  the	  great	  planetary	  chessboard”	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  
2011:	  233).	  	  	  
However,	   since	   2015	   there	   has	   been	   a	  marked	   economic	   slowdown	   across	   Africa,	   with	   the	   latest	  
estimates	  putting	   SSA’s	   2015	  GDP	  growth	  at	   3.4%,	  down	   from	  4.6%	   in	   2014	   (World	  Bank,	   2016a).	  	  
Lower	  oil	  and	  commodity	  prices,	  slowed	  growth	  of	  trading	  partners	  (especially	  China)	  and	  increasing	  
borrowing	  costs	  were	  the	  main	  factors	  responsible,	  with	  power	  shortages,	  rising	  political	   instability	  
and	  terrorism	  also	  playing	  a	  role	  (World	  Bank,	  2016a).	   	  Nevertheless,	  Africa’s	  economic	  growth	  has	  
been	  robust	  and	  future	  projections	  are	  optimistic,	  with	  SSA’s	  GDP	  growth	  expected	  to	  rise	  to	  4.2%	  in	  
2016	  and	  4.7%	  in	  2017	  (World	  Bank,	  2016a).	  
Future	  Growth	  Projections	  
Many	  authors	  have	  compared	  Africa’s	  current	  economic	  rise	  with	  Asia’s	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  predicting	  
that	  the	  continent’s	  growth	  rate	  will	  therefore	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  continue	  to	  accelerate	  as	  Asian	  
economies	  did,	  well	  into	  the	  2040s	  (Robertson,	  2012).	  	  Others	  have	  observed	  similarities	  with	  India,	  
in	   particular,	   a	   country	   that	   underwent	   economic	   transformation	   from	   agriculture	   to	   services	  
without	   large-­‐scale	   industrialisation,	   taking	   advantage	   of	   globalisation	   processes	   to	   expand	   its	  
private	  sector	  and	  entrepreneurial	  opportunities	  for	  its	  booming	  population	  (Cilliers	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  As	  
Africa’s	   population	   is	   also	   projected	   to	   expand	   rapidly,	   especially	   the	   youth	   demographic,	   the	  
emphasis	   will	   be	   on	   harnessing	   this	   potential	   resource	   to	   achieve	   even	   higher	   economic	   growth	  
(AfDB,	  2012).	  	  Africa	  is	  also	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  ‘leapfrog’	  basic	  infrastructure	  and	  technology	  and	  
employ	  modern,	  hi-­‐tech	  equipment	  and	  expertise,	  especially	  with	  the	  advancement	  of	  internet	  and	  
mobile	   phone	   technology	   across	   the	   continent	   (Mahajan,	   2009)	   and	   the	   opportunities	   for	   low-­‐
carbon	  energy	  generation	  (Africa	  Progress	  Panel,	  2015).	  
2.3	  ‘Rising’	  Social	  Development?	  	  
	  
Africa’s	   ‘rise’	   has	   also	   been	   observed	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   social	   development	   over	   recent	   years.	   	   For	  
example,	   household	   surveys	   undertaken	   by	   the	  World	   Bank	   found	   that	   the	   share	   of	   people	   living	  
below	  the	  poverty	   line	  (less	  than	  $1.90	  a	  day)	  fell	   from	  56%	  in	  1990	  to	  43%	  in	  20121	  (Beegle	  et	  al,	  
2016).	  	  The	  last	  decade	  saw	  poverty	  rates	  decline	  by	  1%	  per	  year	  –	  the	  “most	  rapid	  decline	  ever	  seen	  
on	  the	  continent”,	  according	  to	  Radelet	  (2010:	  5).	  	  The	  latest	  UN	  report	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  MDGs	  
confirmed	   that	   significant	   strides	   have	   been	  made	   in	   reducing	   extreme	   poverty,	   hunger	   and	   child	  
mortality,	  increasing	  primary	  school	  enrolment,	  and	  improving	  basic	  health	  conditions,	  including	  the	  
provision	   of	   clean	   water	   and	   sanitation	   facilities	   (UN,	   2015).	   	   As	   Ellen	   Johnson	   Sirleaf	   (previous	  
president	  of	  Liberia)	  remarks,	  “the	  differences	  between	  the	  despair	  and	  misery	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  
hope	  and	  energy	  of	  today	  are	  like	  night	  and	  day”	  (Radelet,	  2010:	  5).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Nonetheless,	  the	  absolute	  number	  of	  people	  in	  poverty	  increased	  from	  280	  million	  in	  1990	  to	  330	  million	  in	  




Africa’s	  Rising	  Middle	  Class	  
Mahajan	   emphatically	   states,	   “The	   rise	   of	   Africa	   is	   hidden	   in	   plain	   sight”	   (Mahajan,	   2009:	   23).	  	  
According	   to	  Mahajan	   (2009),	   Africa	   has	  more	   than	   900	  million	   consumers	   and	   if	   it	  were	   a	   single	  
country,	   it	  would	  be	  richer	  than	  India	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Gross	  National	  Income	  (GNI).	   	  The	  number	  of	  
countries	  ranked	  as	  ‘middle-­‐income’	  in	  Africa	  has	  grown	  from	  6	  in	  1995	  to	  23	  in	  2013,	  and	  as	  many	  
as	   38	   could	   reach	   this	   status	   by	   2025	   (World	   Bank,	   2014a).	   	   By	   2050,	   as	   much	   as	   half	   of	   the	  
continent’s	   population	   could	   be	   categorised	   as	   middle	   class,	   and	   an	   estimated	   two	   thirds	   will	  
probably	   be	   living	   in	   cities	   (Mills	   and	  Herbst,	   2012).	   	   These	   trends	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   instigate	  
significant	  “economic,	  political	  and	  social	  upheavals”	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011:	  93),	  especially	  when	  
coupled	  with	  the	  demographic	  dividend	  of	  a	  youthful	  population.	  	  	  
2.4	  Reasons	  behind	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  claims	  
	  
Africa’s	   recent	   economic	   ‘take-­‐off’	   has	   been	   attributed	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   factors,	   both	   internal	   and	  
external	  to	  the	  continent.	  	  Some	  commentators,	  such	  as	  Perry	  (2012),	  cite	  external	  factors	  as	  being	  
the	  most	   important	   contributors	   to	   recent	   economic	   growth,	   including	   foreign-­‐debt	   cancellations,	  
overseas	  aid,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  external	  private	  sector	  investment.	  	  The	  rise	  in	  commodity	  prices	  since	  
2000,	   sustained	   by	   a	   booming	   Chinese	   economy	   and	   other	   emerging	   markets,	   also	   played	   a	  
significant	  role	   in	  boosting	  the	  economies	  of	   resource-­‐rich	  African	  states	   (AfDB,	  2012).	   	  Trade	  with	  
other	  emerging	  economies	  has	  risen	  substantially;	  overall	  trade	  with	  China	  has	  risen	  from	  $11bn	  to	  
$166bn	   over	   the	   past	   decade	   alone	   (Economist,	   2013).	   	   In	   addition,	   new	   oil	   discoveries	   have	  
increased	  Africa’s	   share	  of	   global	   oil	   resources	   to	  10%,	   a	   volume	   sufficient	   to	   cover	  China’s	   entire	  
import	  needs	  (Robertson,	  2012).	  
However,	  many	  other	  authors	  argue	  that	  it	  has	  been	  internal	  factors	  that	  have	  played	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  
Africa’s	   rise,	   and	   that	   a	   transformation	   in	   economic	   management	   and	   governance	   has	   been	  
occurring	   across	   the	   continent	   over	   the	   last	   couple	   of	   decades	   (Radelet,	   2010).	   	   According	   to	  
McKinsey,	  natural	  resources	  only	  account	  for	  a	  third	  of	  Africa’s	  recent	  economic	  growth,	  and	  it	  has	  
been	  the	  domestic	  economy	  that	  has	  seen	  the	  most	  dramatic	  advancement,	  through	  improvements	  
in	  macroeconomic	  conditions,	  political	  stability,	  quality	  of	  governance	  and	  more	  attractive	  business	  
climates	   (MGI,	   2010).	   	   A	   reduction	   in	   the	   number	   of	   armed	   conflicts,	   greater	   efforts	   to	   curb	  
corruption	   and	   the	   “inevitable	   march”	   of	   democratisation	   also	   helped	   to	   create	   more	   stable	  
conditions	  for	  economic	  growth	  to	  occur	  (Robertson,	  2012:	  9).	  	  	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  these	  efforts	  have	  brought	  about	  structural	  change	  across	  the	  continent,	  in	  
terms	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  employment	  from	  agriculture	  to	  manufacturing	  and	  services	  -­‐	  sectors	  with	  a	  higher	  
productivity	  and	   therefore	  more	  potential	   to	   reduce	  poverty	   rates	   (McMillan	  and	  Harttgen,	  2014).	  	  
Robertson	  (2012)	  notes	  that	  the	  services	  sector	  was	  responsible	  for	  53%	  of	  SSA’s	  economic	  growth	  
from	  2000-­‐2009,	  with	  the	  financial	  and	  telecommunications	  services	  making	  significant	  contributions	  
(UNECA,	   2012).	   	   In	   addition,	   entrepreneurship	   has	   flourished	   –	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   fast	   rate	   of	  
technology	  transfer	  –	  along	  with	  the	  development	  of	  consumer	  markets,	  a	  powerful	  driver	  of	   long-­‐
term	   progress,	   according	   to	   Mahajan	   (2009).	   	   As	   a	   result,	   a	   growing	   ‘middle	   class’	   has	   emerged	  
across	   the	   continent,	   making	   Africa	   ever	   more	   attractive	   to	   both	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   investors	  
(AfDB,	  2012).	  	  Some	  argue	  that	  this	  permeating	  demographic	  change,	  along	  with	  social	  changes	  such	  
as	  urbanisation	  and	  a	  growing	   labour	   force,	  will	   sustain	   the	  continent’s	  economic	  growth	  well	   into	  




2.5	  Criticisms	  of	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  Narrative	  
	  
Whose	  Africa?	  
Not	   everyone	   has	   subscribed	   to	   this	   new	  narrative	   of	   a	   ‘rising’	   Africa,	   and	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  
academics	   and	   economists	  who	  have	   voiced	   their	   concerns	   and	   criticisms	  of	   accounts	   of	   this	   new	  
‘growth	  miracle’.	  	  Kingsley	  Chiedu	  Moghalu,	  a	  Nigerian	  economist,	  points	  out	  that	  few	  of	  the	  authors	  
making	  claims	  about	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  are	  Africans	  themselves,	  and	  therefore	  fail	  to	  put	  into	  perspective	  
the	  continent’s	  standing	   in	  the	  world	  economy,	  or	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  challenges	  facing	  the	  region	  
(Moghalu,	  2014).	  	  Whilst	  Rickett	  (2013)	  questions	  whether	  the	  narrative	  of	  a	  ‘rising’	  Africa	  is	  in	  fact	  
another	  product	  of	   the	  West’s	   ‘White	  Saviour	  complex’,	  Moghalu,	  among	  others,	  believes	   that	   the	  
answer	   lies	  more	   in	  Africa’s	  natural	  assets,	  asking	   the	  critical	  question:	  “Is	  Africa	  assessing	   its	  own	  
progress	   against	   benchmarks	   it	   has	   set	   for	   itself,	   or	   is	   its	   ‘rise’	   the	   received	   wisdom	   from	   global	  
institutions	  and	  the	  ambassadors	  of	  global	  capital	  seeking	  new	  frontiers	  of	  profit?”	  (Moghalu,	  2014:	  
6).	   	  Obeng-­‐Odoom	  (2014)	  agrees:	  “the	  entire	   ‘Africa	  on	  the	  rise’	  discourse	   is	  not	  only	   to	  showcase	  
Africa	   as	   also	   a	   ‘good	   continent’	   but	   also	   to	   set	   it	   up	   for	   further	   accumulation,	   exploitation	   and	  
expropriation”	   (Obeng-­‐Odoom,	  2014:	  13).	   	  The	   interest	  of	   foreign	  powers	   in	  Africa’s	   resources	  has	  
been	   discussed	   at	   length	   by	   many	   authors	   seeking	   to	   expose	   a	   ‘New	   Scramble	   for	   Africa’	   (e.g.	  
Southall	  and	  Melber,	  2009;	  Carmody,	  2011).	  	  	  
Africa’s	  ‘Statistical	  Tragedy’	  
Other	   economists	   have	   looked	   deeper	   into	   the	   economic	   development	   statistics	   themselves,	   and	  
concluded	   that	   the	   evidence	   is	   not	   robust	   enough	   to	   warrant	   the	   impressive	   claims	   being	  made.	  	  
Duncan	  Clarke,	  for	  example,	  suggests	  that	  the	  new	  optimism	  surrounding	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative	  
is	   misplaced,	   and	   that	   economic	   forecasts	   which	   extrapolate	   decade-­‐long	   “golden	   periods”	   are	  
misleading	  and	  “risk	  leading	  to	  fantasy”	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  growth	  rates	  predicted	  for	  Africa	  over	  the	  next	  
40	  years	  have	  never	  before	  been	  achieved	   in	  either	  GDP	  or	  per	  capita	   income	  (Clarke,	  2012:	  220).	  	  
Indeed,	  past	  economic	  growth	  across	  the	  continent	  has	  been	  characterised	  by	  cycles	  of	   ‘boom	  and	  
bust’,	   most	   commonly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   fluctuating	   commodity	   prices	   and	   demand,	   leading	   some	  
commentators	   to	   assume	   that	   Africa’s	   current	   growth	   is	   merely	   a	   continuation	   of	   this	   trend	  
(Somerville,	  2013).	   	   In	  addition,	  Somerville	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  previous	  growth	  episodes	  have	  done	  
little	   to	   improve	   poverty	   rates	   or	   bring	   about	   lasting	   economic	   transformation,	   so	   thus	   remains	  
sceptical	  of	  the	  optimism	  surrounding	  Africa’s	  current	  ‘rise’.	  
Furthermore,	   authors	   such	   as	   Moghalu	   (2014)	   and	   Obeng-­‐Odoom	   (2013)	   concur	   that	   the	   ‘Africa	  
Rising’	   narrative	   itself	   is	   highly	   dependent	   on	   the	   parameters	   used	   and	  who	   does	   the	  measuring.	  	  
Many	   believe	   that	   indicators	   such	   as	   GDP	   and	   per	   capita	   income	   fail	   to	   represent	   the	   lived	  
experiences	  of	  people	  on	  the	  ground,	  especially	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  inequality,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  
data	  is	  made	  to	  fit	  into	  a	  particular	  hypothesis,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  linkage	  (Chitonge,	  2015).	  	  
Thus,	   it	   is	   problematic	   to	  make	   assumptions	   and	   generalisations	   about	   the	   African	   continent	   as	   a	  
whole,	  based	  on	  only	  a	  narrow	  set	  of	  indicators	  and	  data	  from	  only	  a	  few	  countries	  (Obeng-­‐Odoom,	  
2013).	   	   Clarke	   is	   also	  extremely	   critical	  of	   the	  official	  parameters	  within	  which	  Africa’s	  burgeoning	  
middle	  class	   is	  measured	  –	  a	  per	  capita	   income	  of	  $2-­‐20	  per	  day	  –	  arguing	  that,	  “at	  current	   levels,	  
Africa’s	  middle	   class	   today	  might	  approximate	   to	   the	  working	  class	  poor	  of	  Europe	  a	   century	  ago”	  
(Clarke,	   2010:	   236).	   	   By	  having	   such	  a	   low	   threshold	   for	   the	   ‘middle	   class’	   category,	   Clarke	  argues	  




There	  are	  also	  many	  criticisms	  of	  African	  national	  statistics	  themselves,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  methodologies	  
used	  to	  collect	  data.	  	  Jerven	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  many	  African	  states	  have	  a	  weak	  statistical	  capacity	  
due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  resources	  or	  information	  available,	  causing	  gaps	  in	  the	  data.	  	  Furthermore,	  Devarajan	  
(2011)	  highlights	   the	   lack	  of	   consistency	   in	  data	   collection,	  due	   to	   the	  varied	  methods	  used.	   	  Only	  
35%	  of	  Africa’s	  population	   live	   in	  countries	  that	  use	  the	  UN’s	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  system	  (from	  1993),	  
and	   some	  are	  using	   systems	  dating	  back	   to	   the	  1960s	   (Devarajan,	   2011).	   	   This	   can	  have	  profound	  
implications	   for	   national	   statistical	   and	   economic	   analysis.	   	   A	   prime	   example	   of	   this	   was	   Ghana’s	  
decision,	   in	  2011,	   to	  update	   its	  economic	  data	  collection	  to	  the	  1993	  system	  (thereby	  re-­‐basing	   its	  
GDP),	   and	   finding	   that	   GDP	   was	   actually	   62%	   higher	   than	   previously	   thought,	   causing	   it	   to	   be	  
immediately	  reclassified	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  lower-­‐middle	  income	  (Devarajan,	  2011).	  	  Herein	  lies	  a	  
prime	  example	  of	  the	  ‘statistical	  tragedy’	  of	  economic	  development	  statistics;	  despite	  being	  regularly	  
cited	  and	  used	  as	  evidence	  for	  claims	  that	  African	  economies	  are	  ‘taking-­‐off’,	  the	  underlying	  data	  is	  
often	  neither	  complete	  nor	  robust	  (Devarajan,	  2011),	   leading	  to	  denunciations	  of	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  
narrative	  as	  “emotive	  and	  one-­‐dimensional”	  (Heinrich	  Böll	  Siftung,	  2014:	  5).	  
Moreover,	  some	  economists	  argue	  that	  GDP	  should	  not	  be	  used	  as	  the	  sole	  indicator	  of	  a	  country’s	  
wealth	  and	  development.	   	  The	  metric	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “a	   statistical	  mirage”	  as	   it	   is	   simply	  a	  
measure	  of	  market	   consumption,	   so	   therefore	   cannot	   take	   into	  account	  economic	   ‘losses’	   such	  as	  
non-­‐renewable	  resource	  depletion	  following	  extraction	  (Heinrich	  Böll	  Siftung,	  2014:	  6).	  	  Jerven	  takes	  
this	  argument	  further,	  arguing	  that	  GDP	  is	  not	  objective	  but	  a	  result	  of	  “arbitrary	  and	  controversial	  
assumptions”	  and	  should	  therefore	  be	  used	  with	  “the	  utmost	  care”	  (Jerven,	  2013:	  121).	  	  Moreover,	  
the	  authors	  Sandefur	  and	  Glassman	  (2014)	  uncovered	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  national	  statistics	  such	  as	  
GDP	  or	  development	  indices	  are	  exaggerated	  or	  misrepresented	  as	  a	  result	  of	  incentives	  from	  donors	  
or	   government	   policies,	   not	   merely	   due	   to	   error	   or	   a	   lack	   of	   capacity.	   	   Finally,	   GDP	   also	   cannot	  
represent	   the	   nature	   of	   economic	   growth,	   causing	   some	   to	   question	   whether	   growth	   without	  
structural	  transformation	  can	  really	  be	  called	  a	  ‘take-­‐off’	  (Clarke,	  2010).	  	  Rowden	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  
Africa’s	   recent	   economic	   growth,	   which	   has	   been	   occurring	   without	   a	   significant	   increase	   in	  
manufacturing,	  can	  therefore	  not	  compare	  with	  growth	  in	  East	  Asia,	  where	  manufacturing	  has	  been	  
used	  to	  raise	  millions	  of	  people	  out	  of	  poverty.	  
Growth	  in	  Context	  
A	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  sought	  to	  emphasise	  a	  degree	  of	  caution	  when	  making	  sweeping	  claims	  
about	  Africa’s	  ‘take-­‐off’,	  especially	  when	  considering	  the	  continent	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Taylor,	  for	  example,	  
agrees	  that	  Africa’s	  GDP	  is	  rising,	  but	  argues	  that	  this	  growth	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  context	  –	  the	  level	  
of	   growth	   seen	   so	   far	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   seriously	   tackle	  widespread	   poverty,	   for	   instance	   (Taylor,	  
2014).	   	   Similarly,	   as	   Chitonge	   (2015)	   points	   out,	   economic	   growth	   must	   be	   analysed	   alongside	  
population	   statistics,	   to	   get	   a	   full	   picture	  of	  GDP	  per	   capita.	   	   According	   to	  Chitonge	   (2015),	  whilst	  
many	  countries	  across	  the	  continent	  were	  experiencing	  record	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  during	  the	  decade	  
2001-­‐2010,	  a	  total	  of	  seven	  countries	  recorded	  negative	  per	  capita	  growth	  rates,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
their	  population	  was	  growing	   faster	   than	   the	  national	  GDP.	   	   Similarly,	  Rodrik	   (2014)	  highlights	   the	  
need	  to	  view	  current	  growth	  trends	  within	  their	  historical	  context.	   	  He	  contends	  that,	  “as	  welcome	  
as	  recent	  growth	  has	  been,	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  economic	  decline	  prior	  to	  the	   last	  decade	  means	  that	  
many	   African	   countries	   still	   have	   not	   caught	   up	   with	   post-­‐independence	   income	   levels”	   (Rodrik,	  
2014:	  1).	  	  	  
Moreover,	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  developing	  countries	  in	  Asia	  and	  Latin	  America,	  Africa’s	  ‘rise’	  does	  




Africa	  is	  actually	  trailing	  behind	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  poverty	  reduction	  and	  
development.	   	  Comparing	  East	  Asia’s	  per	  capita	  income	  with	  Africa’s,	  for	   instance,	  shows	  that	  over	  
the	  last	  20	  years,	  East	  Asia’s	  has	  been	  growing	  at	  7.3%,	  four	  times	  higher	  than	  Africa’s	  1.8%	  (Hauge,	  
2014).	  	  And	  despite	  claims	  of	  a	  dramatic	  reduction	  in	  extreme	  poverty	  across	  Africa	  (people	  earning	  
less	  than	  $1.25	  per	  day),	  when	  analysed	  over	  a	  longer	  time	  period,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  rate	  has	  hardly	  
improved	  since	  the	  1980s,	  and	  is	  still	  lingering	  at	  around	  40%	  (see	  Figure	  2.2)	  (Hauge,	  2014).	  	  Whilst	  
the	  proportion	  of	  people	  earning	   less	   than	  $2	  a	  day	   reduced	  marginally	   in	  Africa,	   from	  72-­‐70%,	   in	  
East	   Asia	   and	   the	   Pacific,	   the	   figure	   was	   reduced	   by	   two	   thirds	   (Hauge,	   2014).	   	   Hence,	   when	  
considering	  Africa’s	   development	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	   the	   continent’s	   share	   of	  
global	   poverty	   has	   actually	   increased	   and	  will	   continue	   to	   increase,	   unless	   drastic	   steps	   are	   taken	  
(Hauge,	  2014).	  
Figure	  2.2	  Extreme	  Poverty	  Rates	  (<US$1.25	  a	  day	  in	  2005	  PPP)	  
Source:	  Turner	  et	  al	  (2015:	  7)	  
Sustainability	  
The	   current	   economic	   slowdown	   across	   Africa	   has	   largely	   been	   caused	   by	   external	   factors	   in	   the	  
global	   economy,	   including	   a	   fall	   in	   commodity	   prices,	   a	   slowdown	   in	   China’s	   economy	  and	   tighter	  
financial	  controls	  (Sy	  &	  Talvi,	  2016),	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  SSA’s	  recent	  GDP	  growth	  may	  not	  be	  
sustainable	   in	   the	   long	   term.	   	   Despite	   large-­‐scale	   debt	   relief	   during	   the	   1990s,	   debt	   levels	   are	  
currently	   rising	  across	   the	  continent	  and	   fiscal	  environments	  weakening	   (Taylor,	  2016).	   	   Trade	   is	  a	  
significant	  driver	  of	  Africa’s	  economic	  growth,	  yet	  prospective	  trade	  with	  Europe	  has	  been	  described	  
as	   “lacklustre	  at	  best”	   (CEPA,	  2015:	  2).	   	   It	  has	  been	   found	   that	  SSA’s	  dependence	  on	  commodities	  
increased	   during	   the	   2000s,	   particularly	   on	   fuels	   and	  mining2	   (Taylor,	   2016),	   leaving	   resource-­‐rich	  
countries	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  exogenous	  shocks	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  (Moghalu,	  2014).	   	  As	  Taylor	  
argues,	  Africa’s	  ‘rise’	  has	  been	  largely	  based	  on	  “trade	  in	  resources,	  not	  production”,	  which	  is	  crucial	  
for	  not	  only	   igniting	  growth,	  but	  also	  for	  sustaining	   it	   in	  the	   long-­‐term	  (Taylor,	  2016:	  18).	   	  This	  has	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  present,	  11	  out	  of	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further	   implications	   for	   countries’	   economies,	   which	   can	   easily	   fall	   into	   the	   trap	   of	   the	   ‘resource	  
curse’	  (see	  below)	  and	  its	  associated	  problems	  for	  the	  macroeconomic	  environment.	  	  With	  the	  value	  
of	  all	  commodities	  predicted	  to	  fall	  over	  the	  next	  decade,	  many,	  including	  Taylor	  (2016),	  have	  begun	  
to	  question	  whether	  Africa’s	   ‘rise’	   can	   continue	  under	   these	   conditions,	  or	  whether	  diversification	  
from	  commodities	  and	  natural	  resources	  must	  be	  increasingly	  prioritised.	  
2.6	  Challenges	  Remain	  
Resource	  Curse	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  with	  much	  of	  Africa’s	  recent	  economic	  growth	  deriving	  from	  natural	  resources,	  
there	   is	  considerable	  risk	  of	  some	  countries	  falling	   into	  the	  trap	  of	  the	   ‘resource	  curse’,	  a	  situation	  
where	   “riches	   enclose	  whole	   societies	   in	   a	   political	   economy	   of	   capture	   or	   predation	   rather	   than	  
production”	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011:	  152).	  	  In	  many	  cases	  across	  Africa,	  resource	  wealth,	  instead	  of	  
bringing	  broad-­‐based	  growth	  and	  prosperity,	  has	  caused	  a	  significant	  decline	  in	  inclusive	  growth	  and	  
human	  development,	   through	  poor	  governance	  and	  higher	  rates	  of	  corruption	  (Lawson-­‐Remer	  and	  
Greenstein,	  2012).	  	  Foreign	  investors	  and	  the	  local	  political	  elite	  often	  reap	  the	  gains	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	   local	   communities	   and	   their	   environments	   (Heinrich	   Böll	   Siftung,	   2014).	   	   Overall	   economic	  
development	   also	   suffers	   as	   a	   result;	   Auty	   (2000)	   has	   found	   that	   since	   the	   1960s,	   countries	   with	  
abundant	  natural	  resources	  have	  recorded	  slower	  economic	  growth	  than	  countries	  with	  little	  or	  no	  
resources.	  	  This	  is	  often	  either	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ‘Dutch	  disease’	  –	  whereby	  high-­‐value	  natural	  resources	  
drive	   up	   the	   real	   exchange	   rate,	   damaging	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   other	   export	   industries	   –	   or	  
‘financial	   manic	   depression’	   –	   where	   volatility	   of	   commodity	   prices	   translates	   into	   volatile	   public	  
revenues,	   leading	   to	   fragile	   economic	   growth	   (Severino	   and	   Ray,	   2011).	   	   Such	   conditions	   are	  
frequently	   the	   pre-­‐cursor	   to	   conflicts	   (Collier,	   2008),	  which	   also	   have	   a	   profound	   impact	   on	   long-­‐
term	  economic	  growth.	  
Economic	  Transformation	  
Whilst	  some	  authors	  (e.g.	  Henley,	  2012),	  make	  the	  case	  for	  agricultural-­‐led	  economic	  development,	  
the	  predominant	  view	  among	  economists	  is	  that	  industrial	  development,	  especially	  manufacturing,	  is	  
crucial	  to	  drive	  the	  kind	  of	  growth	  needed	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  on	  the	  continent-­‐
wide	   scale	   (UNECA,	   2015;	   Page,	   2012;	   Rodrik,	   2014).	   	   In	   the	   newly	   industrialised	   East	   Asian	  
economies,	   late	   industrialisation	   initiated	   structural	   change	   from	   the	   primary	   sector3	   to	   the	  
manufacturing	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  technological	  and	  capital-­‐intensive	  activities,	  which	  in	  
turn	   boosted	   productivity	   and	   competitiveness	   across	   all	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy	   (Akyüz	   &	   Gore,	  
2001).	   	   Africa,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   has	   been	  experiencing	   ‘premature	  deindustrialisation’	   since	   the	  
1980s;	  between	  1980	  and	  2013,	  the	  share	  of	  manufacturing	  in	  Africa’s	  total	  GDP	  declined	  from	  12%	  
to	  11%,	   the	   lowest	   share	  of	   all	   developing	   regions	   (The	  Economist,	   2015).	   	   As	  Rodrik	   argues,	   “the	  
traditional	   engines	   behind	   rapid	   growth	   and	   convergence,	   structural	   change	   and	   industrialization,	  
are	  operating	  at	  less	  than	  full	  power”	  (Rodrik,	  2014:	  15).	  	  	  
Economic	   transformation	   also	   has	   profound	   implications	   for	   the	   structure	   of	   employment	   and	  
quality	   of	   jobs.	   	   Youth	   unemployment	   in	   Africa	   reached	   20%	   in	   2011,	   twice	   the	   global	   average	  
(Moghalu,	  2014),	  and	  many	  authors	  cite	  the	  stagnation	  of	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  across	  Africa	  as	  
one	   of	   the	   principal	   reasons	   for	   this	   trend	   (This	   is	   Africa,	   2014).	   	   Currently,	   only	   6%	   of	   all	   jobs	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Africa	   are	   in	   the	   manufacturing	   sector,	   a	   figure	   hardly	   changed	   since	   the	   1980s	   (The	   Economist,	  
2015).	  	  Furthermore,	  SSA’s	  manufacturing	  sector	  is	  largely	  made	  up	  of	  small,	  informal	  firms	  that	  are	  
unable	   to	   create	   significant	  numbers	  of	   jobs	  or	   the	  productivity	   level	   required	   to	  drive	   large-­‐scale	  
economic	  growth	  (Rodrik,	  2014).	  	  Although	  SSA’s	  services	  sector	  is	  flourishing,	  productivity	  is	  scarcely	  
higher	   than	   traditional	   agriculture,	   and	   the	   skills	   required	   in	   technical	   sectors	   such	   as	   IT	   make	   it	  
difficult	   for	  people	  previously	  employed	   in	  agriculture	   to	   find	   jobs	   in	  services	   (Rodrik,	  2014).	   	  Thus	  
without	   considerable	   structural	   change,	   “the	  historic	  process	  of	  underdevelopment	   is	   in	  danger	  of	  
being	  further	  entrenched”	  (Taylor,	  2014:	  10).	  	  	  
Inequality	  
Inequality	   is	   a	   hotly	   discussed	   issue	   in	   the	   ‘Africa	  Rising’	   narrative	   as	   recent	   economic	   growth	  has	  
been	  highly	  uneven	  across	  countries,	  cities,	  towns	  and	  communities,	  and,	  according	  to	  Moghalu,	  has	  
done	  nothing	   to	   improve	   the	   living	   standards	  of	   “Africa’s	  masses”	   (Moghalu,	  2014:	  76).	   	  Despite	  a	  
decade	  of	  widespread	  GDP	  growth,	  Africa’s	  Gini	  coefficient	  –	   the	  principal	  measure	  of	   inequality	  –	  
has	  widened,	   from	   0.52	   in	   1993	   to	   0.56	   in	   2008,	   a	   level	   hardly	   better	   than	   in	   1980	   (AfDB,	   2012).	  	  
Currently,	  7	  out	  of	  10	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  unequal	  countries	  are	  found	  in	  Africa	  (Beegle	  et	  al,	  2016).	  	  
Indeed,	   some	   of	   the	   largest	   economies,	   with	   the	  most	   impressive	   GDP	   growth,	   have	   found	   their	  
socioeconomic	  development	  to	  be	  stagnating,	  or	  even	  declining	  (This	  is	  Africa,	  2014).	  	  For	  example,	  
Nigeria	   recorded	   average	   annual	   GDP	   growth	   of	   7%	   during	   the	   period	   2004-­‐2010,	   yet	   also	  
experienced	  an	  increase	  in	  its	  poverty	  rate,	  so	  that	  now	  nearly	  60%	  of	  the	  country’s	  population	  lives	  
in	   extreme	   poverty	   (This	   is	   Africa,	   2014).	   	   Thus,	   Chitonge	   concludes,	   “if	   Africa	   is	   rising,	   there	   are	  
strong	  indications	  that	  it	  is	  rising	  with	  only	  20%	  of	  its	  population”	  (Chitonge,	  2015:	  250).	  
High	  inequality	  persists	  in	  access	  to	  basic	  services	  such	  as	  education	  and	  health,	  with	  African	  women	  
experiencing	  significant	  levels	  of	  discrimination	  in	  traditionally	  male-­‐dominated	  societies	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  
2015a).	   	  Africa’s	   ‘middle	  class’	  also	  remains	  extremely	   fragile;	  an	  estimated	  80%	  of	  the	  310	  million	  
people	  in	  this	  category	  fit	  into	  the	  informally	  labelled	  category,	  the	  ‘floating	  class’,	  earning	  less	  than	  
$4	  per	  day	   (This	   is	  Africa,	  2014).	   	  Vázquez	  and	  Summer	   (2012)	  argue	   that	  such	  categorisations	  are	  
out-­‐dated	  and	  unhelpful,	  such	  as	  the	  terms	  ‘low	  income	  country’	  (LIC)	  and	  ‘middle	  income	  country’	  
(MIC),	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  world’s	  poor	  are	  no	  longer	  found	  in	  LICs,	  but	  MICs.	  	  According	  to	  Heintz,	  
the	   only	   way	   to	   tackle	   inequality	   in	   Africa	   is	   through	   expanding	   employment	   opportunities,	   as	  
“labour	  is	  the	  one	  factor	  of	  production	  which	  poor	  and	  low-­‐income	  households	  typically	  command	  in	  
abundance”	   (Heintz,	   2010:	   200).	   	   Perry	   (2012)	   agrees,	   suggesting	   that	   lessons	   can	   be	   learnt	   from	  
Asia’s	  emerging	  economies,	  especially	  China	  and	  India,	  which	  have	  both	  suffered	  vast	  inequality.	  
Energy	  and	  Infrastructure	  Development	  
Although	   infrastructure	   development	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   has	   expanded	   during	   the	   years	   since	  
independence,	  high	  population	  growth	  has	  largely	  exceeded	  progress	  made,	  leaving	  gaps	  in	  access	  to	  
electricity	  and	  clean	  water	  (Robertson,	  2012).	  	  Two	  thirds	  of	  Africa’s	  population,	  or	  nearly	  600	  million	  
people,	  live	  without	  access	  to	  electricity,	  and	  90%	  of	  rural	  areas	  lack	  any	  kind	  of	  electrification	  at	  all	  
(AfDB,	   2013).	   	   More	   than	   thirty	   countries	   across	   Africa	   currently	   suffer	   from	   power	   shortages	  
(Robertson,	  2012)	  and	  by	  present	  estimates	   it	  could	  take	  up	  to	  2080	  to	  provide	  electricity	  to	  every	  
African	   citizen	   (Africa	  Progress	  Panel,	   2015).	   	   The	   reasons	  behind	   the	   current	  energy	   crisis	   include	  
spiralling	  demand	  and	  a	  lagging	  supply	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  investment	  from	  
African	   governments;	   according	   to	   the	  AfDB	   (2013),	   only	   4%	  of	  Africa’s	   collective	  GDP	   is	   spent	  on	  




both	  human	  development	  and	  economic	  growth	  (Robertson,	  2012),	  and	  with	  Africa’s	  rapidly	  growing	  
population	  and	  increasing	  urbanisation,	  the	  continent’s	  demand	  for	  modern	  energy	  services	  is	  set	  to	  
increase	  dramatically	  over	  the	  next	  fifty	  years	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011).	  	  	  
Nevertheless,	   there	  are	   substantial	  opportunities	   for	  African	  economies	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	   their	  
abundance	   of	   renewable	   energy	   resources	   –	   especially	   solar	   and	   hydropower	   –	   and	   falling	   low-­‐
carbon	  technology	  prices,	  in	  order	  to	  “leapfrog	  into	  a	  new	  era	  of	  power	  generation”	  (Africa	  Progress	  
Panel,	   2015:	   68).	   	  Nearly	   85%	  of	  Africa’s	   rural	   population	   still	   rely	  on	  burning	  biomass	   for	   energy,	  
which	  is	  extremely	  harmful	  to	  both	  human	  health	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  Yet	  according	  to	  the	  AfDB	  
(2013),	   untapped	   hydropower	   resources	   in	   Congo,	   Cameroon	   and	   Ethiopia	   have	   the	   potential	   to	  
provide	  all	  of	  Africa’s	  energy	  needs.	   	  A	  clean	  energy	  future	  could	  also	  bring	  about	  a	  “triple	  win”	   in	  
terms	  of	  an	   improvement	   in	  agricultural	  productivity,	   increased	   resilience	   to	   the	  effects	  of	   climate	  
change,	  and	  a	  reduction	   in	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  (Africa	  Progress	  Panel,	  2015:	  13).	   	  Robertson	  
(2012)	  believes	  the	  time	  is	  ripe	  for	  an	  African	  infrastructure	  and	  energy	  boom	  similar	  to	  the	  East	  and	  
South	  Asian	  take-­‐off	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  and	  is	  the	  pivotal	  means	  by	  which	  Africa	  can	  unlock	  similar	  
economic	  growth	  rates.	  
Limits	  to	  Growth	  
With	  so	  much	  focus	  on	  economic	  growth,	  relatively	  few	  analysts	  have	  considered	  the	  environmental	  
impacts	   such	  growth	  would	  have	  on	  a	   large	   scale,	  and	  how	  this	   type	  of	  growth	  may	  be	   limited	  by	  
environmental	   factors	   or	   depleting	   resources.	   	   Robertson	   (2012)	   adds	   a	   mere	   sentence	   as	   an	  
afterthought	  to	  his	  forceful	  arguments	  for	  unrelenting	  economic	  growth	  policies,	  admitting	  that	  the	  
only	  potential	  barrier	  in	  the	  long	  term	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  earth	  itself	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  absorb	  
another	   900	   million	   consumers	   in	   an	   increasingly	   richer	   society.	   	   The	   AfDB	   (2012)	   cites	  
environmental	  degradation	  as	  an	  urgent	  and	  growing	  challenge	  for	  the	  African	  continent,	  especially	  
as	   nearly	   two	   thirds	   of	   Africa’s	   population	   rely	   on	   the	   environment	   for	   their	   primary	   source	   of	  
income	   (Severino	   and	   Ray,	   2011).	   	   Africa	   is	   also	   the	   continent	   predicted	   to	   suffer	   the	  most	   from	  
climate	   change,	   due	   to	   a	   high	   vulnerability	   in	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   and	   a	   weak	   capacity	   of	  
individuals	  to	  respond	  (AfDB,	  2015;	  Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011).	  	  Instead,	  Obeng-­‐Odoom	  (2014)	  argues	  
that	   what	   is	   needed	   is	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   current	   growth-­‐centred	   paradigm	   for	   economic	  
development,	  one	  which	  de-­‐emphasises	  growth	  and	  re-­‐emphasises	  broader	  ideals	  such	  as	  the	  well-­‐
being	  of	  people	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  The	  AfDB	  (2012)	  points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not	  too	  late	  for	  this,	  as	  
Africa’s	  low	  level	  of	  infrastructure	  development	  means	  that	  the	  continent	  is	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  
develop	  in	  a	  sustainable	  way,	  should	  its	  leaders	  choose	  to.	  
2.7	  Ghana	  Rising?	  	  
	  
Ghana	   is	   commonly	   regarded	   as	   the	   poster	   child	   for	   the	   ‘Africa	   Rising’	   narrative,	   having	   achieved	  
significant	  economic	  progress	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  within	  a	  stable	  democratic	  environment	  (Rexer,	  
2015).	   	   The	   first	   African	   colony	   to	   gain	   independence	   in	   1957,	   Ghana	   was	   initially	   considered	   an	  
“economic	  frontrunner”,	  on	  a	  par	  with	  countries	  such	  as	  South	  Korea	  and	  Indonesia	  in	  terms	  of	  per	  
capita	  income	  (Breisinger	  et	  al,	  2011:	  xi).	   	  Yet	  two	  decades	  of	  political	   instability,	  authoritarian	  rule	  
and	   economic	   mismanagement	   resulted	   in	   soaring	   inflation,	   vast	   reductions	   in	   employment	   and	  
income	   per	   capita,	   and	   a	   significant	   increase	   in	   poverty	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   80s	   (Killick,	   2010).	   	   The	  
establishment	   of	   multiparty	   democracy	   in	   1992	   brought	   with	   it	   substantial	   new	   investments,	  




raising	  per	  capita	   incomes	  by	  40%	  over	   the	  same	  period	   (Radelet,	  2010).	   	  The	  years	  2005-­‐08	  were	  
regarded	  as	  a	  “Golden	  Age”	  for	  Ghana,	  as	  the	  country	  became	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  active	  reformers	  in	  
Africa”,	  such	  that	  by	  2007,	  Ghana	  was	  ranked	  first	  in	  West	  Africa	  on	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  ‘ease	  of	  doing	  
business’	   scale	   (Killick,	   2010:	   413).	   	   Also	   in	   2007,	   the	   discovery	   of	   oil	   inspired	   high	   hopes	   for	  
continued	  economic	  success	  in	  Ghana,	  with	  the	  Institute	  of	  Statistical,	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Research	  
citing	  strong	   investment	   in	   the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sectors	  and	   favourable	  commodity	  prices	  as	   the	   factors	  
capable	  of	  sustaining	  Ghana’s	  growth	  into	  the	  future	  (ISSER,	  2015).	  
Economic	  Success	   	  
Between	  2001	  and	  2012,	  Ghana	  recorded	  GDP	  growth	  of	  6.8%,	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  for	  SSA	  (see	  
Figure	  2.3),	  and	  more	  than	  halved	  its	  unemployment	  rate,	  from	  10.4%	  in	  2000	  to	  4.2%	  in	  2010	  (ILO,	  
2014).	   	   According	   to	   Killick,	   Ghana’s	   economic	   growth	   has	   not	   been	   solely	   reliant	   on	   its	   major	  
primary	   commodities	   of	   gold	   and	   cocoa,	   but	   rather	   has	   been	   “broad-­‐based,	   with	   most	   sectors	  
participating,	  including	  agriculture	  for	  once”	  (Killick,	  2010:	  416).	  	  The	  main	  driver	  of	  this	  has	  been	  a	  
significant	   improvement	   in	  macroeconomic	  management	   since	  2000,	   including	  policies	   to	   increase	  
investment	  and	   raise	   tax	   revenues,	  which	  now	  account	   for	  between	  a	   third	  and	  a	  quarter	  of	  GDP,	  
much	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  for	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011).	  	  In	  addition,	  foreign	  
debt	  relief	  under	  the	  Highly	  Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	  (HIPC)	  initiative	  increased	  international	  aid,	  and	  
remittances	   from	   the	   Ghanaian	   diaspora	   have	   also	   helped	   to	   maintain	   the	   conditions	   for	   stable	  
economic	  growth	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011).	   	   In	   July	  2011,	  after	  a	  rebasing	  of	   its	  national	  accounts,	  
Ghana	  was	  re-­‐classified	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  a	  ‘lower-­‐middle	  income	  country’	  (MIC),	  well	  before	  its	  
own	  2020	  target	  (Ewusi,	  2013).	  	  For	  many,	  this	  proves	  that	  Ghana	  is	  “confidently	  advancing	  today	  on	  
the	  track	  of	  economic	  catching-­‐up...	  [and]	  serves	  as	  a	  model	  for	  several	  of	  its	  neighbours”	  (Severino	  
and	  Ray,	  2011:	  165).	  
Figure	  2.3	  Ghana’s	  Real	  GDP	  growth	  (%),	  1991-­‐2012*
	  
Source:	  Molini	  and	  Pierella	  (2015:	  1)	  
*There	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  explanation	  for	  the	  peak	  in	  SSA’s	  GDP	  growth	  in	  2004.	  
‘Rising’	  Social	  Development	  
Ghana’s	  economic	  growth	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  dramatic	  fall	  in	  poverty	  rates,	  from	  51.7%	  in	  
1991/2	   to	  24.2%	   in	  2012/3,	  making	  Ghana	  the	   first	  African	  country	   to	  achieve	   the	  MDG	  of	  halving	  




have	   been	   made	   in	   other	   areas	   too;	   primary	   school	   enrolment	   has	   risen	   by	   a	   third	   and	   life	  
expectancy	   reached	   60	   years	   in	   2008	   (Radelet,	   2010),	   partly	   due	   to	   a	   new	   government	   health	  
insurance	  policy,	  which	  had	  covered	  over	  a	  third	  of	  the	  population	  by	  2007	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011).	  	  
Thus,	   it	  has	  been	  said	  that	  “to	  a	  considerable	  extent	  the	  poor	  have	  benefitted	  from	  the	  impressive	  
growth	  performance	  of	  the	  economy”	  (Ackah	  &	  Aryeetey,	  2012:	  47).	  	  Furthermore,	  Ghana’s	  current	  
demographic	   transition	   is	   expected	   to	   help	   sustain	   the	   country’s	   rising	   GDP,	   through	   declining	  
fertility	   rates,	   which	   are	   leading	   to	   a	   drop	   in	   the	   dependency	   ratio	   (Breisinger	   et	   al,	   2011).	   	   The	  
proportion	   of	   working	   age	   people	   in	   the	   population	   reached	   57%	   in	   2005	   and	   is	   continuing	   to	  
increase,	  whilst	  the	  share	  of	  young	  people	  aged	  0-­‐14	  is	  decreasing,	  from	  45%	  in	  1983	  to	  39%	  in	  2005	  
(Breisinger	  et	  al,	  2011).	  
Reasons	  behind	  ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  Claims	  
According	   to	   the	  World	   Bank	   (2015c),	   the	   principal	   drivers	   behind	   the	   rising	   economic	   and	   social	  
conditions	   in	  Ghana	  over	  the	   last	   two	  decades	  can	  been	  related	  to	  changes	   in	  the	  structure	  of	   the	  
economy	   and	   employment.	   	   From	   1991	   to	   2012,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   notable	   shift	   away	   from	  
agriculture	   towards	  other	   sectors	  of	   the	  economy,	  predominantly	   the	  services	   sector.	   	   Since	  1991,	  
the	  share	  of	  agriculture	  in	  GDP	  declined	  by	  nearly	  40%,	  to	  23%	  in	  2012,	  despite	  remaining	  the	  largest	  
sector	   of	   employment	   (World	   Bank,	   2015c).	   	   The	   services	   sector	   grew	   significantly	   over	   the	   same	  
period,	  with	  its	  share	  of	  the	  workforce	  increasing	  from	  28.8%	  to	  42%,	  and	  the	  share	  of	  the	  workforce	  
employed	   in	   industry	   also	   increased	   from	   10.7%	   to	   14.9%	   (World	   Bank,	   2015c).	   	   Furthermore,	  
between	  1991-­‐2012,	  the	  labour	  force	  became	  better	  educated,	  with	  an	  approximate	  50%	  increase	  in	  
those	  with	  primary	  schooling	  (World	  Bank,	  2015c).	  
Scepticism	  of	  ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  Claims	  
In	   contrast,	   a	   number	   of	   commentators	   argue	   that	   Ghana’s	   economic	   and	   social	   conditions	   are	  
clearly	   not	   ‘rising’.	   	   When	   considering	   economic	   growth	   on	   a	   larger	   timescale,	   such	   as	   from	  
independence	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  current	  GDP	  is	  only	  marginally	  higher	  than	  it	  was	  
in	  the	  1960s;	  the	  reason	  being	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  been	  permanently	  recovering	  from	  the	  severe	  
economic	  crisis	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  such	  that	  by	  2000,	  GDP	  per	  capita	  had	  only	   just	  reached	  the	  
level	  it	  was	  in	  1960	  (Booth	  et	  al,	  2005).	  	  Furthermore,	  macroeconomic	  challenges	  still	  persist	  today;	  
since	  2007,	  public	  debt	  has	  doubled	  to	  almost	  68%	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP	  (Bax,	  2015).	  	  The	  discovery	  
of	  oil	   in	  2007	  may	  well	  be	  the	  reason	  for	  this;	  the	  promise	  of	  oil	  rents	   increased	  the	  government’s	  
borrowing,	  yet	  despite	  a	  high	  interest	  from	  investors,	  a	  fall	  in	  the	  prices	  of	  cocoa	  and	  gold	  –	  two	  of	  
Ghana’s	  main	  exports	  –	  caused	  spending	  controls	  to	  weaken	  (Bax,	  2015).	  	  Hence,	  after	  achieving	  the	  
fastest	  GDP	  growth	  in	  Africa	  in	  2011	  (14%),	  Ghana’s	  2014	  growth,	  at	  4.2%,	  was	  its	  slowest	  in	  twenty	  
years,	  and	  below	  the	  SSA	  average	  of	  5.0%	  (ISSER,	  2015).	  
The	   evidence	   for	   Ghana’s	   ‘rising’	   social	   development	   has	   also	   been	   challenged.	   	   For,	   although	  
poverty	  rates	  have	  fallen,	  wide	  disparities	  exist,	  both	  geographically	  –	  the	  north	  of	  the	  country	  has	  
far	   higher	   poverty	   rates	   than	   the	   south	   –	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   gender	   –	   more	   women	   suffer	   from	  
deprivation	  than	  men	  (Aryeetey	  and	  Kanbur,	  2008).	  	  Ayelazuno	  argues	  that	  despite	  being	  held	  up	  as	  
a	   “beacon	   of	   development	   and	   democracy	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa”,	   Ghana	   lags	   behind	  most	   other	  
developing	   countries	   in	   terms	   of	   social	   welfare,	   industrialization	   and	   overall	   modernization	  
(Ayelazuno,	   2014b:	   80).	   	   The	   recent	   reclassification	   of	   ‘middle	   income’	   has	   not	   as	   yet	   been	  
accompanied	  by	  any	  tangible	  improvements	  in	  people’s	  lives	  (Ayelazuno,	  2014b).	  	  Indeed,	  although	  




day),	  the	  majority	  of	  this	  group	  is	  surviving	  just	  above	  the	  poverty	  line,	  with	  roughly	  a	  third	  earning	  
just	  $2-­‐4	  a	  day	  (BBC	  World	  Service,	  2013).	  	  	  
Many	   authors	   agree	   that	   the	   primary	   reason	   for	   this	   lack	   of	   social	   progress	   has	   been	   “growth	  
without	  development”	  (Ayelazuno,	  2014b:	  81),	  or	  the	  same	  trends	  that	  have	  been	  observed	  across	  
Africa	   as	   a	   whole:	   a	   lack	   of	   structural	   transformation	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   translation	   of	   growth	   into	  
employment	   opportunities.	   	   Ghana’s	   high	   dependence	   on	   natural	   resources	   and	   primary	  
commodities	   has	   left	   its	   citizens	   vulnerable	   to	   external	   shocks	   and	   volatile	   prices	   (Aryeetey	   and	  
Kanbur,	  2008),	  whilst	  the	  employment	  rate	  has	  struggled	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  GDP	  growth	  and	  a	  rising	  
population	   (Ackah	   and	   Aryeetey,	   2012).	   	   According	   to	   the	   ‘Rising’	   narrative’s	   critics,	   Ghana’s	  
economic	  structure	  has	  hardly	  changed	  since	  independence	  in	  1957,	  except	  for	  a	  modest	  shift	  from	  
agriculture	   to	   services	   in	   the	   1990s,	   with	   minimal	   change	   in	   the	   share	   of	   industry	   (Aryeetey	   and	  
Kanbur,	   2008).	   	   More	   recently,	   mining	   and	   construction	   has	   increased	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
manufacturing,	  which	  has	  declined	  from	  its	  share	  of	  9%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2000	  to	  6.9%	  in	  2008	  (Breisinger	  et	  
al,	  2012).	   	  As	  a	  result,	  80%	  of	  Ghana’s	  working	  population	  still	  remains	   in	  the	   informal	  sector,	  with	  
less	   than	  20%	  earning	   from	  a	  permanent	   job	   (Ackah	  and	  Aryeetey,	  2012).	   	   Furthermore,	   there	  are	  
claims	  that	  youth	  unemployment	  rose	  above	  25%	  in	  2010,	  double	  that	  of	  the	  25-­‐44	  age	  category	  and	  
triple	  that	  of	  the	  45-­‐64	  age	  category	  (Ewusi,	  2013).	  	  	  
With	  much	  of	  Ghana’s	  recent	  growth	  coming	  from	  oil	  and	  mineral	  rents	  (following	  the	  discovery	  of	  
the	   Jubilee	   oil	   field	   in	   2007	   and	   its	   subsequent	   exploitation	   in	   2010),	   many	   commentators	   are	  
sceptical	  of	  whether	  such	  growth	  is	  ‘inclusive’	  and	  beneficial	  to	  ordinary	  citizens	  (Ayelazuno,	  2014a).	  	  
Aryeetey	   and	   Kanbur	   (2008)	   cite	   the	   government’s	   economic	   reforms,	   which	   focus	   on	   private	  
investments,	  as	  the	  principal	  reason	  behind	  the	  country’s	  low	  employment	  rate.	  	  For	  one,	  as	  Ghana’s	  
oil	   industry	   is	   located	   100km	   offshore,	   foreign	   companies	   can	   take	   control	   of	   all	   stages	   of	   the	  
extractive	  process	  without	  ever	  having	  to	  bring	  the	  oil	  onshore	  (Ayelazuno,	  2014a).	  	  This	  means	  that	  
they	   can	   bypass	   the	   local	   economy	   and	   employment,	   and	   expatriate	   profits	   straight	   back	   to	   their	  
home	  countries	  in	  the	  West	  (Ayelazuno,	  2014a).	  	  While	  a	  small	  Ghanaian	  political	  elite	  may	  benefit	  
from	   oil	   revenues	   (Booth	   et	   al,	   2005),	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   country	   will	   only	   suffer	   from	   increasing	  
unemployment	   and	   the	   related	   economic	   effects	   of	   the	   ‘resource	   curse’.	   	   Consequently,	   the	   last	  
decade	  saw	  income	  inequality	  widen	  further,	  reflected	  by	  a	  rising	  Gini	  coefficient	  from	  0.353	  in	  1992	  
to	  0.428	  in	  2013	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015b).	  	  	  
Sustainability	  
The	   sustainability	   of	   Ghana’s	   growth	   has	   also	   been	   called	   into	   question	   following	   the	   national	  
economic	  slowdown	  that	  began	   in	  2014,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  $918m	   IMF	   loan	  that	  was	  granted	   in	  
2015	   (IMF,	  2015).	   	  According	   to	   the	   latest	  Economic	  Outlook	  Report,	   the	  3%	  drop	   in	  growth	   (from	  
7.3%	  in	  2013	  to	  4.2%	  in	  2014)	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  “extensive	  power	  cuts,	  the	  rapid	  depreciation	  of	  
the	  domestic	  currency,	  and	  falling	  global	  prices	  for	  gold	  and	  oil”	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015b:	  3).	  	  Rexer	  (2015)	  
also	  cites	  overspending	  and	  a	  widening	   trade	  deficit	  as	   the	   reasons	  behind	   the	   increasing	   inflation	  
rate	   (which	   rose	   to	   17%	   in	   2014)	   and	   devaluing	   of	   the	   currency.	   	   The	   present	   situation	   is	   having	  
significant	   impacts	   on	   the	   poor	   and	   ‘floating’	   classes,	   who	   remain	   highly	   vulnerable	   to	   external	  
shocks,	  such	  as	  increased	  food	  prices,	  compounded	  by	  their	  lack	  of	  purchasing	  power.	  	  However,	  the	  
World	  Bank	  (2015b)	  expects	  Ghana’s	  growth	  to	  be	  positive	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  predicting	  a	  GDP	  growth	  






Whilst	  Ghana	   is	  still	   in	   its	   infancy	  with	  regard	  to	   its	  oil	   industry,	  many	  commentators	  have	  pointed	  
out	  that	  there	  is	  already	  much	  room	  for	  improvement.	  	  Ackah	  and	  Aryeetey	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  steps	  
must	  be	  taken	  early	  on	  to	  prevent	  the	  neglect	  of	  other	  productive	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  namely	  
agriculture	   and	  manufacturing,	   and	   avoid	   potential	   ‘lock-­‐in’	   to	   unsustainable	   development	   paths.	  	  
Breisinger	   et	   al	   (2012)	   agree,	   suggesting	   that	   oil	   revenues	   should	   also	   be	   used	   in	   this	   effort,	   and	  
invested	   in	  public	   services	   to	  ensure	  growth	   is	  widespread,	   rather	   than	   located	   in	  only	  one	  sector.	  	  
Many	  authors	  believe	  that	  economic	  diversification	   is	   imperative	   if	  Ghana	   is	   to	  avoid	   the	  potential	  
negative	   effects	   of	   the	   ‘resource	   curse’	   and	   achieve	   long-­‐lasting	   growth	   that	   is	   inclusive	   and	  
generates	   employment	   (Ewusi,	   2013;	  Herrera	   and	  Aykut,	   2014;	   Booth	   et	   al,	   2005).	   	   For	   this	   to	   be	  
realised,	   the	   government	   must	   take	   steps	   to	   improve	   the	   policy	   environment	   –	   particularly	  
government	  effectiveness	  –	  strengthen	  institutions,	  resolve	  outstanding	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  
and	   build	   human	   capital	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   intensive	   growth	   based	   on	   productivity	   rather	   than	  
investment,	  as	  has	  been	  the	  strategy	  up	  until	  now	  (Herrera	  and	  Aykut,	  2014).	  
Key	   risks	   to	   Ghana’s	   current	   and	   future	   development	   include	   the	   low	   level	   of	   technology	   in	   the	  
economy	   (Herrera	   and	   Aykut,	   2014),	   as	  well	   as	   a	   serious	   energy	   crisis	   caused	   by	   surging	   demand	  
which	  cannot	  be	  met	  using	  the	  current	   infrastructure	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011).	   	  Consequently,	  the	  
unreliable	   power	   supply	   is	   estimated	   to	   be	   costing	   the	   economy	   2-­‐6%	   of	   GDP	   per	   year	   and	   is	   a	  
significant	  hindrance	   to	  Ghana’s	   social	  development	   (ISSER,	  2014a).	   	   Furthermore,	  Ghana’s	  natural	  
resources	  are	  “rapidly	  degrading”	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011:	  164)	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  country	   is	  
extremely	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   climate	   change,	   particularly	   in	   the	   agricultural	   and	   cocoa	  
sectors,	  which	  make	  up	  the	  largest	  sources	  of	  employment	  (Van	  Dijk	  et	  al,	  2014).	  	  This	  will	  no	  doubt	  
affect	  both	  the	  national	  economy	  and	  the	  livelihoods	  and	  wellbeing	  of	  Ghanaian	  citizens.	  	  Finally,	  if	  
the	  current	  levels	  of	  youth	  unemployment	  and	  underemployment	  are	  not	  addressed,	  this	  could	  have	  
significant	  implications	  for	  Ghana’s	  future	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  (ISSER,	  2014a).	  
2.8	  Conclusion	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative	  elicits	  more	  questions	  than	  it	  answers.	   	  For	  example,	  has	  
SSA’s	  recent	  economic	  growth	  been	  noticeably	  higher	  than	   in	  the	  past	  and	   is	   it	  worth	  celebrating?	  	  
Has	   economic	   growth	   translated	   into	   progress	   in	   social	   development?	   	   Can	   SSA’s	   statistics	   and	  
economic	  data	  be	  trusted	  to	  give	  a	  true	  picture	  of	  experiences	  on	  the	  ground?	  	  Has	  economic	  growth	  
been	  solely	  the	  result	  of	  increasing	  trade	  and	  commodity	  prices,	  driven	  by	  China	  and	  other	  emerging	  
economies?	   	   And	   are	   the	   sources	   of	   SSA’s	   economic	   growth	   reliable	   and	   sustainable	   in	   the	   long	  
term?	   	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   there	   are	   many	   differing	   viewpoints	   on	   the	   above	   questions,	   from	  
academics,	  economists,	   journalists	  and	  financial	   institutions.	   	  Some	  put	  the	   ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative	  
down	  to	  “good	  storytelling”	  (Obeng-­‐Odoom,	  2014:	  14),	  whilst	  others	  argue	  that	  “lots	  of	  challenges	  
need	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   before	   we	   can	   begin	   celebrating	   the	   ‘Africa	   moment’”	   (Chitonge,	  
2015:	  250).	  	  Still	  others	  believe	  that	  factors	  such	  as	  war,	  natural	  disasters	  or	  poor	  governance	  could	  
stall	   and	   even	   overturn	   progress	   made	   in	   individual	   countries,	   however	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   Africa’s	  
economic	  growth	  outlook	  is	  strong	  (Leke	  et	  al,	  2010).	  	  As	  Severino	  and	  Ray	  sum	  up,	  “there	  is	  no	  best	  
recipe,	  only	  good	  cooks”	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011:	  169).	  
For	   Ghana,	   questions	   remain	   as	   to	   whether	   enough	   has	   changed	   to	   merit	   the	   global	   status	   of	   a	  




Ghana’s	  recent	  economic	  slowdown	  raises	  questions	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP	  growth,	  
and	   is	  suggestive	  of	  a	   failure	   to	  manage	  oil	   revenues	  as	  a	  major	  driver	  of	  economic	  growth,	  which	  
peaked	   in	   2011	   (ISSER,	   2015).	   	   Ghana’s	   scores	   on	   government	   effectiveness	   have	   been	   steadily	  
declining	  since	  2009	  (World	  Bank,	  2015d),	  and	  this	  and	  many	  other	  macroeconomic	  challenges	  must	  
be	   addressed	   if	   Ghana	   is	   to	   maintain	   its	   recent	   progress	   in	   economic	   and	   social	   development	  
indicators,	   and	   avoid	   the	   damaging	   impacts	   of	   the	   ‘resource	   curse’	   (ISSER,	   2015).	   	   As	   Booth	   et	   al	  
conclude,	  it	  is	  “unclear	  whether	  Ghana	  is	  on	  track	  to	  become	  a	  really	  successful	  developing	  country,	  
or	   merely	   one	   that	   has	   achieved	   a	   worthwhile	   economic	   recovery	   and	   a	   measure	   of	   political	  
stability”	  (Booth	  et	  al,	  2005:	  4).	  	  	  




Chapter	  3:	  Methodology	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
	  
This	   chapter	  will	  describe	   the	  methods	  used	   for	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis,	  whilst	   situating	   them	  
within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   chosen	   and	   the	   data	   limitations	   of	   the	  
research.	   	   In	  addition	  to	  providing	  definitions	  of	  key	  terms	  used	  during	  the	  analysis	  and	  discussion,	  
this	   section	   will	   also	   attempt	   to	   address	   Research	   Question	   2	   on	   the	   issues	   of	   accessibility,	  
completeness,	  reliability	  and	  accuracy	  of	  the	  evidence	  behind	  the	  ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  claims,	  based	  on	  the	  
following	  definitions:	  
i. Accessibility	  –	  Is	  the	  data	  available	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  (i.e.	  online	  or	  printed)?	  
ii. Completeness	  –	  Is	  the	  data	  complete	  for	  the	  time	  period	  being	  assessed?	  
iii. Reliability	  –	  Is	  the	  data	  consistent	  and	  verified	  by	  more	  than	  one	  source?	  	  
iv. Accuracy	  –	  Is	  the	  data	  from	  an	  “official”	  source?	  i.e.	  from	  an	  agency	  that	  publishes	  the	  
methodologies	  used	  to	  collect	  and	  process	  the	  data?	  And	  has	  the	  data	  been	  reviewed	  and	  
used	  by	  reputable	  analysts?	  
3.2	  Data	  Collection	  
	  
For	  this	  study,	  socioeconomic	  data	  since	  the	  year	  2000	  was	   initially	  sought	  from	  national	  statistical	  
agencies	   in	   Ghana.	   	   However,	   a	   combination	   of	   internet	   searches	   and	   communication	   with	   key	  
contacts	   in	   these	   statistical	   agencies	   over	   the	   course	   of	   six	   months	   yielded	   incomplete	   results,	  
leading	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	   the	  majority	  of	  socioeconomic	  datasets	  are	  not	  readily	  accessible	  to	  
external	   researchers	   or	   the	   general	   public.	   	   Instead,	   the	   agency	   staff	   directed	   the	   queries	   to	  
alternative	   data	   sources,	   mostly	   government	   departments,	   where	   similar	   limitations	   regarding	  
incompleteness	  and	  difficulties	  in	  access	  were	  replicated.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  widen	  the	  
scope	   of	   inquiry	   to	   include	   international	   sources	   such	   as	   multilateral	   development	   banks	   and	  
independent	   research	   bodies,	   which	   make	   data	   easily	   accessible	   online	   through	   interactive	   data	  
portals	  or	  as	  downloadable	  reports.	  	  A	  full	  list	  of	  data	  collected	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  3.1.	  
Table	  3.1	  Socioeconomic	  Data	  Collected	  
	   Source:	  Ghana	   Source:	  International	  
Economic	  data	   • Bank	  of	  Ghana	  Quarterly	  Bulletins:	  
2000-­‐2002,	  2005-­‐2015	  
• Ghana’s	  Economic	  Performance,	  in	  
Figures	  (Ghana	  Statistical	  Service):	  
2005,	  2008,	  2009,	  2010	  
• Ministry	  of	  Finance	  Budget	  
Statements:	  2000-­‐2016	  
• State	  of	  the	  Ghanaian	  Economy	  
Reports	  (Ghana	  Statistical	  Service):	  	  
2002,	  2005,	  2011,	  2012-­‐2014	  
	  
• African	  Economic	  Outlook	  
Reports:	  Ghana:	  2003-­‐2015	  
• World	  Bank	  Development	  
Indicators	  
• African	  Development	  Bank	  
Indicators	  





Social	  data	   • Demographic	  Health	  Surveys	  
(Ghana	  Statistical	  Service,	  Ghana	  
Health	  Service	  and	  ICF	  
International):	  2003,	  2008,	  2014	  
• Ghana	  Living	  Standards	  Surveys	  
(Ghana	  Statistical	  Service):	  2008,	  
2014	  
• Population	  &	  Housing	  Census	  
(Ghana	  Statistical	  Service):	  
2000,	  2010	  
• MDG	  Reports	  (Republic	  of	  
Ghana/UNDP):	  2004,	  2006,	  2010,	  
2013,	  2015	  
• United	  Nations	  Development	  
Programme	  (UNDP)	  Human	  
Development	  Reports:	  2000-­‐
2015	  
• National	  Ecological	  Footprint	  
Accounts	  (Global	  Footprint	  
Network)	  
3.3	  Data	  Limitations	  
This	   dissertation	   was	   designed	   to	   be	   completed	   as	   a	   piece	   of	   desk	   research	   from	   outside	   of	   the	  
country	  of	   focus.	   	  Nevertheless,	   had	   the	   time	  and	  budget	   constraints	  not	   existed,	   travel	   to	  Ghana	  
may	  have	  been	  a	  possibility,	  and	  therefore	  the	  amount	  and	  quality	  of	  data	  collected	  may	  have	  been	  
improved.	  	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  desktop	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  methodology	  may	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  data	   limitation,	  however,	   communication	  with	  organisations	  and	   individual	   contacts	   in	  Ghana	  
did	   not	   seem	   to	   indicate	   that	   a	   personal	   visit	   to	   the	   country	   would	   significantly	   add	   to	   the	   data	  
already	  collected	  or	  the	  study	  as	  a	  whole.	  
Another	  limitation	  of	  the	  research	  methodology	  may	  be	  the	  time	  period	  chosen;	  analysing	  data	  from	  
2000	  onwards	  only	  provides	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  time	  period	  under	  analysis,	  and	  cannot	  fully	  situate	  the	  
data	   in	   its	  historical	  context.	   	  As	  Chitonge	   (2015)	  warns,	   it	   is	   important	  not	   to	  “de-­‐link”	   the	   ‘Africa	  
Rising’	  narrative	  from	  past	  growth	  and	  development,	  otherwise	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  of	  misinterpreting	  
the	   data	   completely.	   	   As	   a	   means	   of	   addressing	   this,	   this	   dissertation	   attempts	   to	   include	   past	  
socioeconomic	   data	   where	   appropriate	   and	   available,	   as	   well	   as	   relevant	   economic	   and	   political	  
history	  in	  the	  background	  chapter	  on	  Ghana.	  
As	  many	  researchers	  and	  economists	  have	  found,	  the	  statistical	  capacity	  of	  many	  African	  nations	  is	  
“generally	  weak”	   (Jerven,	  2013:	  3)	  and	   therefore	   the	  data	  produced	  may	  contain	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  
uncertainty	  (Young,	  2012;	  Devarajan,	  2011).	  	  Whilst	  not	  the	  case	  for	  all	  African	  countries,	  it	  has	  been	  
observed	   that	   many	   African	   statistical	   offices	   still	   lack	   the	   human	   capital	   and	   other	   resources	   to	  
collect	  and	  analyse	  data	  effectively	  (Brock,	  2015).	  	  Furthermore,	  economic	  and	  poverty	  statistics	  are	  
particularly	   difficult	   to	   compile	   in	   African	   countries	   with	   large	   informal	   economies,	   weak	  
infrastructure	  and	  vast	  rural	  populations	  (Mahajan,	  2009;	  Brock,	  2015).	  	  This	  has	  further	  implications	  
for	  policy-­‐making,	  especially	  for	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  sectors	  which	  rely	  on	  the	  use	  of	  accurate	  
data	  (IMF	  Survey,	  2016).	  
In	   addition,	   a	   number	   of	   authors	   have	   highlighted	   the	   political	   nature	   of	   statistics,	   particularly	  
economic	   data,	   and	   argue	   that	   misrepresentation	   frequently	   occurs	   for	   political	   reasons,	   such	   as	  
over-­‐	  or	  under-­‐estimation	  to	  satisfy	  foreign	  donors,	   investors	  or	  government	  targets	  (Sandefur	  and	  
Glassman,	  2014;	  Taylor,	  2014).	   	  Some	  authors	  have	  also	  questioned	  the	  independence	  of	  statistical	  
offices,	  as	  many	  are	   firmly	  under	   the	  control	  of	  national	  governments,	  or	   foreign	   investors	   (Brock,	  
2015).	  	  It	  has	  even	  been	  suggested	  that	  some	  political	  elites	  prefer	  to	  keep	  the	  quality	  of	  data	  poor,	  




Accessibility,	  Completeness,	  Reliability,	  Accuracy	  of	  Data	  Collected	  
As	  explained	  above,	  national	  data	  from	  African	  countries	  can	  be	  fraught	  with	  issues	  and	  problematic	  
to	  rely	  on.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  data	  from	  Ghanaian	  statistical	  agencies	  proved	  difficult	  to	  access	  and,	  of	  the	  
data	  that	  was	  available,	  there	  were	  many	  cases	  where	  it	  was	  incomplete	  with	  certain	  years	  missing.	  	  
It	   is	  unclear	  whether	  data	   for	   those	  years	  does	  not	  exist	  or	   is	   simply	  not	  accessible	  due	   to	  human	  
error	  or	  other	  reasons.	   	   In	  addition,	  some	  reports	  were	   inconsistent	   in	  the	  way	  that	  statistics	  were	  
presented,	   meaning	   the	   data	   could	   not	   be	   compared	   between	   different	   years.	   	   Given	   the	   data	  
limitations	  outlined	  above,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  judge	  the	  reliability	  and	  accuracy	  of	  national	  data	  sources	  
as	   often	   the	   methodologies	   used	   for	   data	   collection	   and	   analysis	   are	   not	   available	   for	   scrutiny.	  	  
However,	   the	   data	   collected	   from	   Ghana	   (see	   Table	   3.1)	   do	   come	   from	   ‘official’	   sources	   and	   are	  
frequently	  used	  by	  independent	  analysts	  and	  larger	  institutions.	  	  	  
The	   international	   data	   sources,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   much	   more	   accessible,	   with	   extensive	  
datasets	  presented	   in	   interactive	  online	  portals	  or	  as	  annexes	   in	  detailed	  and	  easily	  downloadable	  
reports.	   	  This	  data	  was	  found	  to	  be	   largely	  complete	  and	  consistent	   (i.e.	  no	  obvious	  gaps	  or	  errors	  
were	  observed),	  with	  the	  methodologies	  published	  and	  sources	  cited.	  	  However,	  again	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
judge	  the	  reliability	  of	  such	  data	  as	  many	   international	  datasets	  are	  drawn	  from	  national	  statistical	  
agencies	  and	  government	  departments.	  
3.4	  Theoretical	  Framework	  
	  
This	  study	  is	   located	  within	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  development	  economics,	   in	  particular	  the	  
paradigm	   that	   has	   emerged	   since	   the	   1990s,	   which	   has	   shifted	   the	   focus	   of	   ‘development’	   from	  
purely	   economic	   growth	   to	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   poverty	   reduction	   (Sindzingre,	   2008).	   	   This	   has	  
been	  made	   possible	   by	   the	   broadening	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   poverty	   to	   include	   a	   greater	   focus	   on	  
human	  and	  social	  elements,	  such	  as	  literacy,	  health	  and	  social	  inclusion,	  and	  its	  mainstreaming	  into	  
politics	  and	  decision-­‐making,	   for	  example	   through	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	   (MDGs)	  and	  
the	  new	  Sustainable	  Development	  Goals	  (SDGs)	  (Sindzingre,	  2008).	  	  According	  to	  Szirmai	  (2005),	  the	  
definition	   of	   economic	   development	   must	   also	   be	   broadened	   to	   include	   structural	   change,	   both	  
industrial	  and	  technological,	  and	  the	  term	  ‘development’	  must	  encompass	  additional	  aspects	  such	  as	  
income	  inequality	  and	  employment.	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  points	  of	  discussion	  in	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative	  is	  the	  drivers	  of	  recent	  economic	  
growth	   across	   the	   continent	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   are	   able	   to	   bring	   about	   broad-­‐based	  
development	   that	   is	   inclusive,	   equitable	   and	   sustainable,	   from	   both	   an	   economic	   and	   social	  
perspective.	  	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  SSA’s	  current	  growth	  is	  based	  on	  “superficial	  features”	  such	  as	  
GDP	  growth,	  prices,	  debt	  levels	  and	  exchange	  rates,	  rather	  than	  “structural	  features”	  that	  contribute	  
to	  changing	  Africa’s	  role	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  (Taylor,	  2016:	  10).	  	  These	  structural	  changes	  include	  
increasing	   the	   share	   of	   industry	   and	   services	   in	   national	   economies,	   the	   broadening	   and	  
sophistication	  of	  exports,	  and	  the	  movement	  of	  workers	  from	  low	  to	  high	  productivity	  sectors,	  such	  
as	  industry,	  particularly	  manufacturing	  (Taylor,	  2016).	  	  For	  Sy,	  SSA’s	  growth	  needs	  to	  be	  faster	  and	  of	  
better	   quality,	   with	   a	   high	   elasticity	   of	   poverty	   reduction	   (i.e.	   growth	   translates	   into	   increased	  
incomes	  of	  the	  poor),	  which	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  with	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  exports	  of	  oil	  and	  other	  
commodities	   to	  more	   sustainable	   “engines	   of	   growth”	   such	   as	   agriculture	   and	  manufacturing	   (Sy,	  




Although	   some	   authors	   (e.g.	   Morris,	   Kaplinksy	   and	   Kaplan,	   2011)	   challenge	   the	   negative	   view	   of	  
primary	   commodities,	   arguing	   that	   linkage	   opportunities	   exist	   that	   can	   contribute	   to	   sustainable	  
industrial	  development,	   the	  dominant	  paradigm	   is	   that	  economic	   transformation	   is	   typically	  driven	  
by	   industrialisation	   and	   manufacturing,	   which	   bring	   about	   a	   decline	   in	   the	   share	   of	   agriculture,	  
increased	   urbanisation	   and	   the	  modernisation	   of	   economies,	   societies	   and	   institutions	   (Breisinger	  
and	  Diao,	  2008).	  	  The	  current	  trend	  across	  SSA	  is	  a	  move	  from	  agriculture	  directly	  to	  services,	  missing	  
out	   the	   industrialisation	   phase	   completely,	  which	   is	   potentially	   problematic	   as	   it	   could	  mean	   that	  
opportunities	  for	  technological	  innovation,	  policy	  experimentation	  and	  learning	  are	  also	  overlooked	  
(Page,	   2016).	   	   In	   addition,	   it	   is	   largely	   agreed	   that	   the	   services	   sector	  does	  not	  have	   the	  ability	   to	  
generate	  the	  same	  broad-­‐based	  growth	  with	  high	  worker	  productivity	  as	   the	  manufacturing	  sector	  
(Rodrik,	  2014).	  
Economic	  growth	  based	  on	  natural	  resources	  is	  also	  controversial	  among	  development	  economists,	  
as	  empirical	  growth	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  nearly	  all	  resource-­‐rich	  countries	  grow	  at	  a	  slower	  rate	  
than	  countries	  without	  natural	  resource	  endowments	  (Sachs	  and	  Warner,	  2001).	  	  The	  main	  reasons	  
for	  this	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  ‘crowding-­‐out’	  of	  other	  activities	  and	  entrepreneurship	  that	  drive	  economic	  
growth	   (Sachs	   and	  Warner,	   2001)	   and,	   in	   African	   countries,	   the	   inability	   to	  mobilise	   tax	   revenues	  
(Ndikumana	   and	   Abderrahim,	   2010).	   	   In	   addition,	   commodity	   price	   fluctuations	   can	   cause	  
government	   expenditures	   to	   become	   increasingly	   volatile,	   with	   the	   promise	   of	   resource	   revenues	  
often	   leading	   to	   government	   consumption	   booms	   (Ndikumana	   and	   Abderrahim,	   2010).	   	   Thus,	  
without	  sound	  economic	  and	  political	  policies	  to	  effectively	  manage	  revenues	  and	  expenditures,	  and	  
the	   appropriate	   capacity	   to	   implement	   these	   policies,	   the	   long-­‐term	   growth	   of	   resource-­‐rich	  
countries	  is	  extremely	  limited.	  	  	  
In	  addition,	  connections	  have	  been	  made	  between	  economic	  growth	  based	  on	  resource	  extraction	  
and	  rising	  inequality	  (Taylor,	  2016).	  	  According	  to	  the	  latest	  World	  Bank	  report	  (Beegle	  et	  al,	  2016),	  
inequality	  is	  widening	  across	  Africa,	  and	  this	  could	  have	  significant	  negative	  impacts	  on	  both	  poverty	  
reduction	  and	  the	  sustainability	  of	  economic	  growth	  (Berg	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  Indeed,	  a	  recent	  IMF	  report	  
(Dabla-­‐Norris	  et	  al,	  2015)	  notes	  that	  increasing	  incomes	  among	  the	  top	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population	  
result	  in	  a	  decline	  in	  a	  country’s	  GDP	  growth	  over	  the	  medium	  term,	  however	  an	  increase	  among	  the	  
bottom	  20	  per	  cent	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  GDP	  growth.	  	  There	  have	  been	  many	  theories	  put	  forward	  
to	   explain	   inequality,	   beginning	  with	   Kuznets	   in	   1955,	   who	   suggested	   that	   inequality	   increases	   as	  
economic	   growth	   increases,	   before	   peaking	   and	   then	   declining	   (Kuznets,	   1955).	   	   Yet,	   despite	  
providing	  an	  explanation	   for	   inequality	   in	  European	  countries,	  Kuznets’	   theory	  does	  not	   fit	  African	  
countries’	   experiences,	   where	   inequality	   has	   been	   a	   factor	   since	   independence,	   leading	   to	   the	  
assumption	   that	   inequality	  must	  be	  politically	  determined	   (Milanovic,	  2003).	   	   Yet	  political	   theories	  
such	   as	   neopatrimonialism	  and	   clientelism	  have	   also	  been	   criticised	   for	   reducing	   and	   stereotyping	  
the	   diverse	   experiences	   of	   African	   countries	   into	   an	   overarching	   theory	   considered	   by	   many	   as	  
“passé”	  (Mkandawire,	  2015:	  602).	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  none	  of	  these	  theories	  have	  been	  applied	  
in	   this	   research;	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   no	   one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all-­‐approach	   for	   theorising	   and	   addressing	  
inequality	  among	  African	  nations.	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  above,	  the	  key	  questions	  for	  this	  dissertation	  involve	  the	  nature	  of	  Ghana’s	  economic	  
growth	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   it	   has	   translated	   into	   economic	   development	   (see	   definition	   in	  
section	  3.6	  below).	  	  An	  initial	  hypothesis	  that	  situates	  Ghana	  within	  the	  economic	  theories	  described	  
above	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   dependence	   of	   the	   economy	   on	   natural	   resources	   and	   primary	  




pro-­‐poor	  growth	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  more	  broadly.	  Ghana’s	  fledgling	  oil	  sector,	  which	  has	  much	  
potential	   to	  generate	  and	   sustain	  GDP	  growth,	   also	   carries	  major	   risks	   for	   the	   country’s	  economy,	  
including	  fiscal	  volatility,	  overvaluation	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate	  –	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  other	  sectors	  of	  the	  
economy	  becoming	  uncompetitive	  –	  and	  a	  concentration	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  hence	  political	  power	  
in	   the	   hands	   of	   those	   connected	   with	   the	   commodity,	   which	   can	   also	   breed	   corruption.	  	  
Furthermore,	   if	   investments	   are	   not	   being	   made	   in	   other	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy,	   especially	  
manufacturing	   and	   industrial	   development,	   then	   it	   is	   doubtful	   that	   sufficient	   structural	   change	   is	  
taking	  place	  to	  stimulate	  the	  kind	  of	  sustainable,	  inclusive,	  equitable	  growth	  needed	  to	  bring	  about	  
broad-­‐based	  development	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  inequality	  across	  the	  country.	  	  
3.5	  Methodology	  
The	  methodology	  used	  for	  data	  analysis	  draws	  on	  the	  literature	  reviewed	  and	  the	  data	  collected	  to	  
assess	  whether	  there	  is	  socioeconomic	  evidence,	  from	  the	  year	  2000	  to	  the	  present,	  to	  support	  the	  
claims	   that	  Ghana	   is	   ‘rising’,	   economically	   and	   socially.	   	   To	   answer	   this	   question,	   certain	   headings	  
were	   identified	   that	   relate	   to	   both	   the	   claims	   made	   in	   the	   literature	   and	   the	   overall	   picture	   of	  
Ghana’s	  development	  i.e.	  has	  economic	  growth	  been	  equitable,	  sustainable	  and	  inclusive	  (see	  Figure	  
3.1).	   	  The	  primary	  headings	  chosen	  were	  poverty,	  economic	  growth	  and	  employment	  and	  equality,	  
with	   sub-­‐headings	   including	   Ghana’s	  MDG	   progress,	   size	   of	   the	  middle	   class,	   the	  macroeconomic	  
environment,	   and	   the	   structure	   and	   sustainability	   of	   economic	   growth.	   	   Under	   each	   heading,	   the	  
claims	   and	   counter-­‐claims	  made	   in	   the	   literature	   are	   summarised,	   followed	   by	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  
source	  data	  that	  was	  collected	  (see	  Table	  3.1).	  	  A	  discussion	  then	  follows	  to	  analyse	  the	  trends	  found	  
in	  the	  source	  data	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  claims	  made.	  
Figure	  3.1	  Components	  of	  Sustainable	  Economic	  Growth	   	  
	  
Indicators	  for	  Sustainable,	  Inclusive,	  Equitable	  Growth	  
According	  to	  Morse	  (2004),	  “indicators	  can	  be	  powerful	  and	  useful	  tools”;	  however	  their	  power	  lies	  
in	  who	  has	   the	  choice	  of	   indicators	  used,	  how	   they	  are	  measured	  and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   they	  are	  












yet	  only	  if	  the	  available	  data	  is	  reliable,	  and	  accessible	  at	  an	  appropriate	  scale	  or	  scope	  (Costanza	  et	  
al,	  2009).	  	  Furthermore,	  indicators	  may	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  reinforcing	  a	  particular	  paradigm,	  for	  example	  
the	  conflation	  of	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  with	  the	  attainment	  of	  economic	  growth	  as	  a	  means	  
of	  achieving	  well-­‐being	  -­‐	  the	  “Growth	  is	  Good”	  paradigm	  (Costanza	  et	  al,	  2009:	  27).	  	  GDP	  however,	  is	  
only	   able	   to	  measure	   economic	   activity,	   not	  well-­‐being,	   and	   cannot	   factor	   in	   the	   broader	   human,	  
social	  and	  ecological	  capital	  that	  economic	  activity	  relies	  on,	  so	  is	  thus	  also	  incapable	  of	  assessing	  the	  
sustainability	  of	  economic	  development	  (Costanza	  et	  al,	  2009).	  
As	   a	   result,	   there	   has	   emerged	   a	   widespread	   belief	   that	   the	   world	   needs	   a	   “better	   statistical	  
‘compass’	   to	   shift	   emphasis	   from	   measuring	   economic	   progress	   phenomenon	   to	   measuring	  
sustainable	  development”	  (UNECE,	  2014:	  xiii,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  To	  do	  so	  involves	  the	  development	  
of	   indicators	   that	   are	   capable	   of	  measuring	  more	   subjective	   components	   of	   progress,	   particularly	  
current	  and	  future	  human	  well-­‐being,	  as	  well	  as	  harmful	   long-­‐term	  effects	  such	  as	  the	  depletion	  of	  
natural	   resources	   and	   the	   release	   of	   pollutants	   such	   as	   carbon	   emissions	   into	   the	   atmosphere	  
(UNECE,	  2014).	  	  This	  dissertation	  therefore	  endeavours	  to	  consider	  economic	  indicators	  such	  as	  GDP	  
in	  a	  more	  holistic	  manner,	  examining	  not	  only	  the	  growth	  of	  GDP	  over	  time,	  but	  also	  the	  structure	  of	  
GDP	   and	   its	   linkages	   to	   employment,	   poverty	   reduction	   and	   inequality.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   economic	  
indicators,	   MDG	   reports	   will	   be	   used	   to	   examine	   social	   indicators	   such	   as	   income	   and	   gender	  
equality,	  and	  Ecological	  Footprint	  measurements	  for	  information	  on	  environmental	  sustainability.	  	  	  
3.6	  Key	  Definitions	  
Lastly,	  with	  a	  research	  topic	  as	  complex	  and	  diverse	  as	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
define	  the	  key	  terms	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  data	  analysis	  and	  discussion.	  	  These	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
table	  below.	  




Africa	  	   For	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  term	  ‘Africa’	  will	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  
sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  unless	  specified.	  
Middle	  Class	   According	   to	   the	   African	   Development	   Bank:	   “In	   relative	  
terms...	  individuals	  or	  households	  that	  fall	  between	  the	  20th	  
and	   80th	   percentile	   of	   the	   consumption	   distribution	   or	  
between	   0.75	   and	   1.25	   times	   median	   per	   capita	   income,	  
respectively.	  Using	   the	  absolute	  approach...	  per	  capita	  daily	  
consumption	   of	   $2-­‐$20	   in	   2005	   PPP	   US	   dollars	   to	  
characterize	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  Africa”	  (AfDB,	  2011:	  2).	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   Pew	   Research	   Center:	   $10-­‐20.	   “There	   is	  
growing	   consensus	   that	   the	   $10	   threshold,	   which	   is	   five	  
times	   the	  poverty	   line	  used	   in	   this	   study,	   is	  associated	  with	  
economic	   security	   and	   “insulates”	   people	   from	   falling	   back	  
into	  poverty”	  (Kochhar,	  2015:	  8).	  
Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  –	  measured	  
in	  constant	  local	  currency	  (LCU)	  
“GDP	   is	   the	   sum	   of	   gross	   value	   added	   by	   all	   resident	  
producers	  in	  the	  economy	  plus	  any	  product	  taxes	  and	  minus	  
any	  subsidies	  not	  included	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  products.	   It	   is	  
calculated	   without	   making	   deductions	   for	   depreciation	   of	  




resources.	  Data	  are	  in	  constant	  local	  currency.”	  (World	  Bank,	  
2016b)	  
Economic	  Growth	  	   “Quantitative	   change	  or	   expansion	   in	   a	   country’s	   economy.	  
Economic	   growth	   is	   conventionally	   measured	   as	   the	  
percentage	   increase	   in	   gross	   domestic	   product	   (GDP)	   or	  
gross	  national	  product	   (GNP)	  during	  one	  year”	   (Soubbotina,	  
2004:	  133).	  
Economic	  Development	   A	   “multidimensional	   process	   involving	   major	   changes	   in	  
social	  structures,	  popular	  attitudes,	  and	  national	  institutions,	  
as	   well	   as	   the	   acceleration	   of	   economic	   growth,	   the	  
reduction	   of	   inequality,	   and	   the	   eradication	   of	   poverty”	  
(Todaro	  and	  Smith,	  2009:	  16).	  
Inclusive	  Growth	   “...output	   growth	   that	   is	   sustained	   over	   decades,	   is	   broad-­‐
based	   across	   economic	   sectors,	   creates	   productive	  
employment	   opportunities	   for	   a	   great	   majority	   of	   the	  
country’s	   working	   age	   population,	   and	   reduces	   poverty”	  
(Samans	  et	  al,	  2015:	  1).	  
Sustainable	  Growth	  	   Growth	  “that	  will	  protect	  livelihoods,	  improve	  water,	  energy	  
and	   food	   security,	   promote	   the	   sustainable	   use	   of	   natural	  
resources	   and	   spur	   innovation,	   job	   creation	   and	   economic	  
development”	  (AfDB,	  2013:	  1-­‐2).	  
Equitable	  Growth	   “Long-­‐term	   sustainable	   economic	   growth	   that	   creates	  
economic	  opportunity	   in	  the	  form	  of	  decent	  and	  productive	  
employment	   in	   both	   the	   formal	   and	   informal	   sectors	   that	  
may	   be	   accessed	   by	   all	   of	   society	   regardless	   of	   economic	  
status,	   gender	   or	   ethnicity,	   thus	   enabling	   all	   of	   society	   to	  
both	   benefit	   directly	   from	   and	   participate	   in	   economic	  
activity	   and	   future	   growth”	   (Rodríguez-­‐Pose	   and	   Wilkie,	  
2015:	  13).	  
Social	  Development	   “...processes	  of	  change	  that	  lead	  to	  improvements	  in	  human	  
well-­‐being,	   social	   relations	   and	   social	   institutions,	   and	   that	  
are	  equitable,	  sustainable,	  and	  compatible	  with	  principles	  of	  
democratic	  governance	  and	  social	  justice”	  (UNRISD,	  2011:	  2).	  
Poverty	   Ghana	   Statistical	   Service’s	   national	   (upper)	   poverty	   line:	  
1314.00	  Ghana	  cedis	  ($1.83	  approx.)	  per	  capita.	  
	  
“Individuals	   consuming	   above	   this	   level	   can	   be	   considered	  
able	   to	   purchase	   enough	   food	   to	   meet	   their	   nutritional	  
requirements	  and	   their	  basic	  non-­‐food	  needs”	   (GSS,	  2014b:	  
7).	  
Extreme	  Poverty	   Ghana	   Statistical	   Service’s	   national	   extreme	   poverty	   line:	  
792.05	  Ghana	  cedis	  ($1.10	  approx.)	  per	  capita.	  
	  
“...those	  whose	  standard	  of	  living	  is	  insufficient	  to	  meet	  their	  
basic	   nutritional	   requirements	   even	   if	   they	   devoted	   their	  





Chapter	  4:	  Ghana	  Profile	  
4.1	  Introduction	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  background	  information	  on	  Ghana,	  including	  aspects	  such	  
as	   geography	   and	   climate,	   population	   and	   demographics,	   trade	   and	   exports,	   government	   and	  
politics,	  macroeconomics,	  employment,	  energy	  and	  climate	  change,	  to	  present	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  the	  
country	  context	  for	  the	  following	  data	  analysis.	  
4.2	  Geography	  &	  Climate	  
Ghana	  is	  located	  on	  the	  west	  coast	  of	  Africa,	  and	  has	  a	  tropical	  climate	  with	  three	  distinct	  ecological	  
zones:	  dry	  savannah	   in	   the	  northern	  regions;	   semi-­‐deciduous	   rainforest	   in	   the	  middle	  and	  western	  
regions;	   and	   sandy,	   coastal	   plains	   in	   the	   southern	   regions	   (GSS	   et	   al,	   2015).	   	   The	   average	   annual	  
temperature	  is	  26oC	  (79oF)	  and	  the	  average	  annual	  rainfall	  ranges	  from	  1,015mm	  (40	  inches)	  in	  the	  
north	   (which	   has	   one	   rainy	   season)	   to	   2,030mm	   (80	   inches)	   in	   the	   south	   (which	   has	   two	   rainy	  
seasons)	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  Ghana	  is	  divided	  into	  ten	  regions	  (see	  Figure	  4.1).	  
Figure	  4.1	  Map	  of	  Ghana	  
	  




4.3	  Population	  &	  Demographics	  
According	  to	  the	   latest	  Ghana	  Living	  Standards	  Survey,	   the	  population	  of	  Ghana	   is	  estimated	  to	  be	  
26.3	  million,	  divided	  into	  51.7%	  females	  and	  48.3%	  males	  (GSS,	  2014a).	   	  Ashanti	  and	  Greater	  Accra	  
have	   the	   highest	   recorded	   populations,	   of	   5.2m	   and	   4.3m	   respectively,	   whereas	   Upper	   East	   and	  
Upper	  West	  have	  the	  lowest	  populations,	  of	  1.1m	  and	  0.8m	  respectively	  (GSS,	  2014a).	  	  
Table	  4.1	  shows	  the	  trends	  in	  Ghana’s	  population	  and	  demographics	  from	  1960	  to	  2010.	  	  Since	  the	  
first	  census	   in	  1960,	  Ghana’s	  population	  has	   increased	  significantly,	   from	  6.7m	  in	  1960	  to	  24.7m	  in	  
2010,	   with	   a	   steady	   annual	   growth	   rate	   of	   around	   2.5%	   (GSS	   et	   al,	   2015).	   	   The	   share	   of	   the	  
population	   living	   in	  urban	  areas	  has	  more	  than	  doubled	  over	   the	  time	  period,	   from	  23%	  to	  51%	   in	  
2010,	   and	   the	   population	   density	   has	  more	   than	   tripled,	   from	   29	   to	   103	   persons/km2	   (GSS	   et	   al,	  
2015).	   	  Life	  expectancy	  has	  steadily	  increased	  from	  38	  to	  60	  years	  for	  males	  and	  43	  to	  63	  years	  for	  
females	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  
Table	  4.1	  Population	  Indicators,	  1960-­‐2010	  










Population	  (millions)	   6.7	   8.6	   12.3	   18.9	   24.7	  
Annual	  growth	  rate	  
(%)	  








Density	  (pop/km2)	   29	   36	   52	   79	   103	  
%	  Urban	   23	   29	   32	   44	   51	  
Pop	  under	  15	  yrs	  (%)	   45	   48	   46	   42	   40	  
Life	  Expectancy	  -­‐	  	  
Male	  (years)	  	  
38	   45	   50	   55	   60	  
Life	  Expectancy	  -­‐	  
Female	  (years)	  	  
43	   48	   54	   60	   63	  
Source:	  GSS	  et	  al	  (2015)	  
	  
The	   latest	   Ghana	   Living	   Standards	   Survey	   (GSS,	   2014a	   and	   2014b)	   estimates	   that	   24.2%	   of	   the	  
population	  live	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  of	  1,314	  Ghanaian	  cedis	  (approximately	  $1.83)	  a	  day	  and	  8.4%	  
of	   the	   population	   live	   below	   the	   extreme	   poverty	   line	   of	   792.05	   Ghanaian	   cedis	   (approximately	  
$1.10)	  a	  day.	  	  This	  represents	  a	  considerable	  reduction	  since	  the	  early	  1990s	  (see	  Figure	  4.2	  below),	  
making	  Ghana	  the	   first	  African	  country	   to	  achieve	   the	  MDG	  target	  of	  halving	  extreme	  poverty	  and	  
hunger,	  well	  before	  the	  2015	  deadline	  (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2012).	  	  Yet	  as	  Figure	  4.2	  
shows,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   sizeable	   difference	   between	   the	   poverty	   incidence	   in	   the	   rural	   and	   urban	  
regions	  of	  Ghana.	  
	  
	  




Figure	  4.2	  Poverty	  Incidence	  (%),	  1991/92-­‐2005/06	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2007)	  
4.4	  Government	  &	  Politics	  	  
Ghana	  gained	  independence	  from	  Great	  Britain	  in	  1957	  and	  joined	  the	  Commonwealth	  as	  a	  Republic	  
in	  1960,	  with	  Accra	  as	  its	  administrative	  and	  political	  capital	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  Ghana	  is	  a	  multi-­‐party	  
democracy	  made	  up	  of	  10	  administrative	  regions	  and	  216	  districts,	  and	  administered	  by	  an	  elected	  
parliament	  and	  independent	  judiciary	  (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2015).	  	  The	  president	  is	  
elected	   every	   four	   years,	   for	   a	  maximum	  of	   two	   terms	   (GSS	   et	   al,	   2015).	   	   According	   to	   the	   latest	  
African	   Economic	   Outlook	   report,	   “Ghana	   continues	   to	   manifest	   a	   liberal	   political	   economy	   with	  
vibrant	  media	  and	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  West	  Africa’s	  most	  resilient	  democracies”	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  
2015:	  10).	  
Key	  policy	  frameworks	  since	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Millennium	  Declaration	  in	  2000	  include	  the	  Ghana	  
Poverty	   Reduction	   Strategy	   (GPRS	   I)	   from	  2003-­‐2005,	   the	  Growth	   and	   Poverty	   Reduction	   Strategy	  
(GPRS	  II)	  from	  2006-­‐2009,	  the	  Ghana	  Shared	  Growth	  and	  Development	  Agenda	  (GSGDA)	  from	  2010-­‐
2013	  and	  the	  GSGDA	  II	  from	  2014-­‐2017	  (GSS,	  2013b).	  	  Throughout,	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  improving	  
macroeconomic	   stability,	   human	   resource	   development,	   good	   governance	   and	   employment	  
opportunities,	  whilst	   later	  policies	  have	  also	   included	  natural	   resource	  management,	   infrastructure	  
development	  and	  increased	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  (GSS,	  2013b).	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  
government’s	   spending	   on	   poverty	   reduction	   has	   decreased	   considerably,	   from	   34.6%	   of	   total	  
spending	  in	  2006	  to	  21.3%	  in	  2010,	  and	  this	  has	  continued	  to	  decline	  since	  2010,	  when	  Ghana	  was	  
re-­‐classified	  as	  a	  low-­‐middle	  income	  country,	  and	  thus	  ineligible	  for	  much	  of	  the	  official	  development	  
assistance	  (ODA)	  previously	  received	  (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2015).	  




























4.5	  Trade	  &	  Exports	  
Ghana	  has	  a	   “diverse	  and	   rich	   resource	  base”,	  with	  cocoa,	  gold	  and	   timber	  making	  up	   the	   leading	  
export	   commodities,	   followed	   by	   diamonds,	   bauxite	   and	   manganese	   (Ghana	   Statistical	   Service,	  
2013b:	  2).	  	  Oil	  exports	  began	  in	  2011,	  after	  an	  oilfield	  containing	  up	  to	  3	  billion	  barrels	  of	  light	  oil	  was	  
discovered	  in	  2007	  (GSS,	  2013b).	  	  Since	  initial	  production	  of	  24.5m	  barrels	  in	  2011,	  this	  number	  has	  
grown	  to	  approx.	  40m	  barrels	   in	  2014,	  contributing	  6.3%	  to	  GDP	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015).	   	  Consequently,	  
crude	  oil	  has	  become	  Ghana’s	  second	  largest	  export	  commodity	  after	  gold,	  accounting	  for	  28.3%	  of	  
total	  exports	  in	  2013	  (gold	  accounted	  for	  36%)	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  	  
The	  export	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  commodities	  such	  as	  pineapples,	  bananas,	  yams	  and	  cashew	  nuts	  have	  
recently	  increased	  as	  the	  Ghanaian	  government	  has	  sought	  to	  diversify	  its	  economy,	  and	  the	  tourism	  
industry	  has	  grown	  rapidly	  over	  recent	  years	  to	  become	  the	  third	  largest	  earner	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  
after	  merchandise	  exports	  and	  remittances	  from	  abroad	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  
(FDI)	   has	   increased	   significantly	   since	   the	  early	   2000s,	   particularly	   following	   the	  discovery	  of	   oil	   in	  
2007	  and	  the	  global	  financial	  collapse	  in	  2009	  (see	  Figure	  4.3)	  (Nahr,	  2015).	  
Figure	  4.3	  Direct	  Investment	  (net	  US$),	  2003-­‐2014 
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  Narh	  (2015)	  
4.6	  Macroeconomics	  
	  
As	   described	   in	   Chapter	   2.7,	   Ghana’s	   post-­‐independence	   period	   was	   characterised	   by	   poor	  
macroeconomic	   and	   fiscal	   management,	   and	   excessive	   spending	   (Killick,	   2010).	   	   However,	   the	  
reforms	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	   led	  to	  a	  rapid	  reversal	   in	  economic	  conditions,	   including	  
significantly	   reducing	   the	  budget	  deficit	   and	  halting	   the	   spiralling	   inflation	  and	  depreciation	  of	   the	  
Ghanaian	  cedi	  (Killick,	  2010).	  	  Credit	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  rose	  sharply	  and	  the	  economy	  “expanded	  
at	  a	  rate	  unprecedented	  in	  Ghana’s	  history”	  (Killick,	  2010:	  416),	  with	  average	  GDP	  growth	  exceeding	  
6%	   per	   year	   over	   the	   decade	   2001-­‐2012	   (see	   Figure	   4.4)	   (ILO,	   2014).	   	   The	   country’s	   economic	  



























from	  agriculture	  towards	  the	  services	  sector,	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  the	  industrial	  sector4	  (see	  Figure	  
4.5)	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  
Figure	  4.4	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  and	  GDP	  Per	  Capita	  Growth	  (%),	  2000-­‐2014	  	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
	  
Figure	  4.5	  Sectoral	  Distribution	  of	  GDP,	  2005-­‐2014*	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  
*Data	  unavailable	  before	  2005	  at	  the	  same	  constant	  prices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














































Despite	   this	   rapid	   new	   growth,	   in	   2003,	   the	   Institute	   of	   Statistical,	   Social	   and	   Economic	   Research	  
(ISSER)	   noted	   that	   “a	   number	  of	   unstable	   underlying	   conditions”	   underpinned	   the	   fiscal	   sector,	   of	  
most	   concern	   being	   a	   significant	   rise	   in	   domestic	   borrowing	   (ISSER,	   2003:	   1).	   	   In	   2012,	   the	  
government’s	   discretionary	   expenditure	   more	   than	   doubled,	   with	   the	   largest	   items	   including	  
personal	   emoluments	   (salaries,	   allowances,	   pensions	   of	   government	   staff)	   and	   the	   repayment	   of	  
domestic	  debt	  (ISSER,	  2013).	  	  The	  country’s	  GDP	  and	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  declined	  significantly	  in	  2014,	  
and	  there	  was	  a	  sharp	   increase	   in	   inflation,	  compared	  with	  the	  previous	  year	   (see	  Table	  4.2).	   	  This	  
was	   accompanied	   by	   a	   fall	   in	   the	   exchange	   rate	   of	   31.2%	   against	   the	   US	   dollar	   in	   the	   first	   three	  
quarters	  of	  2014,	   compared	  with	  a	  4.1%	  depreciation	  during	   the	   same	  period	   in	  2013	   (AfDB	  et	  al,	  
2015).	   	  Finally,	   the	  climbing	  budget	  deficit	  caused	  public	  debt	   levels	   to	   reach	  67.1%	  of	  GDP	  by	  the	  
end	  of	  December	  2014,	  causing	  the	  government	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  $918m	  stabilisation	  programme	  with	  
the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  in	  2015	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  	  
Table	  4.2	  Ghana’s	  Macroeconomic	  Development,	  2012-­‐2016	  
	   2012	   2013	   2014(e)	   2015(e)	   2016(p)	  
Real	  GDP	  growth	  (%)	   7.9	   7.3	   4.2	   3.9	   5.9	  
Real	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth	  (%)	   5.8	   5.2	   2.1	   1.9	   3.9	  
CPI	  inflation	   9.2	   11.7	   17.0	   8.3	   8.7	  
Budget	  balance	  (%	  GDP)	   -­‐5.8	   -­‐9.5	   -­‐10.4	   -­‐9.5	   -­‐9.9	  
Current	  account	  (%	  GDP)	   -­‐12.4	   -­‐11.9	   -­‐9.2	   -­‐12.7	   -­‐17.3	  
(e)	  estimates;	  (p)	  projections	  based	  on	  authors’	  calculations	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  African	  Economic	  Outlook	  Reports	  
4.7	  Employment	  
Ghana’s	  working	   population	   is	  mostly	   engaged	   in	   agriculture	   (45%)	   and	   services	   (41%)	   (GSS	   et	   al,	  
2015),	  with	  the	  informal	  sector	  accounting	  for	  approximately	  88%	  of	  total	  employment	  –	  it	  must	  be	  
noted	   that	   this	   is	   a	   notoriously	   difficult	   sector	   to	   measure,	   so	   estimates	   can	   vary	   considerably	  
(Republic	   of	  Ghana	   and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	   2015).	   	   The	   latest	  Ghana	   Living	   Standards	   Survey	   estimates	  
that	  one	  fifth	  (20.2%)	  of	  the	  population	  are	  engaged	  in	  wage	  employment,	  and	  of	  those	  who	  are	  self-­‐
employed,	  26.4%	  are	   involved	   in	  agriculture	  whilst	  26.0%	  are	   involved	   in	  non-­‐agricultural	  activities	  
(see	  Table	  4.3)	  (GSS,	  2014a).	  	  Whilst	  over	  three	  quarters	  of	  the	  population	  aged	  15	  years	  and	  older	  
are	   economically	   active	   (77.1%),	   the	   majority	   are	   educated	   only	   to	   a	   basic	   level	   (57.2%)	   and	   a	  
quarter	  (25.2%)	  have	  no	  formal	  education	  (GSS,	  2014a).	  	  The	  unemployment	  rate	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  
low,	  at	  5.2%,	  however	  over	  one	  third	  of	  the	  working	  population	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  underemployed	  
(working	  less	  than	  35	  hours	  a	  week),	  especially	  those	  working	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  (GSS,	  2014a).	  
Table	  4.3	  Employment	  Breakdown	  of	  Ghana’s	  Current	  Working	  Population	  (%)	  
	   Urban	   Rural	   Ghana	  
	   Male	   Female	   All	   Male	   Female	   All	   Male	  	   Female	   All	  
Wage	  Employment	   47.5	   19.1	   32.5	   12.9	   4.5	   8.6	   29.5	   11.7	   20.2	  
Self-­‐employed	  with	  
employees:	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐agricultural	   7.5	   7.3	   7.4	   1.8	   1.5	   1.7	   4.5	   4.4	   4.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Agricultural	   1.9	   1.3	   1.6	   2.7	   1.1	   1.9	   2.3	   1.2	   1.7	  
Self-­‐employed	  
without	  employees:	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐agricultural	   15.8	   44.5	   30.9	   7.2	   18.2	   12.8	   11.3	   31.2	   21.6	  






	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐agricultural	   3.2	   6.0	   4.6	   1.4	   3.1	   2.3	   2.2	   4.5	   3.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Agricultural	   6.1	   7.9	   7.1	   21.5	   38.5	   30.2	   14.1	   23.4	   18.9	  
Domestic	  employee	   0.4	   0.3	   0.4	   0.1	   0.2	   0.1	   0.3	   0.2	   0.2	  
Apprentice	   3.1	   1.4	   2.2	   2.5	   1.1	   1.8	   2.8	   1.3	   2.0	  
Casual	  worker	   3.4	   1.0	   3.7	   1.2	   1.7	   1.5	   2.3	   2.8	   2.6	  
Other	   0.3	   0.1	   0.2	   0.0	   0.1	   0.0	   0.1	   0.1	   0.1	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014a)	  
4.8	  Energy	  
Ghana’s	  primary	  energy	   supply	   comes	  mainly	   from	  biofuels/waste	   and	  oil,	  with	  hydro	  and	  natural	  
gas	  also	   contributing	  a	   small	   amount	   (IEA,	  2015a).	   	   In	   terms	  of	  electricity	   generation,	  hydro	   is	   the	  
leading	  energy	  source,	  making	  up	  64%	  of	  total	  supply,	  with	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  also	  contributing	  from	  
1997	  and	  2009,	   respectively	   (IEA,	   2015b).	   	   Since	  2011,	  Ghana	  has	  been	   in	   the	  grip	  of	   a	   significant	  
power	   crisis,	   with	   the	   country	   experiencing	   extensive	   load	   shedding	   throughout	   2014	   and	   2015	  
(AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015).	   	  Demand	  has	  outstripped	  supply,	  and	  current	  estimates	  predict	   that	  this	  supply	  
gap	  will	   continue	  to	   increase	   in	  years	   to	  come	  (see	  Figure	  4.6)	   (World	  Bank,	  2013a),	  unless	  drastic	  
measures	  are	  taken	  to	  improve	  generating	  capacity.	  
Figure	  4.6	  Power	  Generation	  Capacity	  Forecast,	  2012-­‐2022	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2013a)	  
	  
Ghana’s	   reliance	   on	   hydropower	   has	   been	   highlighted	   as	   one	   of	   the	   factors	   responsible	   for	   the	  
current	   power	   crisis,	   as	   insufficient	   rainfall	   has	   caused	   power	   output	   at	   the	   country’s	   two	   hydro	  
dams	  to	  fall	  significantly	  over	  the	  last	  year	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015b).	  	  The	  lack	  of	  diversification	  into	  other	  




























inadequate	  power	  supply	  to	  become	  a	  “major	  constraint	  to	  future	  economic	  growth”	  (World	  Bank,	  
2013a:	  viii).	  	  Thermal	  electricity	  generation	  has	  added	  1,000	  MW	  of	  generating	  capacity	  over	  the	  past	  
15	   years,	   raising	   total	   generation	   capacity	   to	   2,125	   MW,	   however	   renewable	   energy	   other	   than	  
hydro	   still	   plays	   a	   marginal	   role	   in	   Ghana’s	   energy	   mix,	   with	   only	   one	   2MW	   grid-­‐connected	  
renewable	  energy	  plant	  in	  operation	  (World	  Bank,	  2013a).	  	  Solar	  and	  wind	  power	  are	  still	  at	  the	  early	  
stages	   of	   development	   in	   Ghana,	   and	   they	   are	   expected	   to	   play	   a	   growing	   role	   towards	   the	  
government’s	  10%	  renewable	  energy	  target	  by	  2020,	  especially	  in	  rural	  areas	  (World	  Bank,	  2013a).	  
4.9	  Climate	  Change	  
Ghana’s	   economy	   relies	   heavily	   on	   climate-­‐sensitive	   sectors	   such	   as	   agriculture,	   hydropower	   and	  
forestry,	   leaving	   people	   highly	   susceptible	   to	   climate	   change	   impacts,	   which	   are	   likely	   to	   reverse	  
progress	  made	   in	  poverty	   reduction,	  economic	  growth	  and	   food	   security	   (AfDB	  et	  al,	   2015b).	   	   The	  
population	   living	   in	   the	   northern	   regions	   of	   Ghana	   is	   particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   unpredictable	  
weather	  patterns	  caused	  by	  climate	  change	  because	  of	  higher	  poverty	  rates,	  a	  drier	  climate,	  and	  a	  
higher	   dependency	   on	   subsistence	   rain-­‐fed	   agriculture	   to	   begin	   with	   (Darko	   and	   Atazona,	   2013).	  	  
Cocoa,	  one	  of	  Ghana’s	  main	  exports,	   is	  particularly	  vulnerable	   to	   the	  effects	  of	  a	  changing	  climate	  
(Niang	  et	  al,	  2014),	  as	  are	  other	  staple	  food	  crops	  such	  as	  maize	  (MacCarthy	  et	  al,	  2013).	   	  Ghana’s	  
National	  Climate	  Change	  policy	   (Republic	  of	  Ghana,	  2013)	   therefore	   stresses	   the	  need	   to	   focus	  on	  
developing	  adaptive	  capacity	  rather	  than	  the	  reactive	  measures	  currently	  being	  implemented	  (AfDB	  
et	  al,	  2015b).	  




Chapter	  5:	  Data	  Analysis	  -­‐	  Poverty	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
	  
The	  next	  three	  chapters	  will	  present	  and	  analyse	  the	  data	  collected	  from	  desk	  research	  under	  three	  
separate	  headings:	  poverty,	  economic	  growth	  and	  employment	  and	  equity.	  	  Within	  these	  categories,	  
a	  number	  of	  key	  arguments	  from	  the	  literature	  will	  be	  explored	  –	  through	  the	  claims/counter-­‐claims	  
made	  by	   various	   authors	   and	   institutions	   –	   such	   as	   the	   size	   of	   the	  middle	   class	   in	  Ghana,	   level	   of	  
industrialisation,	   sustainability	   of	   economic	   growth	   and	   inequality.	   	   The	   table	   below	   sets	   out	   the	  
claims	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   made	   about	   poverty	   in	   Ghana,	   and	   the	   data	   sources	   that	   are	   used	   to	  
analyse	  these	  claims.	  	  	  
Table	  5.1	  Poverty	  Claims	  and	  Counter-­‐Claims	  for	  Ghana,	  and	  Sources	  used	  for	  Analysis	  
	   Claims	   Counter-­‐claims	   Source	  Data	  
Poverty	   Dramatic	  fall	  in	  poverty	  rates	  
from	  51.7	  –	  24.1%	  from	  
1991-­‐2012	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  
2015b)	  
Wide	  disparities	  exist	  -­‐	  
north	  of	  country	  and	  
women	  still	  suffering	  high	  
poverty	  (Aryeetey	  and	  
Kanbur,	  2008)	  
Ghana	  Living	  Standards	  
Surveys;	  2010	  Population	  
and	  Housing	  Census	  
MDG	  
Progress	  
Ghana	  was	  the	  first	  country	  
to	  achieve	  MDG	  1	  (halving	  
extreme	  poverty	  and	  
hunger),	  well	  before	  the	  
2015	  deadline	  
Ghana	  still	  lags	  behind	  
other	  developing	  
countries	  in	  terms	  of	  
social	  welfare	  (Ayelazuno,	  
2014b)	  
Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  
MDG	  Reports	  2010,	  2015;	  
UNDP	  Human	  Development	  
Reports	  
Primary	  school	  enrolment	  
risen	  by	  a	  third	  since	  1995	  
(Radelet,	  2010)	  
Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  
MDG	  Reports	  2010,	  2015	  
Life	  expectancy	  reached	  60	  in	  
2008	  (Radelet,	  2010)	  
2010	  Population	  and	  
Housing	  Census	  
Declining	  fertility	  rates	  
reducing	  dependency	  ratio	  
(Breisinger	  et	  al,	  2011;	  World	  
Bank,	  2015)	  
2010	  Population	  and	  
Housing	  Census;	  
Demographic	  &	  Health	  
Surveys	  
Infant	  mortality	  decreased	  
from	  57	  deaths	  per	  1,000	  live	  
births	  in	  1998	  to	  41	  in	  2014,	  
and	  under	  5	  mortality	  
reduced	  by	  more	  than	  half,	  
from	  54	  to	  19	  (World	  Bank,	  
2015)	  
Demographic	  &	  Health	  
Surveys;	  Republic	  of	  Ghana	  




46.6%	  of	  Ghanaians	  
considered	  ‘middle	  class’	  –	  
10.9m	  people	  in	  2008	  
(earning	  $2-­‐20	  per	  day)	  
(AfDB,	  2011)	  
26.8%	  of	  Ghana’s	  middle	  
class	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
‘floating	  class’,	  earning	  
just	  $2-­‐4	  per	  day	  (AfDB,	  
2011);	  ‘Middle	  class’	  
parameters	  are	  not	  truly	  
reflective	  (Clarke,	  2010)	  
AfDB	  ‘Middle	  of	  the	  Pyramid’	  
report,	  2011;	  Pew	  Research	  




5.2	  Poverty	  in	  Ghana	  
	  
Claim:	  Dramatic	  fall	  in	  poverty	  rates	  from	  51.7	  –	  24.1%	  from	  1991-­‐2012	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015b)	  
National	  Poverty	  Incidence5	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  there	  are	  no	  readily	  available	  datasets	  for	  Ghana’s	  poverty	  rates	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  
since	  2000,	  either	  in	  national	  or	  international	  reports	  and	  databases.	  	  Rather,	  data	  is	  available	  only	  at	  
six	   or	   seven	   yearly	   intervals	   when	   the	   Ghana	   Statistical	   Service	   (GSS)	   carried	   out	   surveys	   and	  
calculated	  poverty	  rates	  at	  both	  the	  regional	  and	  national	   levels.	   	  For	  the	  period	  since	  2000,	   these	  
were	  produced	  following	  the	  Ghana	  Living	  Standards	  Survey	  rounds	  5	  and	  6	  in	  2005/06	  and	  2012/13	  
respectively	  (GSS,	  2007).	  	  The	  reports	  reveal	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  poverty	  according	  to	  national	  
poverty	  lines	  based	  on	  consumption	  of	  both	  food	  and	  non-­‐food	  items6.	  	  	  
The	  most	  recent	  poverty	  estimates,	  from	  2012/13	  -­‐	  using	  an	  upper	  (absolute)	  poverty	  line	  of	  1,314	  
Ghanaian	   cedis	   (equivalent	   to	   approx.	   US$1.83)	   per	   adult	   per	   day	   -­‐	   found	   that	   24.2%	   of	   the	  
population,	  approximately	  6.4m	  people,	  were	  classified	  as	  living	  in	  poverty	  in	  2012/13	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  
This	   represents	   a	   7.7	   percentage	   point	   reduction	   since	   2005/06,	  when	   an	   estimated	   31.9%	  of	   the	  
population,	   6.9m	  people,	   lived	   below	   the	   poverty	   line	   (GSS,	   2014b).	   	   Similarly	   impressive	   declines	  
can	  be	  seen	  in	  extreme	  poverty	  rates	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  	  Using	  the	  lower	  poverty	  line	  of	  792.05	  
Ghanaian	  cedis	  (equivalent	  to	  approx.	  US$1.10),	  8.4%	  of	  the	  population,	  approximately	  2.2m	  people,	  
were	   considered	   to	   be	   living	   in	   extreme	   poverty	   in	   2012/13	   (GSS,	   2014b).	   	   Compared	   with	   the	  
extreme	  poverty	  estimates	  for	  2005/06	  (16.5%),	  this	  represents	  a	  reduction	  of	  8.1	  percentage	  points	  
over	  the	  7-­‐year	  period	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  	  
These	   trends	   also	   follow	   the	   poverty	   reductions	   observed	   throughout	   the	   1990s,	   however	   it	   is	  
impossible	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  direct	  comparison	  with	  these	  figures,	  as	  they	  were	  based	  on	  the	  previous	  
national	   poverty	   lines	   of	   3,708,900	   cedis	   for	   absolute	   poverty	   and	   2,884,700	   cedis	   for	   extreme	  
poverty	  (GSS,	  2007).	  	  However,	  when	  examining	  poverty	  estimates	  from	  the	  1990s	  (see	  Figure	  5.1),	  
the	  declines	  were	  even	  greater	  than	  the	  decade	  of	  the	  2000s:	  between	  1991/92	  and	  1998/99,	  upper	  
poverty	  rates	  fell	  by	  12.2	  percentage	  points,	  and	  by	  a	  further	  11	  percentage	  points	  by	  2005/06,	  and	  
lower	  poverty	  rates	  fell	  by	  9.7	  percentage	  points	  between	  1991/92	  and	  1998/99,	  and	  by	  a	  further	  8.6	  
percentage	  points	  by	  2005/06	  (GSS,	  2007).	  	  Unicef	  Ghana	  (2014)	  estimate	  that	  in	  absolute	  numbers,	  
the	  population	  living	  below	  the	  upper	  poverty	  line	  declined	  from	  7.9m	  people	  in	  1991/92	  to	  6.3m	  in	  
2006,	  which	  is	  particularly	  impressive	  considering	  that	  the	  overall	  population	  grew	  by	  6.9m	  over	  the	  
same	  period.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  
6	  “The	  absolute	  [upper]	  poverty	  line	  indicates	  the	  minimum	  living	  standard	  in	  Ghana	  while	  the	  extreme	  [lower]	  
poverty	  line	  indicates	  that	  even	  if	  a	  household	  spends	  their	  entire	  budget	  on	  food,	  they	  still	  would	  not	  meet	  




Figure	  5.1	  Poverty	  Incidence	  (%),	  1991/92-­‐2005/06	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2007)	  
	  
Counter-­‐claim:	  Wide	  disparities	  exist	  -­‐	  north	  of	  country	  and	  women	  still	  suffering	  high	  poverty	  
incidence	  (Aryeetey	  and	  Kanbur,	  2008)	  
Regional	  Poverty	  Incidence	  
Since	   the	  year	  2000,	   the	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  has	   repeatedly	   reported	   that	  poverty	   reductions	  
which	  began	  during	  the	  1990s	  have	  not	  been	  evenly	  distributed	  across	  the	  country,	  with	  Accra,	  the	  
capital,	  faring	  much	  better	  than	  the	  northern	  regions,	  which	  are	  predominantly	  rural	  (see	  Figure	  5.2)	  
(GSS,	   2007).	   	   In	  2012/13,	  Ghana’s	   rural	   population	  accounted	   for	  50%	  of	   the	   total	   population,	   yet	  
made	  up	  78%	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  people	  in	  poverty	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  When	  looking	  at	  estimates	  of	  
extreme	  poverty,	  the	  geographical	  disparities	  are	  even	  more	  distinct:	  of	  the	  2.2m	  Ghanaians	  living	  in	  
extreme	  poverty,	  over	  1.8m	  (81%)	  live	  in	  rural	  areas,	  with	  the	  rural	  savannah	  accounting	  for	  nearly	  
one	  third	  of	  this	  number	  (27.3%	  in	  2012/13)	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  statistics	  show	  that	  rural	  
poverty	   rates	   are	   also	   decreasing	   faster	   than	   other	   regions;	   the	   rural	   savannah,	   for	   example,	  
experienced	   the	  widest	   reduction	   in	   both	   absolute	   and	   extreme	   poverty	   of	   all	   the	   localities	   from	  
2005/06	  to	  2012/13	  (see	  Figures	  5.3	  and	  5.4).	  




























Figure	  5.2	  Poverty	  Map	  of	  Ghana,	  2015	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2015:	  9)	  




Figure	  5.3	  Poverty	  Incidence	  (%)	  by	  Locality	  (Upper	  Poverty	  Line)	  
	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014b:	  11)	  
Figure	  5.4	  Extreme	  Poverty	  Incidence	  (%)	  by	  Locality	  (Lower	  Poverty	  Line)	  
	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014b:	  13)	  
Despite	   the	   impressive	   poverty	   reductions	   observed	   over	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	   when	   comparing	  
poverty	   rates	   at	   the	   local	   level,	   the	   disparities	   are	   still	   vast,	   with	   the	   lowest	   poverty	   incidence	  
recorded	   in	  Greater	  Accra,	  at	  3.5%,	  and	  the	  highest	   in	   the	  Rural	  Savannah,	  at	  55%	  (see	  Figure	  5.3)	  
(GSS,	   2014b).	   	   According	   to	   the	  GSS,	   this	   trend	   can	  be	  partly	   attributed	   to	   the	   high	   proportion	  of	  
people	  who	  have	  migrated	   to	   the	  Greater	  Accra	   area	   and	  are	  now	  working	   in	   the	   services	   sector,	  













































































the	  self-­‐employed	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  The	  urban	  coastal	  area	  is	  the	  only	  locality	  to	  experience	  an	  increase	  
in	  extreme	  poverty,	   as	  well	   as	   in	  absolute	  poverty,	   yet	   the	   reasons	  behind	   this	   trend	  are	  not	   fully	  
understood	  by	  GSS,	  who	  recommend	  further	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  
Multi-­‐dimensional	  Poverty	  Index	  (MPI)	  
Following	   the	   2010	   nation-­‐wide	   population	   and	   housing	   census,	   the	   Ghana	   Statistical	   Service	  
calculated	   a	   Multi-­‐dimensional	   Poverty	   Index7	   (MPI)	   for	   the	   country,	   which	   incorporates	   wider	  
aspects	  than	  just	  income/consumption,	  such	  as	  contributions	  from	  family	  and	  friends	  and	  availability	  
of	   basic	   services	   such	   as	   education,	   health	   and	   housing	   (GSS,	   2013a).	   	   The	   study	   found	   that	   rural	  
households,	   mostly	   found	   in	   the	   northern	   regions	   of	   the	   country,	   suffer	   a	   much	   higher	   level	   of	  
deprivation	  than	  urban	  households,	  reflected	  by	  an	  MPI	  score	  of	  0.261,	  nearly	  three	  times	  the	  urban	  
score	  of	  0.098	  (see	  Figure	  5.5)	  (GSS,	  2013a).	   	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  GSS’s	  Living	  
Standards	  Surveys,	  however	  the	  overall	  national	   incidence	  of	  multi-­‐dimensional	  poverty	  was	  found	  
to	   be	  much	  higher	   than	  other	   estimates,	   at	   42.7%,	   demonstrating	   the	  differences	   in	   results	  when	  
alternative	  parameters	  are	  used	  (GSS,	  2013a).	  
Figure	  5.5	  MPI	  Decomposition	  by	  Region,	  2010	  
	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  MPI	  is	  measured	  on	  an	  individual	  level	  using	  ten	  indicators	  (based	  on	  the	  UN	  MDGs)	  under	  three	  
headings:	  “education	  (number	  of	  adult	  household	  members	  who	  have	  not	  completed	  primary	  school	  and	  
number	  of	  primary	  school-­‐going	  children	  who	  are	  not	  in	  school);	  health	  (number	  of	  under-­‐5	  death	  in	  the	  last	  
12	  months	  and	  maternal	  mortality);	  and	  standard	  of	  living	  (access	  to	  improved	  water,	  toilet,	  cooking	  fuel,	  


















Poverty	  Incidence	  by	  Gender	  
Despite	   the	   general	   belief	   among	   development	   economists	   that	   women	   suffer	   disproportionately	  
from	  poverty,	   the	  Ghana	   Statistical	   Service	   (2014b)	   found	   that	   poverty	   incidence	   is	   higher	   among	  
male-­‐headed	   households	   (25.9%	   in	   2012/13)	   than	   female-­‐headed	   households	   (19.1%	   in	   2012/13)	  
(see	   Figure	   5.6).	   	   Although	   people	   living	   in	   households	   headed	   by	   both	   genders	   experienced	   a	  
reduction	   in	   poverty	   between	   2005/6	   and	   2012/13,	   the	   rate	   of	   decline	   is	   three	   times	   greater	   for	  
male	  headed	  households	  than	  female	  headed	  households	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  
Figure	  5.6	  Poverty	  Incidence	  (%)	  by	  Gender	  of	  Household	  (Based	  on	  Upper	  Poverty	  Line)	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014b)	  
However,	  Aryeetey	  et	  al	  (2000)	  identify	  two	  problems	  with	  the	  finding	  that	  male-­‐headed	  households	  
are	   poorer	   than	   female-­‐headed	   households,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   methodology.	   	   Firstly,	   a	   female-­‐
headed	   household	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   she	   is	   the	   sole	   earner	   for	   the	   household;	   her	  
husband	  or	  another	  family	  member	  may	  be	  sending	  remittances	  from	  elsewhere	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  
family,	  which	  are	  not	  accounted	  for	  in	  poverty	  estimates.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  GSS	  methodology	  does	  not	  
take	  into	  account	  household	  size,	  which	  is	  usually	  much	  smaller	  for	  female-­‐headed	  households,	  so,	  
based	  on	  a	  measurement	  of	  household	  expenditure,	  would	  mean	  that	  poverty	  incidence	  would	  turn	  
out	  to	  be	  much	  lower	  than	  larger	  households	  (Bhushan	  and	  Chao,	  1996).	  	  Indeed,	  when	  households	  
of	  a	   similar	   size	  are	  directly	  compared,	  poverty	   incidence	   is	   found	  to	  be	  higher	  among	  households	  
headed	  by	  females	  than	  by	  males	  (Aryeetey	  et	  al,	  2000).	  
Furthermore,	   Cooper	   (2010)	   recognises	   that	   inheritance	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   gender	   poverty	  
estimates.	  	  Many	  of	  Ghana’s	  ethnic	  groups	  are	  matrilineal,	  meaning	  that	  a	  man’s	  wealth	  is	  inherited	  
by	   his	   sister’s	   children	   upon	   his	   death,	   rather	   than	   by	   his	   own	  widow	   and	   children.	  	   In	   1985,	   the	  
Government	   introduced	   the	   Intestate	  Succession	  Law	  that	  allows	  women	  equal	  access	   to	  property	  
jointly	   acquired	   with	   their	   husband,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   they	   married	   under	   statutory	   or	  
customary	  law	  (Richardson,	  2004).	  	  Nonetheless,	  a	  lack	  of	  education	  about	  the	  law,	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	  legislation	  to	  recognise	  polygamous	  marriages,	  which	  are	  very	  common	  in	  Ghana,	  has	  meant	  that	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5.3	  Ghana’s	  MDG	  Progress	  
	  
Claims:	  Ghana	  was	   the	   first	   country	   to	   achieve	  MDG1	   (halve	   extreme	  poverty	   and	   hunger)	  well	  
before	   the	   2015	   deadline;	   primary	   school	   enrolment	   risen	   by	   a	   third	   (Radelet,	   2010);	   life	  
expectancy	  reached	  60	  in	  2008	  (Radelet,	  2010);	  declining	  fertility	  rates	  reducing	  dependency	  ratio	  
(Breisinger	  et	  al,	  2011;	  WB,	  2016a);	  infant	  mortality	  and	  under-­‐5	  mortality	  reduced	  (WB,	  2016a)	  
MDG	  1:	  Halve	  Extreme	  Poverty	  and	  Hunger	  	  
As	  reported	  by	   the	  2010	  MDG	  report	   (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2012),	  Ghana	  met	   the	  
target	   of	   halving	   extreme	   poverty	   and	   hunger	   in	   2006,	   nine	   years	   ahead	   of	   the	   2015	   deadline.	  	  
Extreme	  poverty	   fell	   by	   50%	   from	  36.5%	   in	   1991	   to	   18.2%	   in	   2006	   (Republic	   of	  Ghana	   and	  UNDP	  
Ghana,	   2012).	   	   The	   reduction	   in	   absolute	   poverty	   narrowly	   missed	   the	   target	   by	   2.6	   percentage	  
points,	  declining	  from	  51.7%	  in	  1991	  to	  28.5%	  in	  2006	  (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2012).	  	  
However,	   following	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   new	   absolute	   poverty	   line	   in	   2013,	   according	   to	   the	  
revised	  metric,	  overall	  poverty	  incidence	  reduced	  from	  32%	  in	  2006	  to	  24%	  in	  2013,	  confirming	  that	  
the	   MDG	   target	   had	   been	   fully	   met	   (Republic	   of	   Ghana	   and	   UNDP	   Ghana,	   2015).	   	   Ghana	   was	  
reportedly,	  “one	  of	   the	   few	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  countries	   to	  achieve	   this”	   (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  
UNDP	  Ghana,	  2015:	  13).	  	  
Primary	  School	  Enrolment	  (MDG	  2)	  
The	  net	  enrolment	  ratio8	  for	  primary	  schools	  across	  Ghana	  has	  increased	  significantly	  from	  45.2%	  in	  
the	   early	   1990s	   to	   89.3%	   in	   2013/14,	   with	   the	   fastest	   increase	   occurring	   from	   the	   mid-­‐2000s	  
onwards	  (see	  Figure	  5.7)	  (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2015).	  	  Despite	  experiencing	  a	  dip	  in	  
2009	  and	  2010,	  this	  represents	  an	  overall	  increase	  of	  44.1	  percentage	  points	  since	  1990	  (Republic	  of	  
Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2015).	  
Figure	  5.7	  Net	  Enrolment	  Ratio	  at	  Primary	  School	  Level	  (%),	  1990-­‐2015	  	  
Actual	  and	  Desired	  Trends	  
Source:	  Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana	  (2015:	  28)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  “…number	  of	  appropriately	  aged	  pupils	  enrolled	  in	  school	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  children	  in	  





According	  to	  the	  most	  recent	  national	  census,	  completed	  in	  2010,	  the	  estimated	  life	  expectancy	  for	  
women	  in	  Ghana	  is	  63.4	  years	  and	  men	  60.2	  years	  (GSS,	  2013c).	  	  The	  population	  census	  data	  shows	  a	  
steady	   increase	   since	  1960,	  when	   life	  expectancy	   for	  women	  was	  43	  years	  and	  men	  38	  years	   (see	  
Table	  5.2).	  








Pop	  &	  Housing	  
Census	  2000	  
Pop	  &	  Housing	  
Census	  2010	  
Life	  Expectancy	  
(Years)	  –	  Male	  
38	   45	   50	   55	   60	  
Life	  Expectancy	  
(Years)	  -­‐	  Female	  
43	   48	   54	   60	   63	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  et	  al	  (2015)	  
Fertility	  Rate	  
Ghana’s	  total	  fertility	  rate9	  began	  declining	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  fell	  most	  steeply	  in	  the	  period	  1998	  to	  
2000,	  when	  it	  declined	  by	  almost	  2.5	  children	  per	  woman.	  	  By	  2010,	  the	  fertility	  rate	  reached	  a	  level	  
that	  was	  almost	  half	  what	  it	  was	  in	  1960:	  3.28	  compared	  with	  6.5	  (see	  Figure	  5.8)	  (GSS,	  2013c).	  	  Since	  
2010,	  however,	  this	  figure	  has	  risen	  again	  to	  4.2	  children	  per	  woman,	  3.4	  in	  urban	  areas	  and	  5.1	  in	  
rural	  areas	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  Askew	  et	  al	  (2015)	  attribute	  this	  increase	  to	  financial	  gaps	  in	  Ghana’s	  
healthcare	  sector,	  which	  have	  caused	  family	  planning	  needs	  to	  go	  increasingly	  unmet	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
resources.	   	  Despite	  this	  recent	   increase,	  Ghana’s	  total	   fertility	  rate	   is	  still	  one	  of	  the	   lowest	   in	  sub-­‐
Saharan	  Africa	  (see	  Figure	  5.9)	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  
Figure	  5.8	  Total	  Fertility	  Rates	  for	  Ghana,	  1960-­‐2010
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2013c,	  2015)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  “...the	  number	  of	  children	  a	  woman	  would	  have	  by	  the	  end	  of	  her	  childbearing	  years	  if	  she	  were	  to	  pass	  
through	  those	  years	  bearing	  children	  at	  the	  current	  age-­‐specific	  fertility	  rates”	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015:	  60).	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Figure	  5.9	  Total	  Fertility	  Rates	  for	  Selected	  SSA	  Countries*	  
Source:	  GSS	  et	  al	  (2015:	  61)	  
*Countries	  selected	  on	  availability	  of	  data	  
	  
Child	  Mortality	  (MDG	  4)	  
Since	  1988,	   infant	  mortality10	   has	   fallen	  by	  47%	  and	  under-­‐5	  mortality11	   by	   61%	   (see	   Figure	  5.10),	  
with	   the	   last	   decade	   seeing	   the	   greatest	   reductions,	   possibly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   Ghana’s	   new	  National	  
Health	  Insurance	  Scheme	  (NHIS)	  which	  was	  introduced	  in	  2003	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  For	  instance,	  since	  
1998,	   infant	   mortality	   has	   fallen	   by	   28%	   and	   under-­‐5	   mortality	   by	   44%	   (GSS	   et	   al,	   2015).	   	   The	  
progress	   in	   under-­‐5	  mortality	  was	   enough	   for	  Ghana	   to	   achieve	   the	  MDG	   target	   of	   reducing	   child	  
mortality	  by	   two-­‐thirds,	  ahead	  of	   the	  2015	  deadline,	  however	   the	  2014	   infant	  mortality	   rate	  of	  60	  
deaths	  per	  1,000	  live	  births	  did	  not	  meet	  the	  MDG	  target	  of	  40	  (Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  
2015).	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  “...	  the	  probability	  of	  dying	  between	  birth	  and	  the	  first	  birthday”	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  2015:	  100)	  




Figure	  5.10	  Child	  Mortality	  Rates	  for	  Ghana,	  1988-­‐2014	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  GSS	  et	  al	  (2015)	  
	  
Counter-­‐claim:	   Ghana	   still	   lags	   behind	   other	   developing	   countries	   in	   terms	   of	   social	   welfare	  
(Ayelazuno,	  2014b)	  
Human	  Development	  Index	  
The	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI),	  which	  expresses	  development	  progress	  as	  a	  single	  value	  using	  
measurements	   of	   life	   expectancy,	   education	   and	   standard	   of	   living	   (GNI	   per	   capita),	   is	   useful	   for	  
comparing	   development	   statistics	   on	   a	   country-­‐by-­‐country	   basis	   and	   against	   regional	   averages	  
(UNDP,	  2015a).	   	  Ghana’s	  HDI	  score	   for	  2014	  was	  0.579	   (risen	   from	  0.487	   in	  2000),	  which	  means	   it	  
ranks	   towards	   the	   lower	   end	   of	   the	   medium	   human	   development	   category,	   at	   140	   out	   of	   188	  
countries	  and	  territories	  (UNDP,	  2015a).	   	  Table	  5.3	  shows	  that	  Ghana	  outperforms	  the	  sub-­‐Saharan	  
Africa	  average	  on	  all	  indicators,	  and	  the	  latest	  UNDP	  report	  notes	  that	  the	  country	  also	  ranks	  above	  
most	   of	   its	   West	   African	   neighbours,	   including	   Nigeria,	   Senegal,	   Benin	   and	   Togo	   (UNDP,	   2015b).	  
However,	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  regional	  averages,	  Ghana	  falls	  behind	  on	  all	  indicators,	  except	  for	  
expected	  and	  mean	  years	  of	  schooling,	  which	  are	  slightly	  higher	  than	  the	  regional	  average	  for	  South	  
Asia	  (UNDP,	  2015a).	  	  	  
Table	  5.3	  Ghana’s	  HDI	  Score,	  2014,	  Compared	  with	  Regional	  Averages	  




Mean	  years	  of	  
schooling	  
GNI	  per	  capita	  	  
(PPP	  US$)	  
Ghana	   0.579	   61.4	   11.5	   7.0	   3,852	  
SSA	   0.518	   58.5	   9.6	   5.2	   3,363	  
South	  Asia	   0.607	   68.4	   11.2	   5.5	   5,605	  
East	  Asia	  and	  the	  
Pacific	  
0.710	   74.0	   12.7	   7.5	   11,449	  
Latin	  America	  and	  
the	  Caribbean	  
0.748	   75.0	   14.0	   8.2	   14,242	  






























5.4	  Ghana’s	  Middle	  Class	  
	  
Claim:	  46.6%	  of	  Ghanaians	  considered	  ‘middle	  class’	  –	  10.9m	  people	  in	  2008	  (AfDB,	  2011)	  
Middle	  Class	  Statistics	  
The	  African	  Development	  Bank	  categorises	  ‘middle	  class’	  as	  per	  capita	  daily	  consumption	  of	  $2-­‐20	  (in	  
2005	  PPP	  US	  dollars),	  split	  into	  three	  categories:	  the	  ‘floating	  class’	  ($2-­‐4	  per	  day),	  the	  ‘lower-­‐middle	  
class’	   ($4-­‐10	   per	   day)	   and	   the	   ‘upper-­‐middle	   class’	   ($10-­‐20	   per	   day)	   (AfDB,	   2011).	   	   As	   the	   AfDB	  
describes,	  individuals	  in	  the	  floating	  class	  “remain	  largely	  vulnerable	  to	  slipping	  back	  into	  poverty	  in	  
the	  event	  of	  some	  exogenous	  shocks”,	  however	  the	  category	  represents	  a	  crucial	  “hinge”	  between	  
the	  poor	  and	   lower-­‐middle	  classes,	   thus	  reflecting	  “the	  direction	  of	  change	   in	  population	  structure	  
through	  time”	  (AfDB,	  2011:	  2).	  	  The	  table	  below	  shows	  that	  in	  2008	  Ghana’s	  middle	  class	  accounted	  
for	  46.6%	  of	  the	  country’s	  total	  population,	  or	  10.9m	  people,	  with	  the	  largest	  proportion	  falling	  into	  
the	  ‘floating	  class’	  category	  (26.8%	  of	  the	  total	  population).	  
Table	  5.4	  Middle	  Class	  Statistics	  for	  Ghana,	  2008	  
Floating	  Class	   Lower-­‐Middle	   Upper-­‐Middle	   Total	  Middle-­‐Income	  
%	  of	  pop	   Pop	  
(millions)	  
%	  of	  pop	   Pop	  
(millions)	  
%	  of	  pop	   Pop	  
(millions)	  
%	  of	  pop	   Pop	  
(millions)	  
26.8	   6.3	   13.5	   3.2	   6.2	   1.5	   46.6	   10.9	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  AfDB	  (2011)	  
Counter-­‐claim:	  26.8%	  of	  Ghana’s	  middle	  class	  are	  part	  of	  the	  ‘floating	  class’,	  earning	  just	  $2-­‐4	  per	  
day	  (AfDB,	  2011;	  BBC	  World	  Service,	  2013);	  ‘Middle	  class’	  parameters	  are	  not	  truly	  reflective	  
(Clarke,	  2010)	  
As	   described	   above,	   the	   share	   of	  Ghana’s	   ‘floating	   class’	  was	   26.8%	   in	   2008,	   accounting	   for	  more	  
than	   half	   of	   the	   total	  middle	   class	   population	   (AfDB,	   2011).	   	   Some	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   problematic	   to	  
include	  the	  floating	  class	  in	  middle	  class	  statistics	  as	  people	  who	  are	  spending	  just	  $2-­‐4	  per	  day	  are	  
only	  just	  surviving	  above	  the	  poverty	  line,	  with	  little	  economic	  security	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  slipping	  
back	  into	  poverty	  (Sumner,	  2012).	   	  This	   is	  a	  particular	   issue	  in	  SSA,	  where	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  
are	  involved	  in	  informal	  or	  ‘vulnerable’12	  employment	  (Stoffel,	  2014).	  	  The	  table	  below	  demonstrates	  
that	  when	  Ghana’s	  floating	  class	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  analysis,	  the	  middle	  class	  makes	  up	  only	  19.8%	  
of	  the	  population,	  or	  4.6m	  people,	  less	  than	  half	  the	  number	  estimated	  above	  (AfDB,	  2011).	  
Table	  5.5	  Middle	  Class	  Statistics,	  Excluding	  Floating	  Class,	  for	  Ghana,	  2008	  
Lower-­‐Middle	   Upper-­‐Middle	   Total	  Middle	  Income	  without	  
Floating	  Class	  
%	  of	  pop	   Pop	  (millions)	   %	  of	  pop	   Pop	  (millions)	   %	  of	  pop	   Pop	  (millions)	  
13.5	   3.2	   6.2	   1.5	   19.8	   4.6	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  AfDB	  (2011)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Other	  researchers	  have	  chosen	  to	  use	  different	  parameters	  for	  measuring	  ‘middle	  class’,	  with	  greatly	  
differing	  results.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  (Kochhar,	  2015)	  defines	  the	  global	  middle	  
class	  as	  earning	  or	  consuming	  between	  $10-­‐20	  a	  day,	  with	  the	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  bracket	  between	  
$20-­‐50	   (in	   2011	   PPP	  US	   dollars).	   	   Using	   this	  methodology,	  Ghana’s	  middle	   class	  was	   estimated	   to	  
make	  up	  2.1%	  of	  the	  population	  in	  2001,	  and	  4.1%	  in	  2011	  (see	  Table	  5.6)	  (Kochhar,	  2015).	  	  This	  is	  an	  
achievement	   in	   itself	   as	   it	   means	   the	   number	   of	   people	   spending	   $10-­‐20	   a	   day	   in	   Ghana	   almost	  
doubled	  in	  the	  space	  of	  a	  decade.	  
However,	   the	  question	   remains	   as	   to	  how	  useful	   estimates	  of	   the	  middle	   class	   are	   in	  determining	  
broader	   economic	   development	   and	   social	   change	   on	   the	   national	   scale.	   	   Firstly,	   middle	   class	  
estimates	  only	  focus	  on	  consumption,	  so	  cannot	  give	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  employment	  structure	  (i.e.	  
how	  many	  people	  are	  involved	  in	  formal/informal	  employment	  and	  which	  sectors	  they	  are	  engaged	  
in)	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   structure	   of	   employment	   is	   changing	   alongside	   rising	   incomes	  
(Stoffel,	   2014).	   	   Secondly,	   depending	   on	   the	   local	   context,	   people	  who	   cross	   the	   line	   into	   ‘middle	  
class’	  may	  not	  necessarily	  feel	  as	  if	  they	  are	  living	  a	  middle	  class	  lifestyle,	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  
quality	  education	  and	  healthcare	  facilities	  and	  affordable	  goods	  and	  services	  (Stoffel,	  2014;	  see	  also	  
BBC	  World	  Service,	  2013).	  
Table	  5.6	  Population	  Distribution	  by	  Income	  Tiers	  (%),	  2001	  and	  2011	  
	   2001	   2011	  
	   Pop	  
(m)	  
Poor	   Low	   Mid	   Upper
-­‐	  mid	  
High	   Pop	  
(m)	  




14.4	   46.4	   44.8	   6.1	   2.2	   0.4	   20.2	   32.2	   61.9	   4.8	   1.1	   -­‐	  
Burkina	  
Faso	  
11.9	   72.2	   27.0	   0.7	   0.2	   -­‐	   16.0	   57.3	   41.2	   1.2	   0.3	   -­‐	  
Burundi	   6.8	   87.5	   12.2	   0.3	   0.1	   -­‐	   9.5	   79.7	   20.0	   0.3	   -­‐	   -­‐	  




3.7	   66.5	   32.3	   1.2	   -­‐	   -­‐	   4.4	   66.7	   31.5	   1.6	   0.2	   -­‐	  
Côte	  
d’Ivoire	  
16.4	   16.7	   71.2	   9.2	   2.6	   0.3	   19.4	   23.8	   68.7	   6.0	   1.5	   -­‐	  
Egypt	   67.2	   0.4	   79.8	   16.6	   2.9	   0.3	   79.4	   0.4	   75.1	   21.0	   3.2	   0.4	  
Ethiopia	   68.0	   61.2	   38.2	   0.5	   0.1	   -­‐	   89.4	   33.8	   64.5	   1.3	   0.3	   -­‐	  
Ghana	   19.3	   50.7	   47.3	   1.9	   0.2	   -­‐	   24.8	   36.7	   59.1	   3.3	   0.8	   -­‐	  
Guinea	   8.9	   58.7	   39.9	   1.1	   0.3	   -­‐	   11.2	   55.3	   43.2	   1.6	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Kenya	   32.1	   21.9	   69.1	   6.8	   1.8	   0.3	   42.0	   31.1	   61.9	   5.2	   1.4	   0.3	  




Malawi	   11.6	   88.7	   11.1	   0.2	   -­‐	   -­‐	   15.5	   73.2	   25.8	   0.8	   0.2	   -­‐	  
Mali	   10.6	   62.4	   36.6	   1.0	   -­‐	   -­‐	   14.4	   52.2	   47.4	   0.5	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Mauritania	   2.8	   22.9	   70.1	   6.0	   1.0	   -­‐	   3.7	   19.8	   72.6	   6.1	   1.4	   0.2	  
Morocco	   29.0	   8.5	   76.8	   11.4	   3.0	   0.4	   32.1	   2.2	   73.3	   19.0	   4.9	   0.7	  
Mozambiqu
e	  
18.8	   83.2	   16.7	   0.1	   -­‐	   -­‐	   24.6	   66.8	   32.2	   0.9	   0.2	   -­‐	  
Niger	   11.4	   79.4	   20.0	   0.5	   0.1	   -­‐	   16.5	   53.7	   45.1	   1.0	   0.2	   -­‐	  
Nigeria	   126.0	   66.4	   32.5	   1.1	   -­‐	   -­‐	   164.2	   48.7	   49.4	   1.9	   0.1	   -­‐	  
Rwanda	   8.8	   75.5	   24.0	   0.5	   -­‐	   -­‐	   11.1	   63.4	   35.1	   1.5	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Senegal	   10.1	   50.8	   47.0	   1.7	   0.4	   0.1	   13.3	   35.1	   61.0	   3.3	   0.7	   -­‐	  
Seychelles	   0.1	   -­‐	   38.8	   38.4	   19.7	   3.1	   0.1	   0.7	   62.4	   25.7	   11.2	   -­‐	  
Sierra	  Leone	   4.3	   58.8	   39.2	   1.7	   0.3	   -­‐	   5.9	   49.9	   48.6	   1.3	   0.2	   -­‐	  
South	  Africa	   44.9	   32.7	   49.4	   10.8	   6.0	   1.1	   51.6	   20.2	   52.7	   13.6	   9.4	   4.1	  
Swaziland	   1.1	   66.4	   31.7	   1.5	   0.4	   -­‐	   1.2	   50.9	   43.9	   3.9	   1.3	   0.1	  
Tanzania	   34.9	   88.7	   11.3	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   46.4	   70.1	   29.2	   0.7	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Togo	   5.0	   30.2	   67.2	   2.7	   0.1	   -­‐	   6.5	   31.7	   63.8	   4.2	   0.3	   -­‐	  
Tunisia	   9.7	   5.8	   72.4	   16.7	   4.6	   0.5	   10.7	   2.2	   64.9	   27.0	   5.5	   0.5	  
Uganda	   25.1	   65.5	   33.3	   1.0	   0.3	   -­‐	   35.1	   40.9	   55.8	   2.6	   0.7	   -­‐	  
Zambia	   10.4	   47.5	   50.1	   1.9	   0.5	   0.1	   13.6	   64.4	   32.5	   2.4	   0.8	   0.1	  
Source:	  Kochhar	  (2015)	  
5.5	  Conclusions	  on	  Poverty	  
The	  evidence	  collected	  shows	  significant	   reductions	   in	  poverty	  across	   the	  country	  since	   the	  1990s,	  
with	   extreme	   poverty	   rates	   declining	   further	   than	   total	   poverty,	   and	   rural	   poverty	   declining	  most	  
rapidly	  overall	  (GSS	  2007;	  2014b).	  	  Nonetheless,	  disparities	  still	  exist	  between	  the	  north	  and	  south	  of	  
the	  country	  (GSS,	  2015)	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  migration	  and	  urbanisation	  are	  playing	  
a	   considerable	   role	   in	   reducing	   rural	   poverty	   (although	   as	   yet	   urban	   poverty	   has	   not	   shown	   any	  
increase,	  which	  is	  surprising)	  (GSS,	  2014b).	   	   In	  addition,	  the	  Multi-­‐dimensional	  Poverty	  Index	  (MPI),	  
which	   takes	   into	  account	  non-­‐monetary	   indicators	  of	  poverty,	  puts	  Ghana’s	  poverty	   rate	  at	  42.7%,	  
nearly	   double	   the	  GSS’s	   estimates	   based	   on	   the	   national	   poverty	   line,	   highlighting	   the	   potentially	  
fragile	  nature	  of	  those	  living	  just	  above	  the	  poverty	  line	  (GSS,	  2013a).	  
In	   terms	   of	   MDG	   progress,	   Ghana	   was	   the	   first	   African	   country	   to	   meet	   MDG	   1	   (halve	   extreme	  
poverty	  and	  hunger)	  before	  the	  2015	  deadline,	  and	  recorded	  substantial	  progress	  in	  primary	  school	  




(Republic	  of	  Ghana	  and	  UNDP	  Ghana,	  2015).	  	  The	  fertility	  rate	  significantly	  reduced	  during	  the	  1990s	  
and	  since	  2000	  has	  remained	  at	  around	  4	  children	  per	  woman,	  one	  of	  the	  lowest	  in	  SSA	  (GSS	  et	  al,	  
2015).	   	   Ghana’s	   HDI	   score	   has	   improved	   year-­‐on-­‐year	   since	   2000	   and	   now	   ranks	   in	   the	   medium	  
category,	  above	  the	  average	  for	  SSA	  yet	  behind	  all	  other	  regional	  averages	  (UNDP,	  2015a;	  2015b).	  
Finally,	   there	   is	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   growing	  middle	   class	  population	   in	  Ghana,	  but	  
statistics	  vary	  greatly	  according	  to	  the	  parameters	  used.	  	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  the	  AfDB	  (2011),	  
nearly	  half	  of	  Ghana’s	  population	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  ‘middle	  class’	  (consuming	  $2-­‐20	  per	  day),	  but	  
when	  using	  Kochhar’s	  (2015)	  categorisation	  of	  $10-­‐20	  per	  day,	  this	  figure	  reduces	  dramatically	  to	  4%	  
of	  the	  population	  (yet	  still	  a	  doubling	  since	  2001).	  	  Thus,	  despite	  the	  arguments	  over	  the	  definition	  
and	  measurement	  of	  the	  ‘middle	  class’,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  steady	  rise	  in	  incomes	  across	  the	  country,	  
as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  growing	  numbers	  of	  people	  consuming	  more	  than	  before.	  	  Even	  so,	  the	  recent	  
empirical	  data	  from	  Ghana	  reveals	  that	  the	  current	  economic	  downturn	  is	  causing	  serious	  hardship	  
for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  many	  of	  whom	  would	  identify	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘floating	  




Chapter	  6:	  Data	  Analysis	  –	  Economic	  Growth	  
6.1	  Introduction	  
	  
The	  table	  below	  describes	  the	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  
economic	  growth,	  and	  the	  data	  sources	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  analyse	  these	  claims	  (see	  Table	  6.1).	  
Table	  6.1	  Economic	  Growth	  Claims	  and	  Counter-­‐Claims,	  and	  Sources	  used	  for	  Analysis	  
	   Claims	   Counter-­‐claims	   Source	  Data	  
GDP	  growth	   Between	  2001-­‐2012,	  Ghana	  
recorded	  average	  GDP	  
growth	  of	  6.8%	  per	  year,	  
higher	  than	  the	  average	  for	  
SSA	  (ILO,	  2014)	  
After	  achieving	  the	  fastest	  
GDP	  growth	  in	  Africa	  in	  2011	  
(14%),	  Ghana’s	  2014	  growth	  
(4.2%)	  was	  its	  slowest	  in	  20	  
years,	  and	  below	  the	  SSA	  
average	  of	  5.0%	  (ISSER,	  2015)	  
African	  Economic	  
Outlook	  Reports	  for	  






Since	  1992,	  GDP	  growth	  has	  
averaged	  a	  robust	  5%	  a	  
year,	  raising	  per	  capita	  
incomes	  by	  40%	  over	  the	  
same	  period	  (Radelet,	  2010)	  
When	  considering	  a	  longer	  
timescale	  e.g.	  from	  
independence	  to	  the	  present	  
day,	  by	  2000,	  real	  GDP	  per	  
capita	  was	  only	  marginally	  
higher	  than	  it	  was	  in	  the	  
1960s	  (Booth	  et	  al,	  2005)	  









Significant	  improvement	  in	  
macroeconomic	  
management	  since	  2000,	  
including	  policies	  to	  increase	  
investment	  and	  raise	  tax	  
revenues,	  which	  now	  
account	  for	  between	  a	  
quarter	  and	  a	  third	  of	  GDP,	  
much	  higher	  than	  the	  SSA	  
average	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  
2011)	  
Macroeconomic	  challenges	  
still	  persist	  today	  –	  since	  
2007,	  public	  debt	  has	  
doubled	  to	  almost	  68%	  of	  the	  
country’s	  GDP	  (Bax,	  2015)	  
African	  Economic	  
Outlook	  Reports	  for	  
Ghana;	  World	  Bank	  
Development	  
Indicators	  
Overspending	  and	  the	  
widening	  trade	  deficit	  are	  
causing	  an	  increasing	  
inflation	  rate	  (which	  was	  17%	  
in	  2014)	  and	  devaluing	  of	  the	  
currency	  (Rexer,	  2015).	  
African	  Economic	  
Outlook	  Reports	  for	  
Ghana;	  AfDB	  





Ghana’s	  economic	  growth	  is	  
not	  just	  reliant	  on	  primary	  
commodities,	  but	  is	  “broad-­‐
based,	  with	  most	  sectors	  
participating,	  including	  
agriculture	  for	  once”	  (Killick,	  
2010:	  416).	  
Ghana’s	  economic	  structure	  
has	  hardly	  changed	  since	  
independence	  in	  1957,	  and	  
remains	  highly	  dependent	  on	  
natural	  resources	  and	  
primary	  commodities	  
(Aryeetey	  and	  Kanbur,	  2008).	  
Ghana	  Living	  Standards	  




Complexity;	  State	  of	  
the	  Ghanaian	  Economy	  
Reports	  
Sustainability	   Strong	  investment	  in	  the	  oil	  
and	  gas	  sectors	  and	  
favourable	  commodity	  
prices	  can	  sustain	  Ghana’s	  
growth	  into	  the	  future	  
(ISSER,	  2015)	  
Ghana’s	  natural	  resources	  
are	  “rapidly	  degrading”	  






Climate	  change	  poses	  a	  
threat	  to	  the	  national	  
economy	  and	  livelihoods	  







6.2	  GDP	  Growth	  	  
	  
Claim:	  Between	  2001-­‐2012,	  Ghana	  recorded	  GDP	  growth	  of	  6.8%,	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  for	  sub-­‐
Saharan	  Africa	  (ILO,	  2014).	  
GDP	  Growth	  (%)	  
Depending	   on	   the	   source	   of	   the	   data,	   GDP	   growth	   (%)	   estimates	   are	   not	   consistent	   and	   can	   vary	  
between	  datasets	  (see	  Table	  6.2).	   	  However,	  the	  trends	  are	  essentially	  the	  same;	  Ghana’s	  real	  GDP	  
growth	   increased	   steadily	   year-­‐on-­‐year	   until	   2009,	   when	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   slowed	   growth	  
rates	  considerably,	  before	  the	  economy	  experienced	  a	  momentous	  rebound	  in	  2011	  with	  a	  growth	  
rate	  of	  14%,	  due	  mainly	  to	  new	  oil	  revenues,	  after	  which	  the	  growth	  rate	  has	  declined	  to	  levels	  seen	  
in	   the	  early	  2000s,	  possibly	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  global	  economic	   slowdown	   (especially	   in	  China),	  and	  
internal	   factors	  such	  as	  the	  national	  energy	  crisis	   (see	  Figure	  6.1)	   (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2012;	  2015b).	   	  Using	  
the	  World	  Bank’s	  figures,	  Ghana’s	  average	  GDP	  growth	  between	  2001-­‐2012	  was	  6.8%,	  nearly	  double	  
the	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  average	  of	  3.87%	  for	  the	  same	  period	  (see	  Table	  6.2).	  
Table	  6.2	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  (%)	  Estimates	  for	  Ghana	  and	  SSA,	  2000-­‐2015	  
	   Year	  
Source	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	   2015	  
GSS	  –	  
Ghana*	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   5.6	   5.9	   6.4	   6.5	   8.4	   4.0	   7.9	   14.0	   9.3	   7.3	   4.0	   3.9	  
AfDB	  -­‐	  
Ghana	  
3.8	   4.2	   4.5	   5.2	   5.6	   5.9	   6.4	   6.5	   8.4	   4.0	   3.4	   14.0	   9.3	   7.3	   4.2	   3.9	  
WB	  -­‐	  
Ghana	  
3.7	   4.0	   4.5	   5.2	   5.6	   5.9	   6.4	   4.3	   9.1	   4.8	   7.9	   14.0	   9.3	   7.3	   4.0	   3.4	  
WB	  -­‐	  
SSA	  
3.5	   3.8	   3.5	   4.3	   9.4	   5.2	   6.1	   6.1	   4.5	   2.0	   5.2	   4.2	   4.0	   4.3	   4.3	   3.7	  
Sources:	  AfDB	  Data	  Portal,	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
*GSS	  GDP	  data	  not	  publicly	  available	  prior	  to	  2004	  
Figure	  6.1	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  (%)	  for	  Ghana	  and	  SSA,	  2000-­‐2015	  
	  



























Counter-­‐Claim:	   After	   achieving	   the	   fastest	   GDP	   growth	   in	   Africa	   in	   2011	   (14%),	   Ghana’s	   2014	  
growth,	  at	  4.2%,	  was	  its	  slowest	  in	  20	  years,	  and	  below	  the	  average	  of	  5.0%	  for	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  
(ISSER,	  2015).	  
Ghana’s	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  for	  2014	  
Although	  Ghana’s	  real	  GDP	  growth	  in	  2014	  was	  low	  compared	  with	  the	  period	  from	  2011,	  it	  was	  not	  
as	   low	   as	   growth	   rates	   in	   2009	   and	   2010	   (using	   AfDB	   estimates),	   and	   only	   just	   behind	   the	  World	  
Bank’s	   estimated	   growth	   rate	   for	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   which	   was	   4.3%	   in	   2014	   (see	   Table	   6.2).	  	  
However,	   Ghana’s	   real	   GDP	   growth	   in	   2015	   slowed	   to	   3.4%,	   compared	   with	   the	   estimated	   3.7%	  
growth	  of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (World	  Bank	  estimates).	  
Trends	  in	  GDP	  Over	  Time	  
Looking	   back	   over	   a	   longer	   time	   period,	   Ghana’s	   GDP	   growth	   fluctuated	   considerably	   in	   the	   two	  
decades	  following	  independence,	  before	  stabilising	  at	  around	  4-­‐5%	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  most	   likely	   in	  
response	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Economic	  Recovery	  Program	  supported	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
IMF	   (Kwasi	  Fosu,	  2001)	   (see	  Figure	  6.2).	   	  Growth	   remained	  stable	  until	   the	  early	  2000s,	  when	   first	  
gradual	   and	   then	   sudden	   increases	   were	   observed,	   with	   2011’s	   growth	   being	   the	   highest	   ever	  
experienced,	   at	   14%.	   	   Therefore,	   although	   2014’s	   growth	   rate	   was	   low	   compared	   with	   the	   three	  
previous	  years,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  trends	  experienced	  over	  the	  last	  20	  years.	  	  	  
Figure	  6.2	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  (%)	  and	  GDP	  (Constant	  LCU),	  1961-­‐2014
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  data	  
	  
GDP	   growth	   has	   varied	   however,	   and	   current	   GDP	   growth,	   at	   3.7%,	   is	   comparable	   to	   the	   rate	   of	  
growth	  experienced	  in	  the	  early	  1960s.	  	  However,	  when	  considering	  GDP	  at	  constant	  local	  currency,	  
it	  becomes	  clear	   that	  absolute	  GDP	  has	   increased	  significantly	  over	   the	  same	  period,	   from	  5,248m	  
Ghanaian	  cedis	  in	  1960	  to	  33,521m	  cedis	  in	  2014.	  







































































































6.3	  GDP	  per	  capita	  
	  
Claim:	  Since	  1992,	  GDP	  growth	  has	  averaged	  a	  robust	  5%	  a	  year,	  raising	  per	  capita	  incomes	  by	  40%	  
over	  the	  same	  period	  (Radelet,	  2010).	  
Real	  GDP	  Per	  Capita	  Growth	  (%)	  
The	   growth	   of	   real	   GDP	   per	   capita	   has	   tracked	   GDP	   growth	   quite	   closely	   over	   the	   decade	   of	   the	  
2000s	  (see	  Figure	  6.3),	  as	  population	  growth	  has	  been	  fairly	  steady	  at	  approx.	  2.6-­‐2.7%	  on	  average	  
(ISSER,	  2014a).	  	  2011	  saw	  a	  high	  of	  11.3%	  growth	  in	  per	  capital	  GDP,	  however	  since	  then	  per	  capita	  
GDP	  growth	  has	  declined	  along	  with	  overall	  GDP	  growth	  to	  reach	  1.6%	  in	  2014,	  its	  lowest	  rate	  since	  
2001.	  	  	  
Figure	  6.3	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  (%)	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita	  Growth	  (%),	  2000-­‐2014	  	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
Counter-­‐claim:	  When	  considering	  a	  longer	  timescale	  e.g.	  from	  independence	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  by	  
2000,	  GDP	  per	  capita	  was	  only	  marginally	  higher	  than	  it	  was	  in	  the	  1960s	  (Booth	  et	  al,	  2005).	  
Figure	  6.4	  shows	  that	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (measured	  in	  local	  currency	  at	  constant	  prices)	  has	  increased	  
considerably,	  by	  36.8%	  since	  1961.	  However,	  the	  majority	  of	  this	  increase	  took	  place	  in	  the	  late	  
2000s,	  following	  a	  long	  period	  of	  slow	  growth	  after	  a	  significant	  fall	  during	  the	  early	  1980s.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  
wasn’t	  until	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  that	  GDP	  per	  capita	  surpassed	  the	  level	  it	  was	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  
1970s.	  



















Figure	  6.4	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (constant	  LCU),	  1961-­‐2014	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
6.4	  Macroeconomics	  
	  
Claim:	   There	   have	   been	   significant	   improvements	   in	   macroeconomic	   management	   since	   2000,	  
including	  policies	  to	  increase	  investment	  and	  raise	  tax	  revenues,	  which	  now	  account	  for	  between	  a	  
quarter	  and	  a	  third	  of	  GDP	  -­‐	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  SSA	  average	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011)	  
Investment	  
Ghana’s	  gross	   fixed	  capital	   formation13	  and	  FDI	   inflows	  fluctuated	  greatly	  during	  the	  decade	  of	   the	  
2000s	   (see	  Figure	  6.5),	  despite	   the	  government’s	  efforts	   to	  make	  the	  private	  sector	   the	  “engine	  of	  
growth”	   (AfDB/OECD,	   2005:	   256).	   	   Since	  2007	  however,	   both	  public	   and	  private	   investments	  have	  
risen	  as	  a	  result	   improvements	  in	  the	  business	  environment	  (AfDB/OECD,	  2008).	   	  FDI	  has	  remained	  
fairly	  constant	  since	  2008,	  with	  most	  private	  investment	  directed	  towards	  the	  oil	  and	  mining	  sectors	  
(AfDB	  et	  al,	  2012).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  accumulation	  of	  physical	  assets,	  including	  “land	  improvements	  (fences,	  ditches,	  drains,	  and	  so	  on);	  plant,	  
machinery,	  and	  equipment	  purchases;	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  roads,	  railways,	  and	  the	  like,	  including	  schools,	  









































































































Figure	  6.5	  Gross	  Fixed	  Capital	  Formation	  (%	  GDP),	  2000-­‐2014	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
Tax	  Revenues	  
The	   early	   2000s	   saw	   tax	   revenues	   increase	   gradually	   to	   reach	   a	   high	   of	   20.7%	  of	  GDP	   in	   2005,	   in	  
response	   to	  “revenue-­‐augmenting”	  measures	   introduced	  by	   the	  Ghanaian	  government,	   including	  a	  
National	   Health	   Insurance	   Levy	   and	   a	   new	   Financial	   Administration	   Act	   (AfDB/OECD,	   2005:	   257).	  
Including	  grants,	  total	  revenue	  reached	  a	  high	  of	  28.6%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2007,	  yet	  since	  then,	  this	  figure	  has	  
stagnated,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  significant	  decline	  in	  grants	  (see	  Table	  6.3).	  	  Younger	  (2016)	  warns	  that	  
this	  decline	  may	  well	  be	  a	  permanent	  fixture,	  stemming	  from	  the	  global	  financial	  slowdown	  that	  has	  
affected	  donor	  budgets,	  or	  from	  the	  promotion	  of	  Ghana	  to	  MIC	  status,	  so	  therefore	  the	  government	  
should	  not	   count	  on	  grants	   increasing	   in	   the	  near	   future.	   	  Nevertheless,	   there	  are	   indications	   that	  
revenues	   are	   recovering	   slightly,	   with	   tax	   revenues	   projected	   to	   reach	   19.1%	   in	   2016,	   and	   total	  
revenue	  20.5%,	  however	  rising	  public	  expenditure,	  particularly	  wages	  and	  interest	  rates,	  has	  resulted	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Table	  6.3	  Ghana’s	  Public	  Finances	  (%	  GDP),	  2000-­‐2015	  
Year	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	  
Total	  Revenue	  
&	  Grants	  
19.8	   25.0	   21.1	   25.5	   30.1	   29.1	   27.4	   28.6	  
Tax	  Revenue	   16.3	   17.2	   17.5	   20.2	   22.3	   20.7	   20.0	   20.0	  




27.7	   32.7	   26.1	   29.0	   33.3	   30.7	   34.4	   37.0	  
Current	  
Expenditure	  
18.5	   19.9	   20.0	   20.0	   20.9	   18.7	   22.0	   22.8	  
Excluding	  
Interest	  
11.0	   12.3	   13.8	   13.8	   16.6	   15.1	   17.3	   16.4	  
Wages	  and	  
Salaries	  
5.2	   6.1	   8.5	   8.4	   8.7	   8.5	   9.7	   10.0	  
Interest	   7.5	   7.6	   6.1	   6.2	   4.3	   3.6	   4.7	   6.4	  
Capital	  
Expenditure	  
9.2	   12.8	   6.1	   8.9	   12.4	   12.0	   12.4	   14.2	  
Primary	  
Balance	  
-­‐0.4	   -­‐0.1	   1.2	   2.7	   1.2	   2.0	   -­‐2.3	   -­‐2.0	  
Overall	  Balance	   -­‐7.9	   -­‐7.7	   -­‐5.0	   -­‐3.5	   -­‐3.1	   -­‐1.6	   -­‐7.0	   -­‐8.4	  
Year	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014(e)	   2015(p)	  
Total	  Revenue	  
&	  Grants	  
16	   16.5	   19.1	   18.7	   18.8	   16.8	   18.2	   19.4	  
Tax	  Revenue	   11.6	   11.9	   12.1	   17.5	   17.1	   16.1	   17.4	   17.9	  




23.9	   20.5	   26.5	   24.4	   30.6	   26.3	   28.5	   29.0	  
Current	  
Expenditure	  
14.8	   13.4	   19	   20.5	   25.2	   21.8	   23.2	   23.5	  
Excluding	  
Interest	  
12.6	   10.6	   15.8	   17.8	   21.7	   17.1	   16.3	   15.9	  
Wages	  and	  
Salaries	  
6.6	   6.8	   6.9	   10.9	   11.1	   11.1	   9.7	   9.5	  
Interest	   2.3	   2.8	   3.1	   2.7	   3.5	   4.6	   6.9	   7.6	  
Capital	  
Expenditure	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   7.6	   3.8	   5.3	   4.5	   5.3	   5.5	  
Primary	  
Balance	  
-­‐5.7	   -­‐1.2	   -­‐4.3	   -­‐3.0	   -­‐8.2	   -­‐4.9	   -­‐3.5	   -­‐1.9	  
Overall	  Balance	   -­‐7.9	   4	   -­‐7.4	   -­‐5.7	   -­‐11.8	   -­‐9.5	   -­‐10.4	   -­‐9.5	  
Source:	  Own	  table	  based	  on	  African	  Economic	  Outlook	  Reports	  for	  Ghana	  





Counter-­‐claims:	   Macroeconomic	   challenges	   still	   persist	   today	   –	   since	   2007,	   public	   debt	   has	  
doubled	   to	   almost	   68%	  of	   the	   country’s	  GDP	   (Bax,	   2015);	  Overspending	   and	   the	  widening	   trade	  
deficit	   are	   causing	   an	   increasing	   inflation	   rate	   (which	   rose	   to	   17%	   in	   2014)	   and	   devaluing	   the	  
currency	  (Rexer,	  2015).	  
Government	  Budget	  Expenditure	  
Since	   2005,	   the	   government’s	   budget	   expenditure	   has	   increased	   substantially,	   from	   2,970m	  
Ghanaian	  cedis	  in	  2005	  to	  26,277m	  cedis	  in	  2013,	  contributing	  to	  a	  growing	  budget	  deficit	  (see	  Table	  
6.3	  above	  and	  Figure	  6.6	  below)	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  increase	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  
recurrent	   expenditure	   (i.e.	   goods	   and	   services),	   rather	   than	   capital	   expenditure	   (i.e.	   acquisition	   of	  
long-­‐term	   assets),	   which	   is	   potentially	   problematic	   as	   capital	   expenditure	   is	   more	   important	   in	  
sustaining	  the	  country’s	  economic	  growth	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  
Figure	  6.6	  Government	  Budget	  Expenditure	  (millions	  of	  cedis),	  2005-­‐2013	  
	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014b:	  4)	  
Public	  Debt	  
Ghana’s	   debt	   burden	   of	   $6.93bn	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1999	   made	   the	   country	   eligible	   for	   the	   Highly	  
Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	  (HIPC)	  initiative,	  which	  was	  instrumental	  in	  reducing	  external	  debt	  levels	  in	  
the	  early	  2000s	  (OECD/AfDB,	  2002).	  	  In	  2006	  Ghana’s	  external	  debt	  burden	  was	  further	  reduced	  by	  
two-­‐thirds,	   to	   $2.1bn,	   under	   the	  Multilateral	  Debt	   Relief	   Initiative	   (MDRI)	   of	   the	   IMF,	  World	   Bank	  
and	  AfDB	  (see	  Figure	  6.7)	  (AfDB/OECD,	  2007).	  	  Since	  then,	  external	  debt	  levels	  have	  increased	  again,	  
to	  a	  figure	  over	  double	  that	  of	  2006,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  widening	  budget	  deficit	  and	  a	  sharp	  rise	  in	  
public	  debt,	  from	  39.7%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2011	  to	  67.1%	  of	  GDP	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2014	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015b).	  	  On	  
Ghana’s	  current	  economic	  trajectory,	  this	  level	  of	  debt	  seems	  impossible	  to	  service,	  however	  there	  is	  




Figure	  6.7	  Ghana’s	  Total	  External	  Debt	  (%	  GNI),	  2000-­‐2014	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
Trade	  Deficit	  
Throughout	   the	   2000s,	   Ghana’s	   trade	   balance	   has	   been	   in	   deficit,	   with	   imports	   consistently	  
outstripping	  exports	  (see	  Figure	  6.8).	  	  In	  addition,	  exports	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  fluctuating	  oil	  and	  
commodity	   prices,	   particularly	   of	   Ghana’s	   two	  main	   exports,	   gold	   and	   cocoa	   (AfDB/OECD,	   2007).	  	  
2008,	   for	   example,	   saw	   a	   substantial	   growth	   in	   imports	   due	   to	   a	   spike	   in	   crude	   oil	   prices,	   which	  
caused	   a	   deeper	  widening	   of	   the	   trade	   deficit	   (see	   Table	   6.4	   and	   Figure	   6.8)	   (AfDB/OECD,	   2009).	  	  
However,	  in	  2009,	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  caused	  a	  substantial	  drop	  in	  imports,	  thereby	  halving	  the	  
trade	   deficit	   and	   the	   current	   account	   deficit	   (AfDB	   et	   al,	   2011).	   	   Since	   then,	   the	   trade	   deficit	   has	  
continued	   to	   narrow,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   new	   oil	   production	   and	   reduced	   demand	   for	   imports,	   as	   a	  
consequence	  of	   the	  gradual	  depreciation	  of	   the	   local	   currency	  over	   the	   last	   few	  years	   (AfDB	  et	  al,	  
2014).	  
Table	  6.4	  Ghana’s	  External	  Sector	  Indicators,	  2000-­‐2014	  
	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  
Current	  Account	  
Balance	  (%	  GDP)	  
-­‐8.0	   -­‐5.4	   -­‐1.1	   1.0	   -­‐3.9	   -­‐6.2	   -­‐5.1	   -­‐7.9	   -­‐10.8	   -­‐4.0	   -­‐8.6	   -­‐9.0	   -­‐11.7	   -­‐11.9	   -­‐9.2	  
Terms	  of	  trade,	  
goods	  (%	  change)	  




-­‐2.5	   -­‐4.8	   7.8	   16.1	   24.8	   8.0	   44.3	   25.8	   47.5	   13.4	   54.5	   123.
4	  




-­‐5.8	   -­‐3.3	   -­‐0.9	   34.6	   47.5	   36.6	   37.6	   31.8	   48.2	   -­‐33.1	   38.0	   51.5	   10.3	   -­‐0.6	   -­‐12.0	  














Months	  of	  Exports	  
0.9	   1.1	   2.0	   3.9	   3.7	   3.2	   3.0	   2.4	   1.7	   3.7	   4.1	   3.4	   2.9	   2.8	   2.6	  


























Figure	  6.8	  Ghana’s	  Trade	  Balance,	  2000-­‐2014	  	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  AfDB	  data	  
Inflation	  Rate	  
Ghana’s	   inflation	   rate	   decreased	   throughout	   the	   early	   2000s	   in	   response	   to	   prudent	   fiscal	   and	  
monetary	  policies	   introduced	  by	  the	  government	   (see	  Figure	  6.9)	   (AfDB/OECD,	  2005).	   	  The	  general	  
election	   in	   2008	   indirectly	   increased	   inflationary	   pressures	   in	   2008	   and	   2009,	   before	   the	   rate	  
dropped	  again	  with	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  government’s	  fiscal	  stabilisation	  plan	  (AfDB	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  
Since	  2012,	  however,	  the	  inflation	  rate	  has	  been	  rising	  partly	  in	  response	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  subsidies	  
on	   petrol	   prices	   and	   an	   increase	   in	   electricity	   and	  water	   tariffs	   (AfDB	   et	   al,	   2014).	   	   This	   has	   been	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  loss	  in	  value	  of	  the	  Ghanaian	  cedi,	  which	  depreciated	  by	  31%	  against	  the	  US	  dollar	  
in	  2014	  (ISSER,	  2015),	  making	  it	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  worst	  performing	  currencies	  (Rexer,	  2015).	  	  	  
According	   to	   Rexer	   (2015),	   there	   were	   plenty	   of	   early	   warning	   signs	   of	   the	   country’s	   impending	  
financial	   crisis,	   including	   procyclical	   spending	   (which	   went	   mostly	   into	   consumption	   rather	   than	  
investment),	   rising	   imports,	   deficits	   in	   the	   current	   account	   and	   trade	   balance,	   high	   inflation	   and	  
overvaluation	  of	   the	   currency,	   however	   these	  were	   largely	   ignored	  by	  policymakers.	   	  Government	  
borrowing	  was	  also	  high	  as	  the	  joint	  effect	  of	  “debt	  relief,	  the	  revaluation	  of	  GDP,	  and	  the	  perceived	  
increase	   in	   oil	   revenues”	   made	   the	   government	   appear	   more	   creditworthy	   (Younger,	   2016:	   21).	  	  
Concerned	  by	  the	  government’s	  rising	  deficits,	  investors	  began	  to	  pull	  out	  of	  the	  country,	  putting	  yet	  
more	  pressure	  on	  the	  currency	  (Rexer,	  2015).	  	  Yet	  as	  long	  as	  the	  current	  account	  is	  in	  deficit,	  the	  cedi	  
will	  remain	  weak,	  meaning	  that	  households	  will	  continue	  to	  endure	  the	  consequences	  through	  a	  loss	  
of	  purchasing	  power	  (Rexer,	  2015).	  



























Figure	  6.9	  Inflation,	  consumer	  prices	  (annual	  %),	  2000-­‐2015	  	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
6.5	  Structural	  Change	  
	  
Claim:	  Ghana’s	  economic	  growth	  is	  not	  just	  reliant	  on	  primary	  commodities,	  but	  is	  “broad-­‐based,	  
with	  most	  sectors	  participating,	  including	  agriculture	  for	  once”	  (Killick,	  2010:	  416).	  
Structure	  of	  the	  Economy	  
Since	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  Ghanaian	  economy	  has	  undergone	  a	  shift	  from	  agriculture	  as	  the	  principal	  
driver	   of	   growth	   to	   the	   services	   sector	   now	   accounting	   for	   the	  majority	   of	   GDP	   (see	   Figure	   6.10)	  
(GSS,	  2014b).	   	  From	  2005	  to	  2013,	   the	  share	  of	   the	  agricultural	  sector	  almost	  halved,	   from	  42%	  to	  
22%	   of	   GDP,	   whilst	   the	   services	   sector	   increased	   from	   31%	   to	   49%	   of	   GDP.	   	   The	   share	   of	  
manufacturing	   has	   declined	   from	   10%	   to	   6%	   over	   the	   same	   period,	   whilst	   the	   share	   of	   industry	  
excluding	  manufacturing14	  has	  been	   increasing	   since	  2011	  when	  crude	  oil	   exports	  began,	  and	  now	  
accounts	  for	  a	  greater	  share	  than	  agriculture,	  making	  up	  23%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2013	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Using	  the	  UN	  International	  Standard	  Industrial	  Classification,	  ‘industry’	  refers	  to	  mining	  and	  quarrying,	  
construction,	  electricity,	  water	  and	  gas.	  Manufacturing	  is	  also	  included,	  but	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  separate	  























Figure	  6.10	  Sectoral	  Distribution	  of	  GDP	  (%),	  2005-­‐2014*	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  
*Data	  unavailable	  before	  2005	  at	  the	  same	  constant	  prices	  
**Separate	  manufacturing	  data	  not	  available	  for	  all	  years	  under	  consideration	  
Whilst	   the	   share	   of	   manufacturing	   in	   overall	   GDP	   has	   decreased,	   in	   absolute	   terms,	   the	  
manufacturing	  sector	  has	  actually	  seen	  a	  gradual	  rise	  in	  value	  added,	  from	  1,824m	  cedis	  in	  2006	  to	  
2,335m	  cedis	  in	  2014	  (see	  Table	  6.5).	  	  Although	  it	  is	  small	  compared	  with	  the	  rise	  seen	  in	  the	  services	  
and	   industrial	   sectors,	   it	   is	   still	   significant	   to	   note	   as	   it	  means	   that	   the	   sector	   is	   at	   least	   growing,	  
rather	  than	  stagnating	  or	  declining	  as	  one	  might	  expect	  if	  the	  share	  is	  declining.	  
Table	  6.5	  Value	  Added	  (Constant	  LCU)	  (millions	  of	  Ghanaian	  cedis)	  
Year	  
	   2006*	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  
Services	  etc.	   8,204	   8,908	   9,584	   9,928	   10,918	   11,909	   13,346	   14,483	   15,284	  
Industry	  excl.	  
Manufacturing	  
3,704	   3,930	   4,522	   4,725	   5,053	   7,157	   7,947	   8,475	   8,542	  
Manufacturing	   1,824	   1,801	   1,868	   1,844	   1,894	   2,321	   2,366	   2,355	   2,335	  
Agriculture	   5,415	   5,322	   5,716	   6,129	   6,452	   6,507	   6,657	   7,035	   7,362	  
Source:	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
*Earliest	  data	  available	  
Industrialisation	  -­‐	  Manufacturing	  
Many	   authors	   agree	   that	   industrialisation	   through	   manufacturing	   is	   one	   of	   the	   fastest	   and	   most	  
effective	   ways	   of	   raising	   incomes	   and	   lifting	   people	   out	   of	   poverty	   (e.g.	   ACET,	   2014;	  McMillan	   &	  
Harttgen,	   2014;	   Rodrik,	   2014;	   Economist,	   2015;	   UNECA,	   2015;	   Taylor,	   2016).	   	   Therefore	   it	   is	  
important	  to	  look	  at	  the	  change	  that	  has	  occurred	  in	  Ghana’s	  manufacturing	  sector	  as	  the	  economy	  
has	   grown.	   	   The	   last	   decade	   has	   seen	   large	   fluctuations	   in	   exports	   of	   manufactures,	   with	   2005	  
recording	  the	  highest	  share	  of	  manufactures	   in	  exported	  goods	  and	  2011	  the	   lowest,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  




























Figure	  6.11	  Manufactures	  Exports	  (%	  Merchandise	  Exports),	  2000-­‐2013	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Data	  
*Latest	  available	  data	  
Investments	  in	  Manufacturing	  
The	  manufacturing	  sector	  made	  up	  the	  highest	  share	  of	  total	  investments	  during	  the	  early	  and	  mid-­‐
2000s,	  until	  2008	  when	  investments	  in	  services	  overtook	  investments	  in	  manufacturing	  for	  the	  first	  
time	   (see	   Figure	   6.12).	   	   Subsequently,	   manufacturing	   investments	   hovered	   around	   15%	   of	   total	  
investments,	   behind	   the	   services	   sector,	   until	   2014	   when	   the	   figure	   almost	   doubled	   to	   28.6%,	  
suggesting	  there	  may	  be	  a	  renewal	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  sector.	  
Figure	  6.12	  Share	  of	  Manufacturing	  (%)	  in	  Total	  Investments,	  2007-­‐2015
	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Investment	  Promotion	  Centre	  

















































































Counter-­‐claim:	  Ghana’s	  economic	  structure	  has	  hardly	  changed	  since	  independence,	  and	  remains	  
highly	  dependent	  on	  natural	  resources	  and	  primary	  commodities	  (Aryeetey	  and	  Kanbur,	  2008).	  
Exports	  	  
Ghana’s	  total	  exports	  increased	  steadily	  over	  the	  decade	  2000-­‐2010,	  from	  just	  below	  US$2bn	  in	  2000	  
to	  just	  over	  US$5bn	  in	  2010	  (see	  Figure	  6.13).	  	  In	  2011	  the	  value	  of	  total	  exports	  more	  than	  tripled	  to	  
US$18.1bn,	   however	   the	   figure	   for	   consumer	   goods	   does	   not	   seem	   credible	   compared	   with	   the	  
estimates	   preceding	   and	   succeeding	   it	   (see	   Table	   6.6).	   	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   the	  
considerable	  increase	  in	  raw	  materials,	  both	  in	  monetary	  terms	  and	  in	  the	  share	  of	  total	  exports.	  
Figure	  6.13	  Ghana’s	  Exports	  (US$	  bn)	  by	  Product	  Category,	  2000-­‐2013*
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Integrated	  Trade	  Solution	  (WITS)	  
*2002	  and	  2004	  data	  unavailable,	  2013	  latest	  available	  data	  


























Table	  6.6	  Exports	  by	  Product	  Category,	  2000-­‐2013*	  





396	   394	   867	   1,040	   1,379	   1,185	   1,444	   1,268	   1,086	   6,538	   6,184	   5,231	  
Product	  
Share	  (%)	  






1,011	   1,032	   1,242	   1,708	   1,882	   2,016	   2,277	   3,437	   3,916	   5,875	   7,931	   6,265	  
Product	  
Share	  (%)	  





240	   270	   191	   227	   332	   265	   206	   290	   172	   5,572	   1,421	   868	  
Product	  
Share	  (%)	  





19	   10	   18	   82	   14	   63	   101	   65	   74	   143	   213	   259	  
Product	  
Share	  (%)	  
1.16	   0.57	   0.76	   2.67	   0.38	   1.79	   2.51	   1.27	   1.41	   0.79	   1.35	   2.05	  
Source:	  World	  Integrated	  Trade	  Solution	  (WITS)	  
*2002	  and	  2004	  data	  unavailable,	  2013	  latest	  available	  data	  
Cocoa,	  gold	  and	  crude	  petroleum	  currently	  make	  up	  Ghana’s	  main	  commodity	  exports	  and,	  for	  much	  
of	   the	   last	  decade,	   cocoa	  and	  gold	  alone	  have	  accounted	   for	  over	  half	  of	   total	  exports	   (see	  Figure	  
6.14).	   	   In	  2011,	  crude	  petroleum	  was	  exported	  for	  the	  first	   time,	  however	  the	  shares	  of	  cocoa	  and	  
gold	  exports	  were	  still	  higher,	  and	  have	  remained	  significantly	  higher	  than	  crude	  petroleum	  in	  2012	  
and	  2013	  too.	   	  Overall,	   the	  share	  of	  other	  products	   in	  total	  exports	  has	  declined	  substantially	  over	  
the	  years,	  from	  almost	  50%	  in	  2000	  to	  20%	  in	  2013,	  meaning	  that	  Ghana’s	  export	  base	  is	  narrowing.	  	  
Should	  this	  trend	  continue,	   it	  could	  become	  problematic	  for	  the	  sustainability	  of	  economic	  growth,	  
given	  the	  increasing	  dependence	  on	  global	  prices	  of	  just	  two	  to	  three	  commodities,	  one	  of	  which	  –	  
cocoa	  –	  is	  very	  much	  reliant	  on	  favourable	  climatic	  conditions,	  which	  are	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  
unpredictable	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  climate	  change.	  
Figure	  6.14	  Share	  of	  Top	  Three	  Products	  in	  Exports,	  2000-­‐2013	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Observatory	  of	  Economic	  Complexity	  (2016)	  
2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  
Other	   48,5	   50,7	   55,5	   48	   46,6	   48	   43,6	   37,8	   39,6	   24,6	   22,7	   28,3	   20,2	   20,4	  
Crude	  Petroleum	   19	   18	   19	  
Cocoa	   22,5	   21,3	   44,3	   40	   52,9	   28	   30,4	   32,2	   31,4	   29,4	   32,3	   23,7	   17,8	   30,6	  




























Share	  of	  Exports	  in	  GDP	  	  
Since	   2000,	   the	   share	   of	   exports	   in	  GDP	   has	   significantly	   increased	   compared	  with	   previous	   years	  
(see	  Figure	  6.15).	  	  The	  highest	  share	  was	  in	  the	  year	  2000	  itself,	  at	  almost	  50%	  of	  GDP,	  followed	  by	  a	  
decline	  into	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  but	  since	  2011	  this	  figure	  has	  been	  rising	  to	  reach	  almost	  40%	  of	  GDP	  in	  
2014.	  	  Again,	  this	  signals	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Ghana’s	  economic	  growth	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  reliant	  
on	  exports,	  and	  yet	  commodity	  prices	  themselves	  are	  volatile	  and	  unpredictable,	  especially	  oil	  prices.	  
Figure	  6.15	  Share	  of	  Exports	  in	  GDP,	  2000-­‐2013	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
6.6	  Sustainability	  
Claim:	  Strong	   investment	   in	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sectors	  and	  favourable	  commodity	  prices	  can	  sustain	  
Ghana’s	  growth	  into	  the	  future	  (ISSER,	  2015)	  
Oil	  Rents	  
Ghana’s	  oil	  rents15	  rose	  from	  around	  1%	  of	  GDP	  during	  the	  period	  2000-­‐2010	  to	  6%	  of	  GDP	  in	  2011,	  
2012	  and	  2013,	  after	  production	  began	  at	  the	  Jubilee	  oil	  field	  (see	  Figure	  6.16).	  	  Ghana’s	  oil	  industry	  
has	  a	  potential	  revenue	  of	  $1bn	  a	  year	  over	  the	  next	  20	  years,	  but	  has	  so	  far	  been	  held	  back	  by	  initial	  
technical	  challenges;	  2011’s	  oil	  revenues,	  for	  example,	  were	  only	  $314m	  (Annan	  &	  Edu-­‐Afful,	  2015).	  	  	  
The	   Ghana	   National	   Petroleum	   Commission	   (GNPC)	   was	   established	   to	   oversee	   the	   country’s	   oil	  
production	  and	  the	  investment	  of	  revenues	  into	  the	  Ghana	  Stabilisation	  Fund	  (70%)	  and	  the	  Ghana	  
Heritage	   Fund	   (30%)	   to	   cushion	   against	   price	   volatility	   and	   begin	   a	   fund	   for	   future	   generations,	  
respectively	   (Annan	  &	  Edu-­‐Afful,	   2015).	   	  However,	   according	   to	  Harguth	   (2012),	   oil	   revenues	  have	  
been	  found	  to	  be	  entering	  a	  general	  treasury	  account	  along	  with	  other	  government	  funds,	  and	  the	  
GNPC	   itself	   has	   been	   accused	   of	   impropriety	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   transparency	   and	   accountability	   in	   its	  
management	  of	  the	  oil	  industry	  (Annan	  &	  Edu-­‐Afful,	  2015).	  	  Furthermore,	  despite	  being	  a	  member	  of	  
the	  Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative	  (EITI),	  which	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  the	  full	  reporting	  
and	  publishing	  of	  oil	  revenues,	  there	  has	  been	  little	  uptake	  within	  the	  Ghanaian	  government,	  as	  few	  
outside	  the	  oil	  industry	  are	  even	  aware	  of	  its	  existence	  (Annan	  &	  Edu-­‐Afful,	  2015).	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  value	  of	  crude	  oil	  production	  at	  world	  prices	  and	  total	  costs	  of	  production	  






















































































































Figure	  6.16	  Ghana’s	  Oil	  Rents,	  2000-­‐2013
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  
Oil/Non-­‐oil	  Growth	  Rates	  
Oil	  exports	  have	  been	  a	  significant	  driver	  of	  Ghana’s	  GDP	  growth	  since	  2011,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  
non-­‐oil	  growth	  rates	  of	  9.4%	  in	  2011	  compared	  with	  overall	  GDP	  growth	  of	  15%,	  and	  3.0%	  in	  2013	  
compared	  with	  the	  5.4%	  overall	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  (see	  Figure	  6.17)	  (ISSER,	  2015).	  	  In	  2014,	  falling	  oil	  
prices	   meant	   the	   sector	   was	   unable	   to	   contribute	   significantly	   to	   Ghana’s	   overall	   GDP	   growth,	  
leading	  to	  a	  non-­‐oil	  growth	  rate	  of	  4.1%	  compared	  with	  overall	  GDP	  growth	  of	  4.2%	  (ISSER,	  2015).	  	  
This	  would	  become	  even	  more	  of	  a	  concern	  in	  the	  future,	  should	  Ghana	  wish	  to	  pursue	  oil	  as	  a	  key	  
driver	  of	  economic	  growth,	  as	   falling	  global	  demand	  due	  to	  climate	  change	  policies	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  
renewable	   energies,	  will	   cause	   oil	   prices	   to	   become	   very	   unpredictable.	   	  Moreover,	   on	   a	   national	  
scale,	   the	   government	  must	   also	   beware	   of	   the	   ‘resource	   curse’	   and	   in	   particular,	   Dutch	   disease,	  
which	  can	  afflict	  oil-­‐dependent	  economies,	  if	  revenues	  are	  poorly	  managed	  (ISSER,	  2015).	  
Although	  Ghana’s	  oil	  production	  is	  still	  in	  its	  early	  stages,	  some	  authors	  have	  already	  begun	  to	  assess	  
whether	   the	   economy	   is	   showing	   signs	   of	   the	   ‘Dutch	   disease’.	   	   Ayelazuno	   (2014a),	   for	   example,	  
argues	   that	   oil	   wealth	   has	   crowded	   out	   other	   export	   activities,	   causing	   stagnation	   in	   the	  
manufacturing	  sector	  and	  a	  decrease	   in	  diversification,	  whilst	   the	  Centre	   for	  Policy	  Analysis	   (2012)	  
points	  to	  the	  growing	  current	  account	  deficit	  tied	  to	  rapid	  increases	  in	  imports	  as	  another	  indicator	  
of	  the	  Dutch	  disease.	  	  Furthermore,	  sudden	  discoveries	  of	  natural	  resources	  can	  lead	  to	  government	  
consumption	   booms	   (Ndikumana	   &	   Abderrahim,	   2010),	   as	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   data	   on	   Ghana’s	  
government	   expenditure	   in	   Figure	   6.6.	   	   These	   largely	   economic	   effects	  will	   no	  doubt	   have	   further	  
implications	  for	  society,	  particularly	   for	  employment,	  as	   jobs	   in	  the	  oil	  sector	  are	  scarce	  and	  highly	  
skilled	  (Annan	  &	  Edu-­‐Afful,	  2015)	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  due	  to	  
a	  rise	  in	  the	  real	  exchange	  rate	  (Sachs	  &	  Warner,	  2001).	  	  Therefore,	  the	  key	  challenge	  for	  resource-­‐
rich	  countries	  is	  to	  safeguard	  the	  economy	  from	  volatile	  commodity	  prices	  and	  put	  in	  place	  effective	  
strategies	   to	  maintain	   a	   careful	   balance	   between	   government	   expenditure	   and	   resource	   revenues	  






















Figure	  6.17	  Real	  GDP	  and	  Non-­‐Oil	  GDP	  Growth	  Rates	  (%),	  2008-­‐2014	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  ISSER	  (2014a;	  2015)	  
Counter-­‐Claims:	  Ghana’s	  natural	  resources	  are	  “rapidly	  degrading”	  (Severino	  and	  Ray,	  2011:	  164);	  
Climate	  change	  poses	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  national	  economy	  and	  livelihoods	  (Van	  Dijk	  et	  al,	  2014).	  
Adjusted	  Net	  Savings	  
Adjusted	   net	   savings,	   or	   genuine	   savings,	   was	   first	   proposed	   by	   the	   World	   Bank	   in	   1999	   as	   an	  
alternative	   measurement	   to	   GDP,	   one	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   natural	   capital	   as	   well	   as	   financial	  
capital,	   thereby	   giving	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   sustainability	   of	   a	   country’s	   economic	   growth	   path	  
(Taylor,	   2016).	   	   Ghana’s	   adjusted	   savings	   for	   natural	   resources	   depletion	   (including	   forest,	   energy	  
and	   mineral	   depletion)	   account	   for	   a	   relatively	   large	   proportion	   of	   Gross	   National	   Income	   (GNI),	  
totalling	  a	  high	  of	  15.5%	  in	  2012	  (see	  Figure	  6.18).	  	  Forest	  depletion	  historically	  made	  up	  the	  largest	  
share	  of	  natural	  resource	  depletion,	  until	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  when	  mineral	  depletion	  began	  to	  increase,	  
and	  2011	  when	  energy	  depletion	  began	  to	  increase.	  	  The	  overall	  level	  of	  natural	  resources	  depletion	  
in	  GNI	   has	   not	   shown	   great	   changes,	   however,	  with	   the	   last	   decade	  mainly	   fluctuating	   around	   an	  
average	  of	  11.5%.	  	  	  
2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	  
Real	  GDP	  Growth	   8,4	   4	   8	   15	   7,9	   5,4	   4,2	  






















Figure	  6.18	  Adjusted	  Savings:	  Natural	  Resources	  Depletion	  (%	  GNI)	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  
*Latest	  available	  data	  
Ghana’s	  Ecological	  Footprint	  
The	  Ecological	  Footprint	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  area	  of	  land	  (in	  global	  hectares)	  needed	  for	  a	  population	  
to	   generate	   all	   the	   resources	   it	   consumes	   and	   absorb	   the	   waste	   generated	   (Global	   Footprint	  
Network,	  2016).	   	  Biocapacity,	  or	  biological	  capacity,	   is	   the	  capacity	  of	  ecosystems	  to	  regenerate	  or	  
renew	  these	  resources	  (also	  in	  global	  hectares)	  (Global	  Footprint	  Network,	  2016).	  	  Figure	  6.19	  shows	  
that	   since	   1961,	   Ghana’s	   biocapacity	   has	   decreased	   by	   almost	   two	   thirds,	   whilst	   the	   Ecological	  
Footprint	   has	   almost	   doubled	   (Global	   Footprint	   Network,	   2016).	   	   Thus,	   since	   1996,	   Ghana’s	  
Ecological	   Footprint	  has	  outstripped	  biocapacity,	  meaning	   that	   the	   country’s	  natural	   resources	  are	  
being	  consumed	  faster	  than	  they	  can	  regenerate.	  	  	  
In	   comparison	  with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	  Ghana’s	   ecological	   footprint,	   2.0	   ha	  per	   capita,	   is	   lower	  
than	   the	  global	  average	  of	  2.84	  ha	  but	  higher	   than	   the	  average	   for	  Africa	   (1.4	  ha)	  and	   low-­‐middle	  
income	  countries	  (1.3	  ha)	  (Global	  Footprint	  Network,	  2016).	  	  Ghana’s	  biocapacity,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
at	  1.4	  ha	  per	  capita,	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  African	  average	  of	  1.3	  ha	  and	  the	  low-­‐middle	  income	  average	  
of	  0.9	  ha,	  but	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  global	  average	  of	  1.73	  ha	  (Global	  Footprint	  Network,	  2016).	  Whilst	  a	  
higher	  biocapacity	  is	  advantageous	  for	  the	  country,	  the	  high	  ecological	  footprint	  could	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  
concern,	   particularly	   considering	   that	   the	   economy	   is	   becoming	   increasingly	   reliant	   on	   natural	  


































Figure	  6.19	  Ghana’s	  Ecological	  Footprint	  and	  Biocapacity
Source:	  Global	  Footprint	  Network	  (2016)	  
Climate	  Change	  Impacts	  in	  Ghana	  
Ghana	  has	  already	  been	  experiencing	  changes	  in	  climate;	  over	  the	  last	  30	  years,	  the	  average	  annual	  
temperature	   has	   risen	   by	   1oC	   and	   sea	   levels	   have	   risen	   by	   2.1mm	   a	   year	   (UNEP	   &	   UNDP,	   2012).	  	  
Other	   impacts	   include	  a	  decrease	   in	  mean	  annual	  rainfall,	  an	   increase	   in	  the	  frequency	  of	  extreme	  
weather	   events,	   and	   coastal	   erosion	   and	   salt	   water	   intrusion	   (UNEP	  &	  UNDP,	   2012).	   	   Figure	   6.20	  
gives	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   climate	   hazards	   Ghana	   is	   likely	   to	   experience	   in	   the	   future	   under	   a	  
‘business	  as	  usual’	  high	  emissions	  scenario	  (orange)	  and	  a	  2oC	  low	  emissions	  scenario	  (green)	  (WHO	  
&	  UNFCCC,	   2015).	   	   The	   diagrams	   show	   that	   the	   greatest	   changes	   are	   predicted	   to	   occur	   in	  mean	  
annual	   temperature	   and	   frequency	   of	   heat	   waves,	   which	   will	   in	   turn	   increase	   heat	   stress,	   heat-­‐
related	  mortality	  and	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  among	  humans,	  crops	  and	   livestock	   (WHO	  &	  UNFCCC,	  
2015).	  	  	  
This	  will	   no	  doubt	  affect	  Ghana’s	  economy,	  particularly	   the	  agricultural	   sector,	  which	   is	   the	   sector	  
most	  vulnerable	  to	  climate	  change	  impacts.	  Rainfall	  variability	  and	  declining	  rainfall	  totals	  present	  a	  
huge	  challenge	  to	  crop	  production	  and	  livelihoods	   in	  rural	  areas	  (UNEP	  &	  UNDP,	  2012).	   	  This	  has	  a	  
wider	   impact	   on	   food	   security	   and	   the	   economy	   at	   a	   national	   level,	   as	   well	   as	   health	   and	   social	  
consequences,	   such	   as	   an	   increase	   in	   rural	   to	   urban	  migration,	   which	  may	   lead	   to	   greater	   urban	  
vulnerability	   and	   increased	   pressure	   on	   the	   informal	   economy	   (UNEP	   &	   UNDP,	   2012).	   	   Ghana’s	  
hydropower	   sector,	   the	   country’s	   main	   source	   of	   electricity,	   is	   also	   susceptible	   to	   future	   climate	  




Figure	  6.20	  Projected	  Climate	  Impacts	  for	  Ghana,	  up	  to	  2100	  
	  
Mean	  Annual	  Temperature	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	  Days	  of	  Warm	  Spells	  (Heat	  Waves)	  
	   	  
Days	  with	  Extreme	  Rainfall	  (Flood	  Risk)	  	   	   	   Consecutive	  Dry	  Days	  (Drought)	  
	  
Source:	  WHO	  and	  UNFCCC	  (2015:	  2)	  
6.7	  Conclusions	  on	  Economic	  Growth	  
The	  evidence	   collected	   shows	   that	  Ghana’s	  GDP	   growth	  was	  high	  during	   the	  decade	  of	   the	   2000s	  
compared	  with	  previous	  years	  and	  the	  average	  for	  SSA,	  but	  slowed	  considerably	  from	  2014	  onwards,	  
to	  a	  level	  not	  seen	  since	  the	  early	  2000s	  (World	  Bank,	  2016b).	  	  	  Growth	  in	  GDP	  per	  capita	  has	  tracked	  
GDP	  closely,	  and	  is	  also	  currently	  at	  its	  lowest	  rate	  since	  2001,	  however	  absolute	  GDP	  per	  capita	  has	  
increased	  greatly	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  recording	  a	  71%	  rise	  since	  2000	  (World	  Bank,	  2016b).	  
Ghana’s	  macroeconomic	  environment	  has	  presented	  some	  improvements	  since	  the	  year	  2000	  but	  in	  
the	   last	  couple	  of	  years	   it	  has	  deteriorated	  at	  an	  alarming	  rate.	   	  Despite	  an	   increase	   in	  FDI	   inflows	  
and	  private	   sector	   investment	  over	   the	  decade	  of	   the	  2000s,	  and	  a	  narrowing	  of	   the	   trade	  deficit,	  
vast	  increases	  in	  government	  expenditure,	  especially	  in	  public	  sector	  wages,	  has	  contributed	  towards	  
a	  growing	  budget	  deficit,	  rising	  public	  debt,	  escalating	   inflation	  and	  a	  depreciation	  of	  the	  currency.	  	  
The	  early	  warning	  signs	  were	  apparent	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis,	  however	  
these	   factors	   went	   largely	   unheeded	   by	   the	   government	   until	   late	   2014,	   when	   a	   stabilisation	  




Ghana’s	  economy	  has	  shown	  signs	  of	  structural	  change,	  with	  the	  majority	  share	  of	  total	  GDP	  shifting	  
from	  agriculture	   to	   services	   in	   the	  mid-­‐2000s.	   	  The	  share	  of	   industry	  has	  also	   increased,	  especially	  
since	   2011	   with	   the	   commencement	   of	   crude	   oil	   production	   (GSS,	   2014b).	   	   The	   share	   of	  
manufacturing,	  however,	  has	  decreased	  over	   the	  decade,	  but	   in	   absolute	   terms	   (value	  added)	   the	  
sector	   has	   seen	   a	   steady	   increase	   since	   2006	   (World	   Bank,	   2016b).	   	   In	   fact,	   the	   share	   of	  
manufacturing	   in	   exports	   and	   new	   investments	  was	   relatively	   high	   over	   the	   period	   2000-­‐2013/15	  
(with	  an	  average	  of	  19%	  and	  25%	  respectively),	  although	  these	  figures	  dropped	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  decade	  (GIPC,	  2016;	  World	  Bank,	  2016b).	  
Thus	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  exports,	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  
time	   the	   export	   base	   is	   narrowing	   –	   in	   2014,	   for	   example,	   gold	   and	   cocoa	  made	   up	   30%	   of	   total	  
exports	   each,	   whilst	   crude	   petroleum	   made	   up	   nearly	   20%,	   leaving	   only	   20%	   for	   other	   products	  
(Observatory	   of	   Economic	   Complexity,	   2016).	   	   This	   could	   present	   a	   risk	   to	   the	   country’s	   future	  
growth,	  should	  commodity	  prices	  continue	  to	  fall,	  as	  many	  are	  predicting	  (Taylor,	  2016).	  	  Since	  2011,	  
oil	   production	   has	   been	   a	   key	   driver	   of	   economic	   growth	   (ISSER,	   2015),	   and	   oil	   rents	   –	   which	  
currently	  make	  up	  6%	  of	  GDP	  –	  have	   the	  potential	   to	   increase	  significantly	   in	   the	   future,	  although	  
management	  of	   these	   revenues	  so	   far	  has	  been	  questionable	   (Annan	  &	  Edu-­‐Afful,	  2015).	   	  There	   is	  
evidence	  of	  the	  ‘Dutch	  disease’	  on	  Ghana’s	  economy,	  as	  well	  as	  increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  country’s	  
natural	   resources	   (Global	   Footprint	   Network,	   2015;	  World	   Bank,	   2016b)	   and	   significant	   predicted	  
climate	   change	   impacts,	   which	   will	   in	   turn	   have	   adverse	   consequences	   for	   the	   agricultural	   and	  
energy	  sectors	  in	  the	  near	  term	  and	  food	  security,	  livelihoods	  and	  health	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  (WHO	  &	  
UNFCCC,	  2015;	  UNEP	  &	  UNDP,	  2012).	  




Chapter	  7:	  Data	  Analysis	  –	  	  
Employment	  and	  Equality	  
7.1	  Introduction	  
	  
The	  table	  below	  describes	  the	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  under	  the	  headings	  
of	   employment	   and	   equality,	   and	   the	   data	   sources	   that	  will	   be	   used	   to	   analyse	   these	   claims	   (see	  
Table	  7.1).	  
Table	  7.1	  Employment	  Claims	  and	  Counter-­‐Claims,	  and	  Sources	  used	  for	  Analysis	  
	   Claims	   Counter-­‐claims	   Source	  Data	  
Employment	   Between	  2001-­‐2012,	  
Ghana	  more	  than	  halved	  
its	  unemployment	  rate,	  
from	  10.4%	  in	  2000	  to	  
4.2%	  in	  2010	  (ILO,	  2014)	  
Youth	  unemployment	  topped	  
25%	  in	  2010,	  double	  that	  of	  the	  
25-­‐44	  age	  category	  and	  triple	  
that	  of	  the	  45-­‐64	  age	  category	  
(Ewusi,	  2013)	  
Ghana	  Living	  
Standards	  Surveys	  	  
80%	  of	  Ghana’s	  working	  
population	  remains	  in	  the	  
informal	  sector,	  with	  less	  than	  
20%	  earning	  from	  a	  permanent	  





The	  poor	  have	  benefitted	  
from	  Ghana’s	  economic	  
growth	  to	  a	  “considerable	  
extent”	  (Ackah	  &	  
Aryeetey,	  2012:	  47)	  
The	  last	  decade	  saw	  income	  
inequality	  widen,	  reflected	  by	  a	  










Claim:	  Between	  2001-­‐2012,	  Ghana	  more	  than	  halved	  its	  unemployment	  rate,	  from	  10.4%	  in	  2000	  
to	  4.2%	  in	  2010	  (ILO,	  2014)	  
Unemployment	  Rates	  
The	   Ghana	   Living	   Standards	   Survey	   Reports	   provide	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	   country’s	   unemployment	  
rates	   according	   to	   age,	   gender	   and	   locality.	   	   Given	   the	   difficulties	   of	   measuring	   the	   country’s	  
extensive	   informal	   economy,	   these	   estimates	   may	   not	   always	   be	   reliable	   and	   therefore	   their	  
usefulness	   in	   the	  overall	  analysis	   is	   limited.	   	  According	  to	  the	  GSS,	  between	  1998/99	  and	  2005/06,	  
the	   overall	   unemployment	   rate	   decreased	   from	   8.2%	   to	   3.6%,	   however	   since	   then	   this	   rate	   has	  
increased	  to	  5.2%	  in	  2012/13,	  with	  both	  the	  urban	  and	  rural	  unemployment	  rates	  following	  the	  same	  
trend	   (see	   Table	   7.2).	   	  Overall,	   urban	   areas	   still	   experience	  higher	   unemployment	   rates	   than	   rural	  
areas	   -­‐	  6.5%	  compared	  with	  3.9%	  -­‐	  with	  Accra	  recording	  higher	  rates	  than	  other	  urban	  areas.	   	  The	  
data	  also	  shows	  that	  women	  experience	  higher	  rates	  of	  unemployment	  than	  men	  –	  5.5%	  compared	  




Table	  7.2	  Unemployment	  Rates,	  1998/99,	  2005/06	  and	  2012/13	  
Urban	   Rural	   Ghana	  
Year	   Gender	   Age	   Accra	   Other	   All	  
1998/99	   Male	   15-­‐24	   29.4	   23.6	   25.3	   8.1	   12.7	  
25-­‐44	   16.5	   13.3	   14.4	   3.2	   7.3	  
45-­‐64	   8.9	   6.3	   7.0	   3.8	   4.8	  
All	   16.4	   12.7	   25.3	   4.3	   7.5	  
Female	   15-­‐24	   31.7	   23.3	   25.9	   14.8	   18.7	  
25-­‐44	   14.8	   10.4	   11.7	   5.2	   7.5	  
45-­‐64	   8.7	   5.9	   6.6	   3.5	   4.5	  
All	   16.8	   11.5	   13.0	   6.4	   8.7	  
All	   15-­‐24	   30.8	   23.5	   25.6	   11.5	   15.9	  
25-­‐44	   15.7	   11.7	   12.9	   4.3	   7.4	  
45-­‐64	   8.8	   6.1	   6.8	   3.6	   4	  
All	   16.6	   12.0	   13.4	   5.5	   8.2	  
2005/06	   Male	   15-­‐24	   11.8	   5.0	   7.1	   2.0	   4.1	  
25-­‐44	   9.9	   5.6	   7.3	   1.4	   4.0	  
45-­‐64	   6.4	   2.4	   3.8	   0.6	   1.8	  
All	   9.8	   4.7	   6.5	   1.4	   3.5	  
Female	   15-­‐24	   9.1	   4.4	   5.9	   2.5	   4.1	  
25-­‐44	   7.9	   7.0	   7.3	   1.7	   4.0	  
45-­‐64	   6.6	   3.3	   4.3	   0.6	   2.0	  
All	   8.1	   5.3	   6.2	   1.7	   3.6	  
All	   15-­‐24	   10.4	   4.7	   6.5	   2.2	   4.1	  
25-­‐44	   8.9	   6.4	   7.3	   1.6	   4.0	  
45-­‐64	   6.5	   2.9	   4.0	   0.6	   1.9	  
All	   8.9	   5.0	   6.3	   1.6	   3.6	  
2012/13	   Male	   15-­‐24	   18.8	   15.2	   15.8	   6.6	   10.2	  
25-­‐44	   5.1	   3.7	   4.1	   2.3	   3.3	  
45-­‐64	   5.2	   2.6	   3.2	   2.3	   2.8	  
All	   6.8	   5.8	   6.1	   3.6	   4.8	  
Female	   15-­‐24	   25.6	   14.8	   16.7	   7.7	   11.7	  
25-­‐44	   4.5	   5.2	   5.0	   3.1	   4.1	  
45-­‐64	   5.8	   16.1	   21.2	   2.6	   3.2	  
All	   8.1	   6.6	   6.9	   4.1	   5.5	  
All	   15-­‐24	   22.4	   15.0	   16.3	   7.1	   10.9	  
25-­‐44	   4.8	   4.5	   4.6	   2.8	   3.8	  
45-­‐64	   5.5	   3.0	   3.5	   2.5	   3.0	  
All	   7.4	   6.2	   6.5	   3.9	   5.2	  




Employment	  to	  Population	  Ratio	  
The	   employment	   to	   population	   ratio,	   or	   labour	   participation	   rate,	   is	   another	   way	   to	   measure	  
unemployment	  in	  a	  country.	  	  In	  1998/99,	  out	  of	  a	  total	  population	  of	  14.7m	  (aged	  7	  years	  and	  over),	  
11.3m	  were	  economically	  active,	  giving	  an	  employment	  to	  population	  ratio	  of	  77.2%	  (GSS,	  2000).	  	  In	  
2005/06,	   this	   ratio	   decreased	   to	   54.1%,	   with	   an	   estimated	   9.7m	   people	   employed	   out	   of	   a	   total	  
population	  of	  18m	  (GSS,	  2008).	   	  2012/13	  saw	  this	   ratio	   increase	   to	  61.2%,	  with	  an	  estimated	  14m	  
people	  employed	  out	  of	  a	  total	  population	  (aged	  5	  years	  and	  over)	  of	  22.9m	  (GSS,	  2014a).	  	  This	  data	  
is	  strange	  as	  it	  follows	  the	  same	  trend	  as	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  above,	  when	  one	  would	  expect	  it	  
to	  show	  the	  inverse.	  	  
Counter-­‐claims:	  Youth	  unemployment	  topped	  25%	  in	  2010,	  double	  that	  of	  the	  25-­‐44	  age	  category	  
and	   triple	   that	   of	   the	   45-­‐64	   age	   category	   (Ewusi,	   2013);	   80%	   of	   Ghana’s	   working	   population	  
remains	   in	   the	   informal	   sector,	   with	   less	   than	   20%	   earning	   from	   a	   permanent	   job	   (Ackah	   and	  
Aryeetey,	  2012)	  
Youth	  Unemployment	  
By	   the	  Ghana	   Statistical	   Service’s	   estimates,	   youth	   unemployment	   fell	   considerably	   from	  15.9%	   in	  
1998/99	   to	   4.1%	   in	   2005/06	   before	   increasing	   back	   to	   10.9%	   in	   2012/13	   (see	   Table	   7.2).	   	   These	  
figures	  may	  not	  be	  credible,	  and	  may	  stem	  from	  some	  kind	  of	  measurement	  issue,	  nevertheless,	  it	  is	  
still	  possible	  to	  deduce	  from	  the	  data	  that	  the	  youth	  unemployment	  rate	  is	  consistently	  higher	  than	  
the	   unemployment	   rates	   experienced	   by	   the	   other	   age	   categories,	   especially	   the	   25-­‐44	   category,	  
which	   has	   maintained	   a	   steady	   decline	   over	   the	   last	   15	   years,	   from	   7.4%	   in	   1998/99	   to	   4.0%	   in	  
2005/06	  to	  3.8%	  in	  2012/13.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  given	  that	  the	  15-­‐24	  age	  group	  accounts	  
for	  over	  a	  third	  of	  the	  country’s	  working	  population	  (34.5%)	  (GSS,	  2014a).	  	  	  
In	   addition,	   youth	   unemployment	   is	   generally	   understood	   to	   be	   an	   urban	   phenomenon	   (Baffour-­‐
Awuah,	  2013),	  and	  this	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  data	  in	  Table	  7.2,	  which	  reveals	  the	  youth	  unemployment	  
rate	   in	   Accra	   to	   be	   approximately	   triple	   that	   of	   the	   rural	   areas.	   	   Urbanisation	   is	   the	   main	   factor	  
responsible	   for	   this	   trend,	   as	   youth	   from	   rural	   areas	  migrate	   to	   cities,	   dissatisfied	  with	   the	   lower	  
incomes	   of	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   (Baffour-­‐Awuah,	   2013).	   However,	   the	   opportunities	   for	  
employment	   in	   cities	   are	   limited	   and	   becoming	   ever	  more	   scarce	  with	   an	   influx	   of	   young	   people,	  
most	  of	  whom	  lack	  the	  necessary	  skills	  and	  training	  for	  the	  jobs	  available.	  	  As	  a	  result	  many	  enter	  the	  
informal	   sector	   or	   remain	   unemployed	   (Baffour-­‐Awuah,	   2013).	   	  Meanwhile,	   the	   predominance	   of	  
agriculture	   in	   rural	  areas	  means	   that	   the	  youth	  unemployment	   rate	   remains	   low,	  and	  yet	   incomes	  
are	  also	  low	  (Baffour-­‐Awuah,	  2013).	  	  Without	  sufficient	  economic	  opportunities	  available,	  it	  is	  likely	  
that	  urban	  youth	  unemployment	  will	   escalate,	   thereby	   contributing	   to	  a	   sub-­‐optimal	  demographic	  
dividend	  (Baffour-­‐Awuah,	  2013).	  
Employment	  by	  Sector	  
Whilst	   the	   informal	   sector	   is	   always	  difficult	   to	  measure,	   the	   latest	  Ghana	  Living	  Standards	  Survey	  
estimates	   that	   one	   fifth	   (20.2%)	   of	   Ghana’s	   population	   is	   engaged	   in	  wage	   employment,	   and	   this	  
trend	   is	   highest	   amongst	   males	   in	   urban	   areas	   (see	   Table	   7.3).	   	   Of	   the	   population	   that	   are	   self-­‐




with	  the	  majority	  of	  self-­‐employed	  men	  working	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  (32.8%)	  and	  the	  majority	  
of	  self-­‐employed	  women	  working	  in	  the	  non-­‐agricultural	  sectors	  (35.6%)	  (GSS,	  2014a).	  	  	  
Table	  7.3	  Employment	  Breakdown	  of	  Ghana’s	  Current	  Working	  Population	  (%)	  
	   Urban	   Rural	   Ghana	  
	   Male	   Female	   All	   Male	   Female	   All	   Male	   Female	   All	  
Wage	  Employment	   47.5	   19.1	   32.5	   12.9	   4.5	   8.6	   29.5	   11.7	   20.2	  
Self-­‐employed	  with	  
employees:	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐agricultural	   7.5	   7.3	   7.4	   1.8	   1.5	   1.7	   4.5	   4.4	   4.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Agricultural	   1.9	   1.3	   1.6	   2.7	   1.1	   1.9	   2.3	   1.2	   1.7	  
Self-­‐employed	  without	  
employees:	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐agricultural	   15.8	   44.5	   30.9	   7.2	   18.2	   12.8	   11.3	   31.2	   21.6	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Agricultural	   10.8	   8.3	   9.5	   48.7	   30.1	   39.2	   30.5	   19.3	   24.7	  
Contributing	  family	  
worker:	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐agricultural	   3.2	   6.0	   4.6	   1.4	   3.1	   2.3	   2.2	   4.5	   3.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Agricultural	   6.1	   7.9	   7.1	   21.5	   38.5	   30.2	   14.1	   23.4	   18.9	  
Domestic	  employee	   0.4	   0.3	   0.4	   0.1	   0.2	   0.1	   0.3	   0.2	   0.2	  
Apprentice	   3.1	   1.4	   2.2	   2.5	   1.1	   1.8	   2.8	   1.3	   2.0	  
Casual	  worker	   3.4	   1.0	   3.7	   1.2	   1.7	   1.5	   2.3	   2.8	   2.6	  
Other	   0.3	   0.1	   0.2	   0.0	   0.1	   0.0	   0.1	   0.1	   0.1	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014a)	  
By	  economic	  activity,	   the	   largest	  sector	   is	  agriculture,	   forestry	  and	  fishing	   (employing	  44.7%	  of	   the	  
working	  population),	  followed	  by	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  trade	  (19.5%)	  and	  manufacturing	  (9.1%)	  (see	  
Table	  7.4)	  (GSS,	  2014a).	   	  Compared	  with	  previous	  years,	  the	  share	  of	  people	  working	  in	  agriculture	  
has	  decreased	  (from	  55%	  in	  1998/99	  and	  2005/06)	  whilst	  the	  share	  working	  in	  trade	  has	  increased	  
(from	  15%	  in	  2005/06)	  and	  the	  share	  working	  in	  manufacturing	  has	  declined	  slightly	  (from	  11.7%	  in	  
1998/99	   and	   10.9%	   in	   2005/06)	   (GSS,	   2000;	   2008).	   	   Unsurprisingly,	   the	   agriculture,	   forestry	   and	  
fishing	  sector	  is	  the	  leading	  activity	  in	  rural	  areas,	  engaging	  71.1%	  of	  the	  rural	  population,	  compared	  
with	  16.8%	  of	  the	  urban	  population.	  	  Wholesale	  and	  retail	  trade	  is	  the	  leading	  activity	  in	  urban	  areas,	  




Table	  7.4	  Employment	  Activity	  of	  Ghana’s	  Population	  aged	  15	  and	  older	  (%),	  2012/13	  
Urban	   Rural	   Ghana	  
Activity	   Male	   Female	   All	   Male	   Female	   All	   Male	   Female	   All	  
Agriculture,	  forestry	  
&	  fishing	  
19.7	   14.2	   16.8	   74.5	   67.9	   71.1	   48.2	   41.4	   44.7	  
Mining	  &	  quarrying	   2.5	   0.3	   1.4	   4.5	   8.1	   6.4	   7.7	   10.3	   9.1	  
Manufacturing	   11.2	   12.6	   11.9	   4.5	   8.1	   6.4	   7.7	   10.3	   9.1	  
Electricity,	  gas,	  
steam	  &	  air	  
conditioning	  supply	  




0.5	   0.3	   0.4	   0.1	   0.1	   0.1	   0.3	   0.2	   0.2	  
Construction	   10.0	   0.2	   4.8	   3.6	   0.2	   1.8	   6.7	   0.2	   3.3	  
Wholesale	  &	  retail	  
trade	  
17.2	   43.1	   30.9	   4.0	   13.3	   8.8	   10.3	   28.0	   19.5	  
Transportation	  &	  
storage	  




1.4	   9.6	   5.7	   0.4	   3.8	   2.1	   0.9	   6.7	   3.9	  
Information	  &	  
communications	  
1.2	   0.3	   0.7	   0.1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.6	   0.2	   0.4	  
Finance	  &	  insurance	   1.7	   1.0	   1.4	   0.2	   0.1	   0.1	   0.9	   0.5	   0.7	  




2.4	   1.2	   1.8	   0.2	   0.3	   0.3	   1.3	   0.7	   1.0	  
Administration	  &	  
support	  services	  




2.0	   0.8	   1.4	   0.3	   0.0	   0.2	   1.2	   0.4	   0.8	  
Education	   6.4	   4.6	   5.5	   2.6	   1.2	   1.9	   4.4	   2.9	   3.6	  
Human	  health	  &	  
social	  work	  
1.5	   1.8	   1.7	   0.4	   0.5	   0.4	   0.9	   1.1	   1.0	  
Arts,	  entertainment	  
&	  recreation	  
1.4	   0.1	   0.7	   0.3	   0.0	   0.2	   0.8	   0.1	   0.4	  




0.6	   1.1	   0.9	   0.7	   1.1	   0.9	   0.6	   1.1	   0.9	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014a)	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7.3	  Income	  Inequality	  
Claim:	  The	  poor	  have	  benefitted	  from	  Ghana’s	  economic	  growth	  to	  a	  “considerable	  extent”	  (Ackah	  
&	  Aryeetey,	  2012:	  47)	  
Income	  Distribution	  
The	  Ghana	  Living	  Standards	  Surveys	  provide	  estimates	  for	  the	  income	  distribution	  of	  the	  population,	  
divided	  into	  five	  quintiles,	  with	  1	  being	  the	  lowest	  and	  5	  being	  the	  highest	  (see	  Figure	  7.1).	  	  Between	  
2005/06	  and	  2012/13,	   income	   inequality	  has	  widened,	  as	  shown	  by	  an	   increase	   in	  the	  two	  highest	  
quintiles	  (4	  and	  5)	  and	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  two	  lowest	  quintiles	  (1	  and	  2).	  	  Currently,	  the	  poorest	  fifth	  
of	  the	  country’s	  population	  earn	  just	  5.4%	  of	  total	  income,	  whereas	  the	  richest	  fifth	  earn	  almost	  half	  
(45.6%).	  	  According	  to	  Osei-­‐Assibey	  (2014),	  this	  trend	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  unequal	  spending	  by	  the	  state,	  
which	  has	  been	  directed	  towards	  certain	  regions	  and	  groups.	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  rise	  in	  inequality	  has	  
caused	   a	   slowdown	   in	   poverty	   reduction,	   meaning	   that	   the	   poor	   are	   not	   benefitting	   from	   the	  
country’s	  economic	  growth	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  those	  in	  the	  upper	  quintiles	  (Osei-­‐Assibey,	  2014).	  
Figure	  7.1	  Income	  Distribution	  (%),	  2005/06	  –	  2012/13	  
Source:	  Own	  graph	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2008	  and	  2014a)	  
Growth	  Incidence	  Curve	  
By	   using	   a	   growth	   incidence	   curve,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  measure	  whether	   economic	   growth	   has	   been	  
‘pro-­‐poor’	  by	  plotting	  the	  growth	  in	  consumption	  across	  each	  percentile	  of	  the	  distribution,	  and	  then	  
comparing	   the	   growth	   rates	   of	   the	   poorer	   and	   richer	   sections	   of	   the	   population	   (GSS,	   2014b).	  
Ghana’s	  growth	  incidence	  curve	  falls	  within	  a	  fairly	  narrow	  band	  of	  7-­‐9.5%,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
population	  experiencing	  a	  positive	  growth	  in	  consumption	  of	  around	  8.5%	  (see	  Figure	  7.2).	  	  Despite	  
being	   a	   fairly	   ‘flat’	   curve,	   growth	   rates	  were	   highest	   for	   the	   two	   extreme	   ends	   of	   the	   population,	  
below	   the	   10th	   percentile	   and	   between	   the	   80th	   and	   95th	   percentiles.	   	   The	   growth	   in	   the	   lowest	  
percentile,	  coupled	  with	  steady	  growth	  in	  the	  middle	  section	  indicate	  pro-­‐poor	  growth	  and	  a	  rising	  
middle	  class	  in	  Ghana	  (GSS,	  2014b),	  yet	  the	  high	  growth	  among	  the	  richest	  percentile	  is	  a	  concern,	  as	  
it	   points	   to	   a	   retrogressive	   situation	   where	   the	   country’s	   elites	   benefit	   the	   most	   from	   economic	  
growth.	  









Figure	  7.2	  Growth	  Incidence	  Curve	  for	  Ghana,	  2005-­‐2013	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014b:	  24)	  
The	  growth	  incidence	  curves	  for	  Ghana’s	  urban	  and	  rural	  populations	  show	  similar	  trends,	  with	  the	  
population	  over	  the	  60th	  percentile	  experiencing	  higher	  growth	  rates	  compared	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	   population,	   especially	   in	   the	   rural	   areas	   (see	   Figures	   7.3	   and	   7.4)	   (GSS,	   2014b).	   Despite	   the	  
poorest	   10%	  of	   the	   population	   experiencing	   high	   growth	   rates	   in	   both	   rural	   and	   urban	   areas,	   the	  
majority	   of	   the	   population	   (20th-­‐60th	   percentiles),	   most	   likely	   the	   ‘floating’	   middle	   class,	   has	  
experienced	  a	  much	  lower	  income	  growth	  than	  the	  70th-­‐95th	  percentiles.	  	  Over	  time,	  this	  income	  gap	  
could	  cause	  a	  widening	  in	  inequality	  across	  the	  country.	  
Figure	  7.3	  Growth	  Incidence	  Curve	  for	  Ghana’s	  Urban	  Population,	  2005-­‐2013	  




































Figure	  7.4	  Growth	  Incidence	  Curve	  for	  Ghana’s	  Rural	  Population,	  2005-­‐2013	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014b:	  25)	  
Counter-­‐Claim:	  The	  last	  decade	  saw	  income	  inequality	  widen,	  reflected	  by	  a	  rising	  Gini	  coefficient	  
(AfDB	  et	  al,	  2015b)	  
Gini	  Coefficient	  
The	  Gini	  coefficient	  is	  the	  most	  common	  measure	  of	  inequality,	  measuring	  “the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
distribution	   of	   income	   or	   consumption	   expenditure	   among	   individuals	   or	   households	   within	   an	  
economy	   deviates	   from	   a	   perfectly	   equal	   distribution”	   (GSS,	   2014b:	   20).	   	   A	   Gini	   coefficient	   of	   0	  
represents	   absolute	   equality	   and	   a	   coefficient	   of	   1	   or	   100%	   represents	   absolute	   inequality.	   	   From	  
2005/06	  to	  2012/13,	  Ghana’s	  Gini	  coefficient	  widened	  slightly,	  from	  41.9%	  to	  42.3%	  (see	  Figure	  7.5).	  
Despite	   being	   only	   a	   small	   increase,	   it	   is	   nevertheless	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	  widening	   trend	   since	  
previous	  years	  –	  in	  1998/99	  the	  coefficient	  was	  39%,	  for	  example	  (Osei-­‐Assibey,	  2014).	  	  This	  was	  the	  
case	   for	   both	   urban	   and	   rural	   areas,	   however	   the	   rural	   areas	   experienced	   the	   highest	   increase,	  
especially	   the	   rural	   coastal	   locality,	   where	   the	   Gini	   coefficient	   widened	   by	   8.8	   percentage	   points.	  
The	   Greater	   Accra	   locality	   experienced	   the	   largest	   decrease,	   from	   41.5%	   in	   2005/06	   to	   36%	   in	  
2012/13.	  	  Overall,	  Ghana’s	  Gini	  coefficient	  is	  still	  lower	  than	  the	  average	  for	  SSA,	  which	  was	  close	  to	  



















Figure	  7.5	  Gini	  Coefficient	  by	  Locality,	  2005/06	  –	  2012/13	  
Source:	  Ghana	  Statistical	  Service	  (2014b:	  22)	  
7.4	  Conclusions	  on	  Employment	  and	  Inequality	  
The	  evidence	  collected	  on	  employment	   trends	   for	  Ghana	  show	  a	  mixed	  picture	  overall,	  with	  many	  
discrepancies	   among	   the	   data.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   employment	   rate	   and	   unemployment	   rate	   both	  
show	  the	  same	  trend,	  of	  a	  decline	  to	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  followed	  by	  an	  increase	  to	  2012/13	  (GSS,	  2000;	  
2008;	  2014a).	  	  This	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  methodological	  change	  in	  data	  collection	  between	  those	  
time	  periods,	  or	  due	  to	  another	  kind	  of	  error,	  however	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  tell	  from	  the	  source	  data.	  
Consequently,	   these	   figures	   cannot	  be	   seriously	   considered	   in	   the	  analysis.	   	   The	   trends	  within	   the	  
unemployment	   data	   are	   important	   to	   consider	   however,	   as	   they	   show	   unemployment	   to	   be	   a	  
growing	  problem	  among	  the	  youth,	  and	  more	  prevalent	  in	  urban	  areas	  (GSS,	  2000;	  2008,	  2014a).	  
Of	  all	  the	  employment	  data	  available	  from	  Ghana,	  the	  most	  useful	  estimates	  are	  probably	  those	  of	  
the	  formal/informal	  sectors,	  although	  the	  reliability	  of	  these	  estimates	  must	  also	  be	  borne	  in	  mind.	  	  
Currently,	  around	  20%	  of	  the	  working	  population	  are	  engaged	  in	  formal	  wage	  employment,	  implying	  
that	   80%	   are	   self-­‐employed	   or	   work	   in	   the	   informal	   sector,	   and	   the	   share	   of	   employment	   by	  
economic	  activity	   is	  also	  slowly	  shifting	  from	  agriculture	  to	  services	  (GSS,	  2014a).	   	  Whilst	  structural	  
change	   is	   generally	   perceived	   to	   be	   an	   important	   driver	   for	   economic	   growth	   and	   development,	  
without	  employment	  creation	   in	   the	  manufacturing	  sector,	   income	  and	  spatial	   inequalities	  start	   to	  
widen,	   as	   is	   happening	   currently	   in	   Ghana	   (see	   Figures	   7.1	   and	   7.5):	   as	   the	   agricultural	   sector	  
contracts	  and	  the	  services	  sector	  expands,	  inequalities	  in	  income	  and	  infrastructure	  widen	  between	  
rural	  and	  urban	  areas	  (Osei-­‐Assibey,	  2014).	  	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  a	  growing	  oil	  industry	  will	  
exacerbate	   this	   inequality,	   as	   there	   are	   limited	   opportunities	   for	   linkages	   with	   other	   economic	  
sectors,	  so	  it	  ends	  up	  producing	  an	  ‘enclave’	  economy	  and	  concentrated	  wealth	  (Osei-­‐Assibey,	  2014).	  
The	  growth	  incidence	  curves	  for	  Ghana	  show	  that	  growth	  has	  not	  been	  evenly	  distributed	  across	  the	  
population,	  with	   the	   two	  extreme	  percentiles	   experiencing	   the	  highest	   growth,	  but	   the	  majority	  –	  
who	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  ‘floating’	  class	  -­‐	  experiencing	  the	  lowest	  growth	  (GSS,	  2014b).	  	  This	  is	  a	  
serious	  concern	  as	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  country’s	  elites	  may	  be	  benefitting	  more	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
population,	  and	  that	  inequality	  could	  rise	  as	  a	  result.	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Chapter	  8:	  Discussion	  and	  Conclusion	  
8.1	  Introduction	  
This	  chapter	  will	  draw	  together	  the	  findings	  of	   the	  research	  and	  discuss	  their	   implications	  for	  both	  
the	  ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  and	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narratives.	   	  The	  discussion	  will	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
available	  evidence	   from	  Ghana	  supports	   the	  claims	  made	   in	   the	   literature	  regarding	  Ghana’s	   ‘rise’,	  
before	  looking	  more	  deeply	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  Ghana’s	  economic	  growth	  and	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  said	  
to	   be	   inclusive,	   equitable	   and	   sustainable	   based	   on	   the	   evidence	   collected	   and	   analysed.	   	   The	  
limitations	  of	   the	   research	  process	  will	  also	  be	   reviewed	  and	  discussed	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  potential	  
impact	  on	  the	  findings	  and	  conclusions	  made,	  and	  recommendations	  for	  further	  research	  presented.	  
8.2	  Ghana	  Rising?	  The	  evidence…	  
The	   key	   question	   that	   this	   dissertation	   aims	   to	   address	   is	   whether	   Ghana	   is	   indeed	   ‘rising’,	   both	  
economically	   and	   socially.	   	   The	   evidence	   collected	   verifies	   that	   considerable	   changes	   have	   taken	  
place	   over	   the	   last	   10-­‐15	   years,	  many	   of	   them	   positive	   but	   also	   some	   negative.	   	   On	   balance,	   the	  
overall	  picture	  of	  Ghana’s	  socioeconomic	  development	  since	  2000	  is	  a	  positive	  one,	  with	  substantial	  
progress	  observed	  in	  poverty	  reduction,	  economic	  growth	  and	  income	  per	  capita.	  	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  
question	  to	  consider	  is	  whether	  this	  growth	  is	  (a)	  sustainable,	  i.e.	  uses	  natural	  resources	  sustainably	  
and	  promotes	   long-­‐term	  development;	   (b)	   inclusive,	   i.e.	   broad-­‐based	  growth	   that	   reduces	  poverty	  
and	   creates	   productive	   employment	   opportunities;	   and	   (c)	   equitable,	   i.e.	   growth	   enables	   all	  
members	  of	  society	  to	  benefit	  from	  and	  contribute	  to	  long-­‐term	  economic	  development?	  
In	  order	   to	  determine	   the	  answer	   to	   this	   question,	   the	  analysis	   focused	  on	   the	  drivers	  of	  Ghana’s	  
recent	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  economy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  corresponding	  effects	  on	  
poverty,	  inequality	  and	  employment.	  	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  distinct	  economic	  shift	  
from	   agriculture	   to	   services,	   which	   has	   also	   been	   mirrored	   in	   employment	   statistics.	   	   Since	   oil	  
revenues	   started	   flowing	   in	   2011,	   the	   share	   of	   industry	   in	   GDP	   has	   increased,	   however	   the	  
manufacturing	  sector	  has	  dwindled	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  This	  could	  present	  a	  risk	  to	  future	  development	  
as	   traditional	   agricultural	   livelihoods	   are	   replaced	   by	   more	   fragile,	   informal	   jobs	   in	   the	   services	  
sector.	   	  So	  far,	  employment	  opportunities	   in	  the	  oil	   industry	  have	  been	  scarce	  and	  mostly	  directed	  
towards	  skilled	  workers,	  whilst	  unskilled/semi-­‐skilled	  manufacturing	  jobs	  are	  on	  the	  decline.	  	  A	  likely	  
consequence	   of	   this	   will	   be	   rising	   inequality	   between	   rich	   and	   poor,	   which	   has	   already	   begun	   to	  
reveal	  itself	  in	  income	  distribution	  data	  from	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  onwards.	  
Furthermore,	  Ghana’s	  recent	  economic	  growth	  has	  been	  driven	  largely	  by	  commodities,	  namely	  gold	  
(30%	  of	  total	  exports),	  cocoa	  (30%)	  and,	  since	  2011,	  crude	  petroleum	  (20%).	  	  When	  global	  prices	  are	  
high,	   as	   they	   were	   during	   the	   early	   2000s,	   commodities	   can	   be	   a	   significant	   contributor	   to	   a	  
country’s	  economic	  growth	  and	  development,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ghana.	  	  However,	  commodity	  prices	  
are	   unpredictable	   and	   prone	   to	   fluctuations,	   and	   the	  most	   recent	   slump	   has	   been	   a	   considerable	  
driver	   in	  Ghana’s	  current	  economic	  slowdown.	   	  Poor	  management	  of	  commodity	  and	  oil	  windfalls,	  
coupled	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  diversification	  of	  exports,	  left	  Ghana’s	  economy	  extremely	  vulnerable	  to	  global	  
shocks,	   including	   China’s	   recent	   slowdown.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   evidence	   that	   Ghana’s	   economy	   has	  
begun	  to	  show	  effects	  of	  the	  ‘Dutch	  disease’	  demonstrates	  that	  without	  careful	  management	  –	  such	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as	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   stabilisation	   fund	   -­‐	   the	   oil	   industry	   too	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   cause	   severe	  
macroeconomic	  problems	  for	  the	  country.	  
Turning	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Ghana’s	   growth	   has	   been	   inclusive	   and	   equitable,	   the	  major	  
challenge	   for	   the	   country	   has	   been	   how	   to	   turn	   economic	   growth	   into	   long-­‐term	   development.	  
Structural	  change	  has	  been	  occurring	  in	  the	  economy,	  but	  from	  agriculture	  to	  services,	  bypassing	  the	  
manufacturing	  sector	  completely.	  	  This	  is	  a	  worrying	  trend	  as	  many	  economists	  agree	  that	  growth	  in	  
services	  alone	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  significantly	  raise	  incomes,	  reduce	  poverty	  and	  raise	  GDP	  to	  a	   level	  
needed	   to	   sustain	   development;	   structural	   change	   in	   the	   form	   of	   industrialisation,	   especially	  
manufacturing,	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  much	  more	  effective	  in	  this	  regard	  (e.g.	  Page,	  2016).	  	  Leapfrogging	  
to	  the	  services	  sector	  is	  also	  not	  likely	  to	  produce	  growth	  that	  is	  inclusive	  or	  equitable;	  in	  Ghana	  the	  
majority	  of	  the	  population	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  informal	  sector,	  which,	  despite	  aiding	  people	  to	  break	  
out	   of	   poverty	   and	   unemployment,	   seriously	   increases	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   the	  
workforce.	   	  Youth	  unemployment	   is	  also	  high	  and	  has	  been	  growing	   in	  recent	  years,	  which	   is	  most	  
likely	   driven	   by	   urbanisation.	   	   This	   also	   presents	   a	   key	   risk	   to	  Ghana’s	   future,	   unless	   the	   youthful	  
population	   can	   be	   harnessed	   effectively	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   productive	   employment	  
opportunities.	  
Therefore,	   the	   data	   assessed	   can	   be	   used	   to	   conclude	   that	   Ghana’s	   recent	   economic	   growth	   has	  
been	   driven	   primarily	   by	   commodity	   exports	   and	   oil	   revenues,	   so	   is	   neither	   broad-­‐based	   nor	  
sustainable	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  country’s	  growth	  has	  not	  been	  sufficiently	  inclusive	  or	  
equitable;	   despite	   halving	   poverty	   since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   inequality	   has	   risen	   both	   spatially	  
(increasing	   the	   rural/urban	  divide)	   and	  by	   income	   (widening	   the	   gap	  between	   rich	   and	  poor),	   and	  
widespread	  employment	  opportunities	  are	  yet	  to	  materialise.	  
8.3	  Africa	  Rising?	  The	  evidence…	  
Reflecting	  on	  the	  broader	   ‘Africa	  Rising’	  narrative,	   the	  evidence	  collected	   from	  this	  dissertation	  on	  
Ghana’s	  socioeconomic	  development	  does	  provide	  some	  useful	  analysis	  for	  the	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐
claims	  made	  regarding	  Africa’s	   ‘rise’	  over	  the	   last	  10-­‐15	  years.	   	  For	   instance,	   the	  broad	  claims	  that	  
great	  strides	  have	  been	  made	  in	  both	  economic	  growth	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  across	  the	  continent	  
are	  certainly	  true	  for	  Ghana	  during	  the	  decade	  of	  the	  2000s,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  data	  shows.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  
SSA	  has	  undergone	   considerable	   structural	   transformation	   into	  more	  productive	   economic	   sectors	  
(McMillan	  and	  Harttgen,	  2014)	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  Ghana	  to	  an	  extent,	  however	  Ghana’s	  industrial	  
and	  manufacturing	   sectors	   still	   trail	   behind	   the	   services	   sector	   in	   both	   value	   added	   and	   share	   of	  
employment.	  	  Another	  claim	  that	  has	  not	  been	  fully	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence	  collected	  during	  this	  
research	   is	   the	  argument	   that	  progress	   in	   governance	  and	  macroeconomic	  management	  has	  been	  
one	  of	  the	  key	  drivers	  of	  the	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  story	  (MGI,	  2010).	  	  In	  Ghana’s	  case,	  the	  macroeconomic	  
environment	   has	   seen	  more	   negative	   change	   than	   positive,	   thereby	   acting	   as	   a	   hindrance	   to	   the	  
sustainability	  of	  the	  country’s	  growth,	  rather	  than	  an	  enhancement.	  
The	  evidence	  from	  Ghana	  also	  lends	  support	  to	  some	  of	  the	  counter-­‐claims	  surrounding	  the	  ‘Africa	  
Rising’	  narrative.	  	  Firstly,	  Moghalu	  (2014)	  noted	  that	  many	  of	  the	  claims	  heralding	  Africa’s	  ‘rise’	  have	  
come	  from	  external	  parties	  and	  not	  African	  authors	  themselves.	  	  This	  has	  certainly	  been	  observed	  for	  
the	  ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  claims,	  which	  mostly	  come	  from	  multilateral	  institutions	  and	  development	  banks,	  
and	   it	   is	   the	  Ghanaian	  authors	  who	  are	  mostly	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  counter-­‐claims.	   	  Secondly,	  
the	  quality	  of	  the	  data	  cited	  by	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  claims	  has	  been	  called	  into	  question	  by	  various	  authors	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(e.g.	  Devarajan,	  2011;	  Clarke,	  2012;	  Chitonge,	  2015),	  which	  echoes	  the	  data	  limitations	  experienced	  
during	  the	  research	  for	  this	  dissertation	  (although	  there	  are	  some	  reliable	  data	  to	  strongly	  support	  
some	  claims).	   	  Finally,	  several	  specific	  challenges	  or	  risks	   identified	   in	  the	   ‘Africa	  Rising’	  story	  were	  
apparent	   in	   the	  evidence	   for	  Ghana,	  most	  notably	   the	  problems	  of	  high	  youth	  unemployment	  and	  
the	  low	  share	  of	  manufacturing	  in	  total	  employment.	  
Returning	   to	   the	  Research	  Questions	  presented	   in	  Chapter	  1,	   this	  dissertation	  aimed	   to	  determine	  
the	  claims	  made	  about	   ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  and	  who	  was	  making	  them;	  assess	   the	  availability,	   reliability	  
and	   accuracy	   of	   the	   evidence	   behind	   these	   claims;	   and	   evaluate	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   data	  
supports	   the	   claims	   that	   Ghana	   is	   ‘rising’	   and	   reflects	   the	   ‘Africa	   Rising’	   narrative	   more	   broadly.	  	  
Chapter	  2	  summarised	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  ‘Ghana	  Rising’	  and	  ‘Africa	  Rising’	  stories,	  drawing	  out	  the	  
claims	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   sources,	   including	   academics,	   journalists,	   economists,	  
multilateral	   institutions	   and	   development	   banks.	   	   The	   need	   to	   research	   the	   evidence	   behind	   the	  
claims	  was	  evident,	  and	  the	  methodology	  was	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  Throughout	  the	  data	  analysis	  
in	  Chapters	  5,	  6	  and	  7,	   it	  became	  apparent	   that	  gaps	  and	  anomalies	  were	   frequently	   found	  within	  
the	  data,	  making	  it	  increasingly	  challenging	  to	  construct	  solid	  arguments	  based	  on	  the	  data	  that	  was	  
available,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  employment	  and	  export	  statistics.	  
However,	  despite	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  data,	  there	  is	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  make	  conclusions	  about	  
the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  made	  regarding	  Ghana’s	  ‘rise’.	  	  The	  claims	  that	  Ghana	  
is	  ‘rising’	  are	  supported	  by	  strong	  evidence	  of	  poverty	  reduction	  (both	  monetary	  and	  non-­‐monetary)	  
and	  economic	  growth,	   including	  some	  structural	  change.	   	  The	  claims	  of	  a	  growing	  middle	  class	  and	  
rising	   per	   capita	   incomes	   have	   weak	   support	   from	   the	   data,	   and	   the	   claims	   that	  macroeconomic	  
management	  has	  improved	  and	  recent	  growth	  has	  been	  ‘pro-­‐poor’	  have	  very	  weak	  or	  no	  support.	  	  In	  
fact,	  closer	  examination	  of	  various	  aspects	  of	  Ghana’s	  socioeconomic	  development	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  
recent	  growth	  has	  been	  based	  on	  a	  fragile	  foundation,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  key	  risks	  such	  as	  government	  
debt,	  management	  of	  oil	  revenues	  and	  rising	  income	  inequality	  must	  be	  addressed	  if	  the	  country	  is	  
to	  continue	  on	  a	  path	  of	  sustainable,	  inclusive,	  equitable	  growth	  into	  the	  future.	  	  	  
In	   terms	   of	   the	   ‘Africa	   Rising’	   narrative,	   evidence	   exists	   to	   support	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   debate.	   	   In	  
Ghana’s	   case,	   the	   ‘Africa	   Rising’	   claims	   may	   have	   been	   a	   bit	   premature	   –	   especially	   given	   the	  
economic	  troubles	  of	  the	   last	  couple	  of	  years	  –	  and	  based	  on	  a	  few	  surface	   level	   indicators,	  rather	  
than	  a	  deeper	  analysis	  of	  a	  range	  of	  indicators	  (e.g.	  structural	  change,	  employment,	  inequality	  etc).	  
However,	   the	   strides	  made	   in	   poverty	   reduction	   and	  economic	   transformation	   cannot	   be	   ignored.	  
Indeed,	   this	   case	   study	   of	   Ghana	   serves	   to	   highlight	   the	   need	   to	   undertake	   deeper	   analyses	   of	  
individual	  countries	  -­‐	  and	  their	  complexities	  and	  nuances	  -­‐	   in	  order	  to	  build	  up	  a	  picture	  of	  what	   is	  
taking	   place	   throughout	   Africa	   as	   a	   whole,	   before	   the	   entire	   continent	   is	   painted	   with	   the	   same	  
brush.	  
8.4	  Research	  Limitations	  and	  Recommendations	  for	  Further	  Research	  
An	   important	   element	   of	   this	   study	  was	   to	   assess	  which	   data	   could	   be	   accessed	   through	   diligent,	  
thorough	  and	  persistent	  desk	   research,	  despite	   the	   limitations	   that	  might	  be	  experienced.	   	   In	   fact,	  
these	   limitations	   became	   part	   of	   the	   research	   inquiry,	   with	   Research	   Question	   2	   exploring	   “how	  
accessible/reliable/accurate/complete	   is	   the	   evidence	   behind	   the	   Ghana	   ‘Rising’	   claims?”	   	   The	  
answers	  that	  emerged	  from	  this	  question	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  points	  below,	  which	  offer	  a	  reflection	  
on	  the	  research	  limitations	  experienced	  and	  recommendations	  for	  further	  research	  in	  this	  area.	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1. The	   purpose	   of	   this	   dissertation	   was	   to	   take	   a	   broad	   approach	   to	   the	   topic,	   rather	   than
deepening	   the	   analysis	   to	   look	   at	   specific	   issues	   in	   more	   depth.	   	   Deepened	   analysis	   of
specific	   issues	  would	   therefore	  be	  a	  natural	   continuation	  of	   this	   research,	  especially	   in	   the
areas	  of	  industrialisation	  and	  structural	  change,	  the	  implications	  of	  oil	  and	  commodity	  prices
on	  macroeconomic	  stability	  and	  economic	  growth,	  and	  the	  trends	  and	  impacts	  of	  increasing
urbanisation	  and	  migration	  on	  economic	  growth	  and	  poverty	  reduction.
2. The	  choice	  to	  undertake	  a	  desk	  study	  was	  another	  reason	  for	  keeping	  the	  dissertation	  broad
in	  scope;	  finding	  data	  on	  specialised	  sectors	  or	  indicators	  proved	  to	  be	  difficult	  from	  behind	  a
computer,	   even	   with	   the	   help	   of	   contacts	   in	   statistical	   agencies	   in	   Ghana.	   	   It	   would	   be
interesting,	   therefore,	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   similar	   study	   in-­‐country,	   to	   see	   whether	   access	   to
government	   ministries	   and	   statistical	   agencies	   with	   available	   datasets	   would	   make	   a
significant	  difference	  to	  the	  overall	  results	  of	  the	  research.
3. During	   the	   research	   process,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	   the	   data	   available	   was	   often
incomplete	   and	   of	   questionable	   accuracy	   and	   rigour,	  which	  made	   the	   analysis	   challenging
and	   somewhat	   frustrating.	   	   Despite	   collecting	   many	   different	   types	   of	   data	   from	   various
sources,	   both	   national	   and	   international,	   few	   proved	   of	   value	   due	   to	   incompleteness	   of
indicators	   or	   years	   under	   examination.	   	   This	  may	  be	  due	   to	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   including
weak	   human	   and	   financial	   capacity	   of	   statistical	   agencies	   (Jerven,	   2013),	   or	   simply	   the
practicalities	   of	   collecting	   data	   in	   countries	   with	   weak	   infrastructure,	   sizeable	   rural
populations	   and	   large	   informal	   economies	   (Devarajan,	   2011;	   Brock,	   2015).	   	   Furthermore,
there	   may	   also	   be	   political	   reasons	   for	   poor	   quality	   or	   inconsistent	   data,	   either	   for	   the
purpose	  of	  meeting	  certain	  targets	  (Sandefur	  &	  Glassman,	  2014)	  or	  to	  reduce	  accountability
(Beegle	   et	   al,	   2016).	   	   Further	   investigative	   research	   in	   this	   area	   would	   be	   extremely
interesting	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ghana	  and	  its	  socioeconomic	  development	  statistics.
4. The	   final	   suggestion	   for	   further	   research	  would	   be	   to	   undertake	   similar	   analyses	   of	   other
African	   countries	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   ‘Africa	   Rising’	   narrative,	   and	   to	   also	   make
comparisons	  with	  developing	  countries	  in	  other	  regions	  such	  as	  South-­‐East	  Asia,	  to	  open	  up
the	  analysis	  to	  broader	  development	  pathways.
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